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ABSTRACT 
A Systemic Meta-Model of Family Development 
as a Framework for Family Therapy 
(February 1986) 
Scott J. Nielsen, M.Ed., University of Massachusetts 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: William J. Matthews 
The family therapy field has chosen the Family Life Cycle (FLC) as 
its developmental framework, but implicit developmental understandings 
of family therapists are far more sophisticated than this model. The 
FLC fails to account for diversity of structure and complexity of pro¬ 
cess of families and is incongruent with systemic theory of family 
therapy. The FLC is based on demographics which portray families as 
isolated from their context and in a static, normative manner. 
This study offers a theoretical meta-model of family development 
that remedies these issues. The meta-model is a generative grammar 
which allows an observer to specify how each family observed embodies a 
unique structure. The study consists of definitions of a series of 
concepts, how they operate and how they are linked. 
Families are self-defining, self-organizing systems consisting of 
sets of meanings unifying members into a primary social group. Develop¬ 
ment is successive, structural transformations of a system over its life 
course. Family development is described using rules, consolidations of 
meaning which emerge out of interaction. Developmental interaction 
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requires novelty and confirmation, and results in a diversity of struc¬ 
tures across a class of systems. The context of family development are 
the Society, Culture, Family, and Individuals through which transforma¬ 
tions occur. The Generations, Life course. Stages and Episodes of 
family interaction are the temporal contexts of development. 
The meta-model, called the Family Rules Model (FRM), has three 
phases--Establishing, Consolidating/Diversifying, and Contracting. Dur¬ 
ing the first phase the basic rules that form the identity of a system 
are established. A search for novelty dominates in the first phase. In 
the second phase, rule-making develops an economy as the rules are con¬ 
solidated into a unified whole. Consolidation demands diversification 
or elaboration as a system focuses now on its relationship with its 
context. In the third phase, some rules outlive their usefulness and so 
they contract or shrink from usage. A contract of meaning about those 
rules continues to guide interaction as a system seeks confirmation in 
this phase. The phases then start again on a new level of meaning. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Explicitly or implicitly, every orientation to therapy exhibits a 
developmental framework through which therapeutic goals or directions 
are formulated. From training, experience and intuition a therapist 
constructs an impression of how a client's understandings, relationships 
and skills might evolve and change to reorganize their life more effec¬ 
tively. To anchor a sense of how human life should develop, the field 
of family therapy has chosen a concept which antedates the field by half 
a century: the family life cycle (FLC), which describes "typical 
stages" of family life. 
Examined initially, the FLC is an exciting concept, providing a 
general sense of how families change over time. As a guide for the 
typical family's future, many family therapists rely on the FLC due to 
its being simply constructed from obvious and time-honored data. 
Some major family therapy theorists support the FLC as a develop¬ 
mental framework that blends individual and family change, but they 
acknowledge that the models of this concept are limited by notions of 
the typical, the obvious, and its simplicity (Bowen, 1980; Haley, 1973; 
McGoldrick, 1983). Other family researchers have criticized FLC models 
(1) for having invariant and hierarchical stages that leave much of fam¬ 
ily life unexplained and (2) for implying that only nuclear families are 
normal and the great majority of family forms are deviant (Clavan, 1969; 
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Seegalen, 1974; Troll, 1973; Trost, 1974). Additionally, an issue for 
family therapists that is not frequently cited in the literature is that 
the FLC was borrowed from a field with important theoretical differences 
from family therapy. The idea of a specific framework to outline the 
life course of families holds appeal, but the FLC exhibits some serious 
1 imitations. 
The problem addressed in this study is that despite demonstrating 
some appealing factors the FLC is inadequate as a developmental frame¬ 
work for family therapy. The FLC fails to adequately describe the com¬ 
plexity of family process and the diversity of family structure of 
families seen in treatment. Further, the theoretical foundations of the 
FLC and the systems-based family therapies are incongruent. 
Purpose of the Study 
In response to these problems, the purpose of this study is to pre¬ 
sent a framework and meta-model of family development that describes the 
change and growth of a family's organization. This study challenges, at 
a fundamental level, the adequacy of the current developmental framework 
of family therapy. The aim of this research is to provide a qualita¬ 
tively different description of the developmental process that families 
experience. In contrast to the current framework, the model presented 
in this study addresses change and evolution in families in a context of 
greater diversity and complexity and in a language more congruent with 
theoretical underpinnings of family therapy. On a larger scale this 
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research is viewed as contributing to the understanding of the psychol¬ 
ogy of families. 
The process of designing the developmental framework and meta-model 
involved: 
(a) identifying how the FLC became an inadequate developmental 
framework for family therapy; 
(b) critiqueing the FLC concepts through a review of representa¬ 
tive literature; 
(c) defining the method and procedures of this theoretical re¬ 
search; 
(d) drawing information on the nature of change from epistemologi¬ 
cal, developmental, family and related literature; 
(e) describing principles and processes of family development 
leading to construction of a family developmental framework; 
(f) elaborating a meta-model of family development based on evolv¬ 
ing rule-structures; and 
(g) suggesting possible applications of the framework and meta¬ 
model to systems-based family therapies. 
Definitional Issues 
Definitions of almost all terms and perspectives are integrated 
into the body of the study. Terms are defined in a manner so as to make 
their use consistent, but non-technical. For example, developmental 
framework is defined in the first paragraph of this study and epistemol¬ 
ogy is defined later as the study of "how we know what we know." Per¬ 
spectives, coherent comprehensive frames of a field, are outlined in the 
section in which they are most relevant. For example, a systemic per¬ 
spective of family therapy is presented in Chapter IV. The broader 
epistemological perspective of this study is addressed in two places: 
basic assumptions in Chapter I, and a fuller discussion of emerging 
epistemological principles from many fields is offered in Chapter IV. 
Rationale of the Study 
A broadly agreed upon goal among family therapists is to facilitate 
a family's development through the life cycle. A study that broadens 
and reorganizes a family developmental framework could have theoretical 
and practical importance for the field of family therapy. A revised 
framework that describes evolution and change of families with greater 
diversity and complexity and with more theoretical congruence with 
family therapy theories could be useful in helping therapists to think 
about families in general and intervene in families in particular. 
The more explicit and comprehensive the developmental framework for 
family therapy is, the easier it is to teach and evaluate family therapy 
methods. A vague, incomplete, and incongruent framework limits the 
effectiveness and consistency of implementation of methods. Using the 
current narrow frame, therapists will either tend to stereotype families 
and fit them to the model or abandon the model and use information that 
the framework cannot provide. If this author's meta-model can describe 
a greater number of families and can identify more relevant organiza¬ 
tional issues with a similar amount of concepts as the current frame¬ 
work, then more families can be treated more flexibly and more uniquely 
in therapy. 
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While no leaders of the family therapy field are explicitly calling 
for a revised developmental framework, as previously noted, major pro¬ 
ponents of the current model have criticized the FLC strongly. Clearly 
many family therapists have their own intuitive developmental principles 
that are more sophisticated than the current framework. McGoldrick 
(1983) in particular recognizes problems of the FLC vis-a-vis the 
sophistication of the family therapy field. Suggesting that this is 
representative of the field invites a suitably revised developmental 
framework. 
Family therapy, as an orientation to human problems, has grown in 
sometimes dramatic and discontinuous leaps. It has been a field that 
has valued innovation even at the expense of long honored ideas and 
practices. There is a continual search for greater effectiveness of 
practice and finer elegance of theory. This study attempts to be a part 
of that tradition of innovation by offering a new and significantly 
different punctuation of family development than the current framework. 
Problem Statement 
The FLC is a concept that has been expressed through scores of 
models over the past eighty years (Nielsen, 1981; Young, 1977). Almost 
every model is based upon the notion that there are succeeding stages 
throughout family life and that these stages are best identified by the 
changing structural configuration of family membership. Drawing on 
demographic data, individual development theories and stereotypes of the 
6 
ideal family these models attempt to combine the life course of indi¬ 
viduals in a sense of how a family changes as a whole. 
As development is the central concept in this study, an examination 
of the FLC as a developmental framework for family therapy suggests a 
developmental perspective of the problems. As broadly defined in this 
study, a developmental view requires the historical examination of how a 
system has evolved through a progression of changing contexts. In this 
case, the FLC is an abstract system, family therapy is a changing but 
enduring context, and the notion of a developmental framework represents 
a function that meaningfully connects system and context. 
More particularly, the most productive critique will derive not 
just from a statement of current problems, but from an understanding of 
(1) how the FLC concept came to be associated with family therapy; (2) 
how they usefully fit together; (3) how, as they evolved, discontin¬ 
uities emerged; and (4) what current problems exist. This type of prob¬ 
lem statement will lead to an examination of what issues must be ad¬ 
dressed to develop an adequate developmental framework for family 
therapy. 
Chapter I assumes the first three points by tracing how family 
therapy began; how it adopted systems theory and the FLC as foundations; 
and how the family therapy field has evolved and outgrown the FLC. In 
Chapter II, as the literature is reviewed and critiqued, current prob¬ 
lems of the FLC as a developmental framework are discussed in depth and 
issues leading to a more adequate framework are identified. 
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Background of Family Therapy Practice and Theory 
Family therapy emerged from traditional psychoanalysis as a more 
practical, action-oriented approach to human problems. Guided by a 
deeply felt desire to help solve therapy-defying dilemmas, like schizo¬ 
phrenia and delinquency (Guerin, 1976; Haley, 1971), early family thera¬ 
pists abandoned what they saw as the overly complicated theory of uncon¬ 
scious pathology of individual psychotherapy. Rather than emphasizing 
the long term process of constructing insights into the unconscious 
motivations of individual behavior, the pioneering family therapists 
suggested that presenting problems in therapy involved the client's 
social context. In consideration of that context they believed that 
those problems should be resolved in a manner which would prevent their 
recurrence or the appearance of another symptom in the client or other 
family member. The originators shared a sense that interactions con¬ 
necting family members were a critical factor in maintaining and re¬ 
solving problems, but they did not have a clear theory to lead their 
ventures. From a wide variety of disciplines they experimented with the 
transactions of families, finding more effective ways to change and 
understand problematic behavior. The family therapy field was, for a 
considerable time, a therapy in search of a theory (Bowen, 1980; Haley, 
1971; Minuchin, 1974). 
From various fields like biology, mathematics and philosophy, 
founding family therapists gathered concepts that fit their experience 
that behavioral problems are interactional^ determined. Eventually, 
leaders in the field discovered that their clinical family therapy 
8 
experience fit with the growing idea of General Systems Theory (GST) 
(Berta!anffy, 1968). GST is a meta-theory of science describing prin¬ 
ciples, qualities, and functions consistently evidenced across levels 
and fields of systems. GST operates as an open ended framework as it 
accommodates not only systems theory, but cybernetics, information 
theory, games theory, and others under its umbrella. Theoretical family 
therapy concepts such as homeostasis (Jackson, 1957), logical types 
(Bateson, 1972), boundaries (Minuchin, 1974), hierarchy (Haley, 1977), 
differentiation (Bowen, 1966) either came from or fit into GST. 
The major value of GST to family therapy lies in its continual re¬ 
organization as it accommodates new ideas emanating from various fields. 
Currently, the framework is undergoing major revision as family therapy 
proclaims its "new epistemology" (Hoffman, 1981) discusses the "second 
cybernetics" (Keeney, 1983) and the "emerging paradigm of evolution" 
(Jantsch, 1980). As GST is an expanding field of ideas, family therapy 
is both a contributor to and a derivative of GST. 
A word should be mentioned here about the special role of Gregory 
Bateson. He is the only person who has contributed fundamental work to 
both the fields of family therapy and systems theory. His epistemologi¬ 
cal reflections (1) have profoundly influenced the systems-based family 
therapies: structural, strategic, and systemic and (2) have given a 
clearer sense of how life operates as a systemic whole in Mind—3nd 
Nature (1979). 
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(Exactly how a systems view and systemic therapy are defined in 
this study is discussed in detail in the body of the study in Chapter 
IV.) 
Systems ideas have been fundamental to the understanding, within 
the family therapy field, of how family systems function and malfunc¬ 
tion. They do not, however, answer the question posed by Haley (1973): 
towards what end is therapy directed? 
The Role of the Family Life Cycle in Family Therapy 
By definition, all living systems necessarily change and evolve 
through time. In a therapeutic context a developmental framework 
acknowledges the inevitable transformation of client systems and hence 
the importance of such a framework in therapy is apparent. Haley's 
question directs attention to the changing organizational patterns of a 
particular type of client system: families. The notion of the FLC was 
adopted by family therapists to describe the change and evolution of 
family systems and thus provides a direction for family therapy. In 
this regard, one of Haley's points about Erickson is applicable to the 
family therapy field. "Therapy is most understandable if one takes into 
account family development processes and the points of crisis that arise 
when people go from stage to stage through the family life cycle" 
(Haley, 1973, p. 40). 
As usually described, the FLC is a concept describing typical 
stages of family life. There are numerous FLC models illustrating the 
concept, each model organizing the stages in a slightly different 
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fashion. Passages between stages "are concerned with the shifting mem¬ 
bership over time, and the changing status of family members in relation 
to one another" (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980, p. 8). Four major FLC 
models are presented in Chapter II. The FLC concept has been in exis¬ 
tence since the turn of the century (Rowntree, 1910), but family thera¬ 
pists borrowed it as articulated in the 1950s by family sociologists 
(Carter and McGoldrick, 1980). 
Although the FLC is perhaps embedded in the multi-generational 
assessment tools of Bowen (1966) and Satir (1964), it was Haley (1973) 
who first explicitly stressed the FLC as a guide to family therapy and 
used the term synonymously with the developmental process that families 
experience. While the field generally embraced this view, the concept 
was not further advanced until Carter's and McGoldrick's book. The 
Family Life Cycle (1980) promoted the concept as "a framework for family 
therapy." Carter and McGoldrick (1980) note that the FLC has "long been 
a basic assumption of most family therapy approaches" (p. 7). And "per¬ 
haps the family life cycle was not particularly focused on earlier 
because it seemed to fall in the area of premises that 'everyone knows'" 
(p. 8). 
In describing the change and evolution of family systems three 
principles derived from the FLC have been particularly useful in family 
therapy. Haley (1973) states that the transitions between stages of the 
life cycle are the periods when symptoms are more likely to occur. This 
principle places dysfunction in a developmental context. The second 
principle, which describes the general developmental process of 
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families, is that every time a member is added to or leaves the family 
the system must reorganize (Haley, 1980). Major changes of status 
likewise occasion a significant restructuring of the family (McGoldrick, 
1983). The third, implicit in the FLC, is the notion of developmental 
momentum. Family therapists have long assumed that if a family can 
successfully experience what was a problematic transition they can then 
manage their future developmental progress on their own. These continue 
to be valuable principles in the assessment and resolution of presenting 
problems. 
There are a number of other factors that initially made the FLC 
congruent with family therapy. Underpinning both the FLC and family 
therapy originally are assumptions that observable actions and simpli¬ 
fied descriptions of behavior are adequate for their purposes. The FLC 
describes the "normal or ordinary processes in the lives of people" 
(Haley, 1973, p. 8); it is simply constructed and based on information 
that has been known for centuries (Bowen, 1980); it is currently founded 
on actual census data (Glick, 1947, 1977); and while it has a basic in¬ 
dividual orientation, it attempts to picture the changing status of 
family members in relation to each other (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980). 
McGoldrick has stated that their work has "oversimplified it (the FLC) 
to think about the type of changes a family is required to make" (1983). 
This simplification is quite appropriate at one level, in that a useful 
sense of development in therapy must be organized by a few guiding prin¬ 
ciples that can be applied to diverse and complex situations. The 
simplicity of a therapeutic approach can be dangerous however, if it is 
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used to stereotype families, as stereotyping reduces therapeutic effec¬ 
tiveness. 
Emerging Discrepancies of the Family 
Life Cycle in Family Therapy 
It is these initially appealing factors that are the source of some 
of the most serious problems with the FLC as a developmental framework 
for family therapy. Over the past thirty years, family therapy theories 
have grown increasingly complex while maintaining their applicability. 
Despite continual supplemental descriptions of life cycle events, the 
FLC has basically remained at the same level of organization, a descrip¬ 
tion of changes of middle-class nuclear families. The FLC models do not 
include the cultural and structural diversity of American families nor 
do they describe the systemic complexity of the developmental process 
that families experience, and as systems-based family therapies have 
grown more sophisticated the theoretical discrepancies of the FLC have 
become more obvious. 
By and large, it has been the endorsement of the FLC idea through 
the writings of Haley (1971, 1973) and Minuchin (1974) and through the 
therapeutic work of Bowen (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980) that have helped 
secure the favorable position in the field that the FLC has today. How¬ 
ever, Haley (1973), Bowen (1980), and McGoldrick (1983) are equivocal in 
their support of the FLC. Haley (1973), though certainly aware of the 
census data base of the FLC models, complains about "how little informa¬ 
tion there is about the life cycle of families" (p. 42). Presumably, he 
means that there is little about the changing interactions of family 
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members--the information that family therapists are interested in. Fur¬ 
ther, he notes "that what understanding we do have about the development 
of a family can be quickly outdated as the culture changes and new forms 
of family life appear" (p. 42). He makes a plea for recognizing the 
diversity of families, for which the FLC cannot account and he acknow¬ 
ledges that the model he presents is a "rudimentary framework" (p. 43). 
Bowen concedes that in constructing a comprehensive approach to the 
family he has "chosen other concepts as more consistent for theory" 
(1980, p. xviii). McGoldrick has stated that thinking about the FLC "is 
hard to do" as it has "a lot of limitations" and "is arbitrary at one 
level" (1983). Carter and McGoldrick (1980), along with Haley, admit 
that the FLC model they present is limited to describing middle-class 
families. Despite their attempt to include some structural and cultural 
variations (divorced families and Mexican-American families) such varia¬ 
tions are still portrayed as deviations from the idealized norm. 
Currently, family therapy theorists are urging that the field con¬ 
sider "new epistemologies" (Allman, 1982; Dell, 1982; Hoffman, 1981; 
Keeney, 1982). There is no consensus on what constitutes a new epis¬ 
temology, as reference to the above citations will confirm, but there 
are some agreed upon targets within the "old" epistemology. Notions of 
power hierarchy, homeostatic stability, and therapist objectivity are 
all viewed as remnants of a linear model of causality that were not 
expurged as the original systemic epistemology was applied through the 
1950s, 60s and 70s. 
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Originally, family therapy pulled itself up from individual ther¬ 
apy, using new systems ideas, but still with aspects of a linear world¬ 
view deeply embedded from cultural conditioning. The FLC concept had 
the individual and linear roots in common with family therapy. Many of 
the original systems concepts of family therapy which were at variance 
with the FLC were not noticed due to the common roots. Now, the new 
epistemology makes these discrepancies all the more glaring. 
Originally, the FLC was assumed from common knowledge and was con¬ 
sidered adequate as a developmental framework for the family therapy 
field. The FLC concept was initially useful as a tool to help form a 
more pragmatically relevant therapy that dramatically differentiated 
itself from traditional psychotherapy. As family therapy originated it 
was an appropriate first step to use the FLC to provide the requisite 
perspective on the evolution and change of families. As family therapy 
has evolved into a more complex field, the shortcomings of the FLC as a 
concept of evolution and change have become increasingly apparent and an 
examination and revision of the developmental framework is due. 
The problem addressed in this study has been outlined through a 
brief exposition of the background of family therapy. The issues of 
complexity and diversity, necessary for effective practice of family 
therapy, have been acknowledged, and the issue of congruence with the 
evolving theoretical foundations of family therapy has been identified. 
A number of issues referred to in the problem statement need to be 
further explicated and are addressed later in the study. A detailed 
analysis of specific problems of the FLC concept and model is presented 
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in Chapter II. An understanding of systems-based family therapies is 
offered in Chapter IV. A sketch of principles representative of the new 
epistemologies from various fields is drawn in Chapter IV. However, 
basic epistemological assumptions of this study are outlined in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Epistemological Assumptions 
Before examining in any more detail the problems of the FLC, it 
will be useful to identify some of the basic assumptions grounding the 
perspective used in this study. Eight assumptions will be offered as an 
adequate but not total explication of that perspective. These interre¬ 
lated assumptions are all concerned with the process of constructing and 
describing knowledge and thus are epistemological. Offering such a per¬ 
spective can be helpful in understanding the limitations and measuring 
the consistency of this research. 
The first and most basic assumption has been most succinctly 
stated by Bateson: "The division of the perceived universe into parts 
and wholes is convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity deter¬ 
mines how it shall be done" (1979, p. 38). This statement infers that 
our perception or division of the universe alters how we experience 
reality as we interact. The unavoidable role of perception in our ex¬ 
perience leads to the other assumptions. The manner in which the per¬ 
ceived universe is divided in this study is by use of a systems perspec¬ 
tive. In general, from a systems perspective, to understand the quali¬ 
ties, function and identity of a system it is more important to examine 
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the relationships connecting elements of that system than to look at all 
the separate elements. The interrelated terminology of this view is 
more fully defined in Chapter IV. 
The second assumption is that more than a scientific undertaking, 
this study is an epistemological enterprise. The word science comes 
from an Old English word meaning "to know." No distinction between 
reality and belief is implied. Science, in general, has come to mean 
the specification of replicable methods used to gain knowledge. Epis¬ 
temology refers to the study of "how we know" and leads to a distinction 
between what is true and what we perceive. Epistemology has come to 
imply that the values, the perception of the observer play a role of 
equal importance to methods in the construction of knowledge. This per¬ 
spective can be characterized by Greenebaum's statement that "reality 
exists, but is only knowable from a point of view" (1981). Throughout 
this study, therefore, I will repeatedly refer to the point of view that 
illuminates the content. 
The third assumption, derived from the second, is that objectivity 
is not possible. An increasing number of thinkers from a diverse group 
of fields are acknowledging this point of view (Bateson, 1979; Jantsch, 
1980; Zukav, 1979). An individual bias is inextricably woven into the 
fabric of "knowledge." In turn, that individual bias is influenced by 
both known and unknown factors from the social whole. Therefore, this 
study is but one of many possible views, all in some way biased, on this 
topic. 
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The fourth assumption, paired with the third, is that identifica¬ 
tion of an observer's frames of reference is preferable to an attempt at 
objectivity. When an observer's frames of reference are included in a 
description of a phenomenon a more thorough determination of its validi¬ 
ty can be made. Discussion between disciplines and even within disci¬ 
plines is often unproductive due to a failure to identify similar and 
different spatial and temporal punctuations. This assumption is charac¬ 
teristic of the "new epistemology" in family therapy and of the "emerg¬ 
ing paradigm of evolution" (Jantsch, 1980). For example, the original 
systems (Bertalanffy, 1968) view considered a system within an unspeci¬ 
fied context. The revised view that is currently being developed in¬ 
sists on viewing a system interacting with other systems, within a 
specified context, all within an unspecified context. Epistemological¬ 
ly, there is always a level of unspecified context that implies that the 
extent of our knowledge is limited. 
The fifth assumption is that human descriptions are incomplete 
translations of reality, our experience of it and our perceptions of it. 
Bateson (1979) notes that stability and change are part of our descrip¬ 
tion (p. 61). Jantsch (1980) made the same claim about structure and 
process. Einstein claimed the same about space and time. One of the 
most famous examples of this assumption is Heisenberg's Uncertainty 
Principle which states that it is impossible to capture precise, simul¬ 
taneous descriptions of space time. The incompleteness of descriptions 
is attributable not just to the limits of perception, but to the further 
limits of language as well. There is no language capable of expressing 
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all of the contingencies of a situation, much less a language capable of 
expressing its own effect on the reality being perceived. This assump¬ 
tion is not an excuse for this study to be any more incomplete than any 
other study. Nonetheless, this research does not aim to provide a total 
picture of its topic, but to offer one punctuation of the issue that 
demonstrates theoretical consistency and practical applicability. 
The sixth assumption is that time is not real, it is a concept de¬ 
scriptive of the reality of change. Time and change have what Korsybski 
(1941) describes as a map-territory relationship. More precisely, time 
is a measure of the irreversibility of change. To the extent that 
change is irreversible, time is a useful concept. Within a context of 
irreversibility time is a necessary concept for adequate description. 
Reference to irreversibility is not a claim that time is linear nor that 
it has a direction. No claim is made that time is circular. All of 
these terms are spatial analogies and thus from a frame of reference 
that cannot offer a valid description of the time aspect of change. The 
claim in this study is that the pace of change varies from context to 
context. As the varying rates of change are contrasted with each other 
different types of time are yielded. So while time within a context 
measures irreversibility, the types of time define each other mutually 
and reflexively. (Irreversibility could be called a form of linearity 
or directionality and the reflexive definition of types of time could be 
called a form of circularity, but these are not only inadequate analo¬ 
gies, they are ultimately misleading epistemologically. 
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The seventh assumption is that meaning is reflexive. Harre and 
Madden (1975) and Maturana (1978) claim that the structure of a system 
determines its behavior. Theorists in family therapy and many other 
fields claim that context determines meaning. These two statements are 
not contradictory, but are complementary. In a situation in which mean¬ 
ing constitutes structure, such as social systems, context is hierarchi¬ 
cal to structure. That is, context determines which contingencies of 
structure are expressible. However, behavior is capable of creating new 
contexts or of evoking different contexts and thus completes a reflexive 
loop of context-meaning-structure-behavior. Meaning is the central con¬ 
cept in this assumption because it is both an independent factor in the 
loop and a determinant of how context and structure are perceived. This 
assumption draws on Cronen's Theory of Reflexivity (1980) as a source 
and companion. 
The eighth and summary assumption is that not only is social sci¬ 
ence not lawlike, but that it should not aim to be primarily lawlike. 
In the physical sciences prediction is the primary aim. In the social 
sciences, prescription is as important as prediction. For example, in 
the People's Republic of China the prediction that if the present birth 
rate structure continues, then the population will double by such and 
such a date is not important primarily for either its predictive or its 
lawlike quality. This prediction is a statement of contingency, not 
necessity. Its importance, therefore, lies in the prescriptions that 
emerge from it. This assumption about social science is based on the 
relationship of the contingencies of context and structure. When 
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perceived structure provides for few behavioral options, laws and caus¬ 
ality appear to be useful organizing concepts. But, when the field or 
context provides for numerous contingencies, then lawlikeness and 
causality are not useful and prescription becomes the predominant part¬ 
ner to prediction. (Causality, as shall be elaborated later, only makes 
sense in a frame of structurally determined necessity.) Some may be 
more comfortable substituting the word heuristic for the word prescrip¬ 
tive but, if the prescriptive value of social science is ignored then 
some accept descriptions as rigid truth and others scoff at the limita¬ 
tions. If the prescriptive value is acknowledged, by specifying frames 
of reference, then a distinction is made between the truth and a point 
of view and one is freer to accept, modify or reject the prescription. 
Prescriptive power, then, is of a lesser magnitude than predictive 
power. 
The preceding assumptions outline how the process of description is 
viewed in this study and thus form the foundation of its perspective. 
Repeated reference will be made to these assumptions throughout the 
research. They inform how the problem is perceived, how the methods are 
designed, and how the results are yielded, as there is, of course, no 
theory-free observations. 
Overview of the Method 
This study is a piece of theoretical research. This is a time- 
honored approach to epistemological and scientific difficulties with 
luminous adherents from Aristotle to Einstein. It should be obvious 
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that this study makes no claim to in any way rival the level of research 
of the above noted immortals. They are cited as a reminder in our 
empirically minded era that there is still an important role for theo¬ 
retical work in the construction of knowledge. Theoretical research 
signifies the opportunity to begin a research program and to generate 
descriptive hypotheses rather than signifying the empirical support of 
research hypotheses. 
Doing theoretical research means that the data needed to design a 
new and hopefully useful punctuation of a dilemma currently exists in 
accumulated human knowledge. Data must be extracted from the library 
rather than from the running or interviewing of subjects. The burden is 
on the researcher to creatively synthesize data for a reorganized view 
of the topic that yields greater flexibility and options for theorists 
and practitioners. In the first step of the methodology, theoretical 
and empirical data were used to design a framework and meta-model as the 
basis of a theory of family development. 
To obtain its final results, the study uses a conversational meth¬ 
od. This term has been adapted from the ideas of Churchman (1982). He 
noted that his design of an ideal life was based on "conversations" with 
historical and current figures that he admired. It is a good name for 
and useful guide for refining the method devised for this study. Since 
the appeal and to some extent the utility of a theory is often initially 
determined by the response of those involved in similar pursuits, writ¬ 
ten and verbal "conversations" with family therapists interested in the 
topic were recognized as a useful method to supplement and revise the 
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theory. After the data were organized into a framework and meta-model, 
the second step of the methodology was an analysis by a number of family 
therapy theorists recognized as contributing to the theoretical develop¬ 
ment of the field. These "conversations" then explicitly influenced the 
final version of the framework and meta-model. The procedures of this 
two step methodology are detailed in Chapter III. 
Limits of the Study 
The major limitation of this study is that it is theoretical re¬ 
search. It does not provide for the support of specific empirical 
hypotheses; it is merely a beginning that will generate possible hypo¬ 
theses. The study's contact with human interaction is limited to 
"conversations" with others engaged in similar pursuits. The danger of 
the conversational method is that its results could be taken for some¬ 
thing more than they are, at best a provisional consensus on the direc¬ 
tion of a developing theory. 
As to the content of the study, its primary purpose is not to have 
a direct clinical impact, but to lay down a theoretical base for the 
design of clinically applicable models. On a practical level, it will 
not be a therapeutic technique, but a guide for the assessment of fami¬ 
lies. While this theory aims at accounting for the diversity of fami¬ 
lies its scope is limited to the families of this country. Even then, 
it does not describe in detail any significant amount of the structural 
and cultural variations of American families. It offers a few examples 
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of diverse structures to demonstrate how varying family structures can 
be assessed in a non-deviant manner. 
This model focuses on the changing relationships between systems. 
In considering changing relationships the theory emphasizes one major 
organizing principle: the evolution of rule-making processes. While 
this focus and principle are viewed as central to the organization and 
development of systems, there are certainly other factors that could be 
used to describe the development of families. 
The theory may well describe the development of systems other than 
families, as it will depict systems interaction from a very general to a 
very specific level. However, no rigorous claim will be made for the 
theory to extend beyond family systems. 
Chapter Topics 
The remaining chapters discuss the following topics. 
Chapter II presents a review and critique of the FLC model most 
influential to the family therapy field. 
Chapter III presents the two step methodology and the procedures of 
this theoretical dissertation. 
Chapter IV presents information on the nature of change from 
epistemological and content literature. 
Chapter V presents a synthesis of the basic information into a 
framework and meta-model of family development. 
Chapter VI presents a discussion of and implications of the pro¬ 
posed theory. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter builds on the general problem statement and epistemo¬ 
logical assumptions presented in the first chapter to offer a thorough 
critique of the FLC concept through discussion of major FLC models. In 
this critique, the following models are cited as representative of the 
FLC concept: Glick (1947), Duvall (1952), Rodgers (1962), Haley (1973), 
Aldous (1978), Carter and McGoldrick (1980). The last four models are 
all primarily derived from Duvall, but Glick was the major influence on 
Duvall and a secondary influence on the others. 
Only Haley and Carter and McGoldrick originally aimed to be rele¬ 
vant to family therapy. However, since these models are based on the 
others, all can be fairly evaluated under criteria for family therapy 
applicability. The issues of complexity, diversity, and theoretical 
congruence shape the questions and sub-questions below that are the lens 
for this critique. 
What is it that FLC models describe and predict? 
To what extent do they explain principles, processes, phases, 
and events of the evolution and change of families? 
To what extent do they discuss family development in dynamic 
time frames? 
Whom do these models include? 
To what extent do they depict the diversity of culture and 
structure of families seen in family therapy? 
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To what extent do they examine relationships between members 
and with other systems? 
How well do they fit the way family therapists conceptualize fami- 
1 ies? 
To what extent do they characterize families as systems of 
interaction? 
To what extent do they portray the expected and unexpected 
transitions that change family systems? 
Both the philosophical view underpinning the FLC concept and the 
methodology used in designing the models reveal significant limitations 
in applicability to family therapy. The problems of the FLC as a thera¬ 
peutic framework are interconnected to such an extent that discussion 
could begin at any number of points. Since the philosophy of a concept 
is frequently only apparent after a model has been constructed, the 
methodological issues are addressed first. There are two sub-groupings 
in both the methodology and philosophy section. In weighing the method¬ 
ological issues, the demographic statistics base and the structural 
method of abstraction are discussed. In considering the philosophical 
difficulties, the normative values and the organizing concepts are 
assessed. 
Methodological Problems 
Statistical Base 
Click's Model. The FLC began to gain popularity as a sociological 
and policy making tool following Paul Glick's massive undertaking at the 
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United States Census Bureau in the 1940s (1942, 1947, 1957, 1965, 1975, 
1977). His demographic analyses of American families continue to dis¬ 
play some utility in a variety of fields with a macroanalytic scope. 
Glick uses census data from 1790 on, to describe a series of changes of 
typical families (1947). His FLC models describe (a) the usual ages of 
the couple at different stages, (b) changes of family composition and 
(c) changes in economic characteristics over the FLC (1947). Glick's 
models vary somewhat from publication to publication, but the basic 
seven stage model is outlined in the table below and contrasts 1890 with 
1940 according to median ages of husbands and wives at different stages 
(1947, p. 165). 
Being rooted in actual data could have appeal for family therapists 
as they emphasize the importance of observed sequences of behavioral 
TABLE 1 
MEDIAN AGE OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AT EACH STAGE OF THE 
FAMILY CYCLE, FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1940 AND 1890 
Median Age of Husband Median Age of Wife 
Stage of the 
Family Cycle 1940 1890 1940 1890 
A. First marriage 
B. Birth of first child 
C. Birth of last child 
D. Marriage of first child 
E. Marriage of last child 
F. Death of husband or wife 
G. Death of husband, if last 
24.3 
25.3 
29.9 
48.3 
52.8 
63.6 
69.7 
26.1 
27.1 
36.0 
51.1 
50.4 
57.4 
66.4 
21.6 
22.6 
27.2 
45.6 
50.1 
60.9 
22.0 
23.0 
31.9 
47.0 
55.3 
53.3 
Death of wife, if last 73.5 67.7 
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interaction as the basis of their work. However, any tool organized 
primarily on a statistical base will evidence deficits of applicability 
in relation to family therapy. As Caplow (1949) states in reference to 
Glick's work, "a coherent formulation of a family life cycle in terms of 
modal values offers many difficulties . . . (one) cannot combine vast 
dispersions of a factor into a single sequence" (p. 152). Along the 
same line, Hareven (1978) points out that Glick's models "measures mean 
patterns of change, but does not examine variance from the norm or 
differentiation by ethnicity or occupation" (p. 3). Despite some 
regional and racial breakdowns, the variations of American family life 
cannot be usefully distinguished from Glick's model. And when the 
statistical data are collapsed into a single FLC model, a strong norma¬ 
tive influence is exerted as only a minority of American families are 
portrayed. 
Some reviewers of FLC research have concluded that the concept is 
not empirically useful in accounting for change within families (Nock, 
1979; Spanier et al., 1975). Trost (1974) notes that these models have 
no way to describe divorce of childless couples. His own research 
claims that after five years only 38 percent of families were following 
the FLC path (cited in Feldman, 1975). One researcher presents data 
from a U.S. Census Statistical Abstract (Sussman, 1978) that clearly 
shows that the nuclear family pictured in the FLC models is a minority 
form (approximately 30 percent). 
Confusion of household and family. Not intending to picture 
interaction in families, the statistical method characterizes the FLC as 
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a group of isolated, demographic events. This type of demographic 
analysis describes families as if they were an additive collection of 
members, a perspective incompatible with the systemic idea that a family 
is more than the sum of its parts (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980). The 
fundamental flaw that confounds the statistical data beyond reclamation 
is the continual equating of a household with a family (Hareven, 1974; 
Winch, 1971). For economic purposes households may be useful, but for 
family therapy and other social concerns families must be defined in 
terms of meaningful relationships between members, not in terms of popu¬ 
lation units. This statistical approach is obviously incapable of 
mirroring the vibrancy of the living organizations that are families. 
FLC models based on statistics are useful for large scale economic 
or social purposes that do not require an understanding of the diversity 
of American families. However, the difficulty is that the models that 
purport to describe the FLC in greater developmental detail (Aldous, 
1978; Carter and McGoldrick, 1980; Duvall, 1972; Haley, 1973; Hill and 
Rodgers, 1964) are all significantly influenced by Glick's model and his 
use of household as a synonym for family. Despite the vast quantity of 
data Glick uses, the quality of information needed to offer a develop¬ 
mental view relevant to therapy cannot be simply added on to overcome 
the statistical limitations. 
Structural Method 
Haley's model. Haley (1973) admits that the FLC model he presents 
is a "rudimentary framework" (p. 43). This is a problem that plagues 
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all FLC models. The rudimentary structural method used to abstract 
social FLC models from the demographic models seriously limits the FLC 
concept in describing family development as it is a mechanistic view. 
Haley's six stage model, outlined below, addresses the FLC in very 
simple terms in order to present common patterns of dysfunction in the 
development of middle class families. 
I. Courtship Period 
II. Marriage and Its Consequences 
III. Childbirth and Dealing with the Young 
IV. Middle Marriage Difficulties 
V. Weaning Parents from Children 
VI. Retirement and Old Age 
While this model meets Haley's requirement for simple theories to guide 
clinical action (1977), it does not meet the criterion that makes sim¬ 
plicity useful: the elegant portrayal of complexity. This model offers 
information that "everyone knows" (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980, p. 6), 
but it does not provide a strong theoretical base for the understanding 
of development. 
Hays (1977) criticizes family researchers for not specifying their 
theoretical base and its assumptions. Going even further, Christensen 
(1969) states that most family research does not even qualify as theory. 
These statements particularly apply to the FLC concept. The type of 
structuralism used to depict a family's changes is far too limited to 
describe the developmental significance of family reorganization. The 
criteria delineating the stages are problematic, the transitions between 
the stages are undefined, and the complexity of time as a variable is 
ignored. 
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Problems of the stage concept. Grounded in the demographic events 
by Glick (1947), the FLC models relevant to this discussion (Aldous, 
1978; Carter and McGoldrick, 1980; Duvall, 1971; Haley, 1973; Rodgers, 
1962) chronicle a series of stages. The stages, the central concept in 
the FLC, are founded on events that result in the changed configuration 
and/or changed status of membership (marriage, childbirth, schoolchil¬ 
dren, launching, aging, etc.). However, these stages are not the only 
events that provoke developmental change. Developmentally, the stage 
approach is problematic as the structure of membership is inadequate to 
capture much of significance. Minuchin's (1974) point about subsystems 
in families is relevant as an analogy to FLC stages. In understanding 
the structure of a family, the membership of subsystems is not nearly as 
important as the transactions between subsystems. In family development 
it is the transitions through and between stages that are of concern, 
not the membership configuration of the stage. 
A critical difference in family therapy from psychoanalysis has 
been the quantum leap it made from the psychoanalytic one-to-one 
approach in which the client presented a carefully painted picture of 
their past. In contrast, family therapy brought multiple members into 
the session and had them interact, which more closely approximates a 
live video newsreel. Yet, for one of its grounding concepts, family 
therapy has retained the static FLC stages, which resemble a series of 
snapshots (Hareven, 1974) that do not account for significant periods of 
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time and important family actions. Revolving around single events, each 
stage leaves the impression that a family is preoccupied with one uni¬ 
fied task (see Rhodes, 1977). Implicitly, the suggestion is made that 
the duration of each stage is homogenously organized, when, for example, 
the "beginnings" of each new stage may be more interactionally similar 
than a "beginning" and a "middle" of one stage. 
Alpert (1981), critiqueing the utility of the FLC, summarizes the 
three common criticisms of the stage theory approach. The first is that 
stage theory is too biologically based on age. She points out that 
stage changes may be due to the "joint impact of age-graded, history- 
graded and non-normative life events as they are mediated through the 
developing family" (p. 26). The second criticism relates to the "as¬ 
sumption that each stage occurs in an orderly, unidirectional and 
irreversible sequence" (p. 26). The third criticism is that stage 
theory assumes a universal course followed by all people. 
Aldous (1972) vigorously defends the stage concept as currently 
constructed, "our use of the word stage indicates that the framework 
does not specifically handle short episodes encompassing a limited 
number of interactions ... the family life cycle stages cover sizeable 
time spans, and, even though one shades into the other, there are breaks 
or discontinues between them that give each stage its distinctive char¬ 
acter" (p. 90, quoted in Trost, 1973, p. 38). In previously challenging 
just such a view, Rodgers had stated that the "stages are in no sense 
real entities, though some of the literature in the area would appear to 
approach the point of reification" (Rodgers, 1968, p. 500, quoted in 
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Clavan, 1969, p. 313). Hareven (1974) used the snapshot analogy to 
criticize the static quality of the FLC stages that Rodgers wished 
to change. 
Rodgers (1962), recognizing the limited number of families that 
Duvall's FLC described, attempted to include a broader range of family 
forms by devising a 24-category FLC. However, using the same basic cri¬ 
teria to define development--variations in family membership configura¬ 
tions--!^ constructed a model that was unwieldy by his own admission. 
Rodgers tripled the number of stage "snapshots," and his attempt to 
describe changes in terms of position and role additions and deletions 
was therefore \ore complicated than useful. For example, he identified 
five stages of launching families and that only accounts for two married 
parents and the ages of the oldest and youngest child. The position and 
role sequences proliferate so rapidly with more than four members that 
it is an unmanageable solution. The model ended up intensifying the 
static-dynamic issues by primarily emphasizing the possible myriad fam¬ 
ily forms and was not able to provide a useful sense of how transitions 
are made. 
Static vs. dynamic view. It is precisely the transitions between 
stages that Haley (1973) indicates are of greatest concern in family 
therapy. The FLC models do not account for transitions from one stage 
to another; they state merely that the events of changing membership 
evoke new stages. About Rodgers' efforts to revise the FLC stage notion 
Clavan (1969) states that he fails to "emphasize the 'ongoingness' of 
one period to the next" (p. 313). Hareven (1974) and Nock (1979) concur 
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that the stage notion represents family life as basically static and 
that the traditional FLC fails to capture action in families. In 
Clavan's (1969) terms, the idea of process with plateaus is needed to 
better portray the stable and dynamic aspects of family life. 
Schram (1979), citing three major studies using the FLC as a pre¬ 
dictor for marital satisfaction, says that these research results are 
noteworthy for their "inconclusiveness, inconsistency and ambiguity" (p. 
7). Echoing Haley, understanding FLC transitions is Schram's prime 
concern: "We need to explore junctures which function as a bridge from 
one stage to the next" (p. 11). The entire developmental approach to 
the FLC stages needs to be reevaluated, according to Schram. 
Christensen (1969) asserts that "perhaps the greatest challenge 
facing the (family) field today and at the same time, the greatest prom¬ 
ise for rewarding theory development is this methodological problem of 
comparative research which requires the handling of time and space 
simultaneously" (p. 221). The FLC handles neither time nor space ade¬ 
quately. It assumes time as a constant, an undifferentiated linear pro¬ 
gression. It describes changing space in terms of the changing member¬ 
ship of only the nuclear family form. 
Hareven (1974) complains that the FLC models do not distinguish 
between "family time" and "social time" (p. 325). The FLC models keep 
social time constant (based on how changing social conditions affect 
family development), while varying family time (based on the changes of 
the internal workings of a family). This ignores the continual, but 
differing, movements and the mutual influence of both types of time. 
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Clavan (1969) suggests that the "temporal boundaries" (p. 313) 0f 
FLC stages—the focus on the past and present situations, but excluding 
expectations of the future—disqualifies the stage models' utility, as 
development necessarily involves "anticipated social conditions" (p. 
313). A further temporal limitation is evident in Aldous' admission 
that the stage concept "doesn't handle short episodes of interaction" 
(1972, p. 90, quoted in Trost, 1973, p. 38). These are the sort of 
difficulties that need to be addressed in responding to Feldman's (1975) 
call for improvements in the FLC in terms of both microanalysis and 
macroanalysis. Despite Carter and McGoldrick's effort to include three 
generations in their model, the FLC still represents a two generational 
view of families and so do not include a broader view of time—multiple 
generations—nor a more specific time frame—episodes within stages. To 
be useful in family therapy the FLC must evidence a temporal flexibility 
as well as accounting for family variations. 
The methodological approach of the FLC models is not a clearly 
thought out structuralism. Reviewing Piaget's book. Structuralism 
(1973), Manfred (1972) points out that structures are at once "structur¬ 
ing and structured" (p. 181) organizations. FLC models emphasizing sta¬ 
tic configurations in families rather than stressing the developmental 
processes and transitions that result in changed membership patterns, 
present families as structured, but neglect the structuring aspect of 
their lives. Weigert and Thomas (1971), in examining the universality 
of families, assert that "function precedes structure, but . . . to 
grant primacy to structure is to hypostatize the past" (p. 191). This 
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is precisely what FLC models do as they assume a structure that somehow 
determines functions, rather than a dialectic between the two aspects of 
family process. If structure is primary, then interaction between fam¬ 
ily systems and their context, and between elements of the systems, is 
constrained. Structure in FLC models is conceptualized at a level that 
is of limited effectiveness for family therapists. Rather than focusing 
on the structure of membership, it would be more useful to abstract 
structure from patterns of relationships. These models view families, 
as shall be explained in more detail later, as closed systems. Manfred 
(1972), again referring to Piaget, but applicable to the FLC, warns 
researchers not to stereotype specific individuals or families (p. 181) 
on the basis of such a closed, structural view. As the next section 
explains, this is what FLC models unfortunately do. 
In summary, the particular structural approach that marks all of 
these FLC models does not provide a comprehensive and flexible basis 
from which the complexities of development can be delineated. In gener¬ 
al, the statistical and structural limitations render the FLC methodolo¬ 
gically unsuitable as a family therapy developmental frame, for it is 
like a net that is too small to catch many American families and for the 
families who are on target, the webbing is too gross to capture the 
complexity of development. 
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Philosophical Difficulties 
Normative Values 
Duvall1s model. Like the Macy conferences in 1946 and 1947 that 
heralded the emergence of general system theory (Bateson, 1972), the 
1948 White House Conference of Families, chaired by Evelyn Duvall and 
Reuben Hill marked the genesis of the developmental FLC models (Duvall, 
1971). This conference was one part of the effort to renormalize Ameri¬ 
can family life after World War II. The participants faced and were a 
part of strong socio-political pressures that emphasized the conceptual¬ 
ization of the American family as a homogenous group. This was one so¬ 
lution to such problems as what to do with returning servicemen who had 
been killers in the war and how to get the female labor force back in 
the home. The FLC models that came out of the conference were an aspect 
of the attempt to provide a unified view of family life in the face of a 
rapidly changing world society whose differences threatened to destroy 
it. 
As Duvall led the charge in promoting the FLC, she built on Glick's 
work, which as noted had a narrow normative bent. The models generated 
from this effort used the white, middle-class, two-parent nuclear family 
as the ideal. Duvall's eight stage model is outlined below with impor¬ 
tant member positions and major developmental tasks. This model deline¬ 
ates the FLC in terms of the predictable evens and typical tasks of an 
isolated nuclear family. There are a number of reasons why the applic¬ 
ability of this model as a developmental framework for family therapy is 
severely limited. 
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Iheminority nuclear family as ideal. Like the criticism leveled 
at Glick's (1947) model, Duvall's FLC fails to picture a great number of 
American families. One needs only to acknowledge some of the important 
social issues of the past decade--teenage pregnancies, alternative life¬ 
styles, divorce, homosexuality, the plight of the elderly, the feminiza¬ 
tion of poverty--and it becomes apparent that the life course and devel¬ 
opmental tasks that Duvall proposes as typical exclude significant num¬ 
bers of people and family forms. 
A point could be raised that these social issues, which have 
changed the structure and meaning of American families, have arisen only 
recently and that the nuclear family was predominant when the FLCi odels 
were originally designed. However, some researchers challenge this 
view. Winch (1970) notes that contrary to the expectations of sociolo¬ 
gists in the 1950s the isolated nuclear family has not become the pre¬ 
dominant form, implying that this structure was not the majority even 
then. Deutsch (1983) concurs that the nuclear family was never the 
dominant form as she suggests that it was only "the typical family in 
the Dick and Jane primers." Winch's research shows that the majority 
family form is what he calls the embedded nuclear family, which has a 
strong network of extended kin. Yorburg (1975) suggests that modified 
extended and modified nuclear families are the most frequent forms in 
America. And in a warning particularly relevant to the FLC, she states 
that "individual variability subverts typologising" (Yorburg, 1975, p. 
5). The typologising of families in FLC models results in a narrow 
of normative values being promoted as ideal. range 
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Hareven (1974) marshalls evidence to challenge the notion that 
American families were any more nuclear in the 19th century than they 
are now. She claims that the structure of individual families varied 
significantly through their life course. Trost (1973) and Leichter 
(1970) identify a number of variations of family structure that are ex¬ 
cluded from the FLC. Even Glick (1977) acknowledges the narrowness of 
the normative values in the FLC when he predicts that half of all cur¬ 
rent American children will live in single-parent households during 
their lifetime. Even if families had changed from primarily nuclear, 
the FLC has remained basically the same over the past thirty years. 
While there is a diverse range of family forms which are excluded 
by the normative values of the FLC, the issue of how many of what kind 
of families exist is thoroughly confused by researchers' failure to dis¬ 
tinguish between households and families. A household is a population 
unit in a particular domicile, while families may extend far beyond a 
single dwelling. For years, defining the family has left researchers in 
a quandary. Many major texts either lack or offer contradictory and 
confusing definitions (Wiegert and Thomas, 1971). Segalen (1974) re¬ 
ports that at the 13th Seminar on Family Research there was no agreement 
on the FLC as there was no agreement on the nature of the family. What 
is apparently least disagreed upon is the idealized form called the 
nuclear family. 
As Duvall's, Glick's and others' work makes clear, family research¬ 
ers have frequently incorporated a narrow range of normative values in 
their FLC models that limits their utility. Clavan (1969) holds that 
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researchers have long offered positive sanctions of the romanticism 
surrounding marriage. Bernard (1981) cites research that has reinforced 
overly positive myths about marriage and overly negative myths about 
divorce. Nock (1979) notes that the FLC demands that all couples with¬ 
out children should want them. He goes on to indict the family develop¬ 
mental approach (as outlined by Hill and Rodgers, 1964) because it must 
assume that "families are without exception in abiding by normative 
constraints" (Nock, 1979, p. 16). 
The claim of the predictability of developmental stages and tasks 
further illustrates the normative limitations of the FLC. Duvall (1971) 
states that "since families grow through predictable stages of develop¬ 
ment it is possible to anticipate what lies ahead for any given family 
at any one point in their development" (p. 332). Ignoring for the 
\oment that this is obviously false, emphasizing predictability for such 
narrowly defined stages and tasks is a step towards defining one family 
form as ideal and others as deviant. 
Troll (1973) takes Duvall to task for the assumed notion "that all 
families must go through the sequence of stages in the correct order 
. . . and must accomplish all the developmental tasks ascribed to each 
stage to enter properly into the next stage" (p. 69). "The families 
that are successfully chalking up merit badges for accomplishing their 
developmental tasks are clearly the suburban 'Better Homes and Garden' 
set, dedicated to stereotyped sex roles, regular church attendance, 
faithful fulfillment of military service and the Protestant Ethic" (p. 
73). Duvall (1971) carries her emphasis on predictability to the point 
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which she states it is the unexpected quality of much in family living 
that makes it hazardous" (p. 512). She not only suggests the type of 
desired family, but prescribes what kind of lives those families should 
live. This "assumes desirability of conformity to standards or norms 
and allows no place for change, confusing variability or uncertainty" 
(Troll, 1973, p. 69). 
The deviance of other family forms. The FLC is one example of how 
the attempt to discover universals in the social sciences is confused 
with identifying the normative which is in turn confused with the ideal. 
Levine (1981) cites a number of family researchers (Birdwhistell, 1970; 
Jackson and Lederer, 1968; Schorr and Moen, 1979) who concur that iden¬ 
tifying one family form as normal sets it up as an idealized model which 
leads to the pejorative labeling of other family forms as deviant. 
Weigert and Thomas (1971), writing on the universality of the family, 
state that in naming one family form as universal, any variations are 
implied to be aberrant. Nock (1979) and Segalen (1973) both acknowledge 
that FLC models lead to the labeling of non-nuclear families as deviant. 
Hareven (1974) notes that '"family breakdown' has been subject to the 
demonology of the theorists of 'social disorganization'" (p. 325). And 
in the field of family therapy, Haley (1973) reminds clinicians that 
they "labor under the burden of myths of how families ought to be rather 
than how they are" (p. 42). 
In outlining the Developmental Approach, which forms the foundation 
of the FLC, Hill and Rodgers (1964) assert that a number of family types 
without an appropriate number of positions filled, such as childless and 
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one-parent families, exhibit a "deficit in structure" (p. 185). Con¬ 
versely, family types with additional positions to those prescribed, 
such as families with three generations, with stepchildren and with out 
of wedlock children, have an "excess of structure" (p. 185). Hill and 
Rodgers follow with a claim that such deficits and excesses "would 
present problems in boundary setting and boundary maintenance" (p. 185). 
Even if their views have changed since that time, the FLC, which was 
built on these values, has not. 
Glick (1977) in acknowledging that we do not yet know the impact of 
growing up in a single-parent household, implies that we need to examine 
the effects of diverse family forms before promoting one form as ideal. 
FLC models continue to present the overly idealized nuclear family as 
preferable, relegating variations to undesirable status. Levine (1981) 
thoroughly documents the deleterious effects of overly idealized or 
overly negative expectations on self-image and performance. In applying 
a developmental framework to family therapy, it is critical to chances 
of success that such pitfalls be avoided. 
Christensen (1969), writing in support of normative theory, admits 
that value-free research is probably impossible. He suggests that re¬ 
searchers should (a) try to be value-free anyway or (b) clearly state 
their values. To the extent that they fail to do either, FLC composers 
limit the utility of their models. 
Aldous1 model. Some FLC researchers have attempted to address the 
narrow range of normative values of these models. Aldous (1978) pre¬ 
sents five FLC models based on various criteria. Four of the models 
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offer different punctuation of nuclear family life cycles. One model is 
based on membership patterns and another on the age and role transitions 
of the oldest child. The third model combines the criteria of the two 
preceding ones and results in the Duvall model. The fourth model, which 
Aldous chooses to base her book on, is basically the same as Duvall's 
with very slight changes. As one exception to the nuclear family, she 
proposes FLC "stages for single-parent families of divorced women" 
(1978, p. 93). 
Stage I Establishment of the Single-Parent Family 
Stage II Women Institute or Reinstitute their Work-Life 
Career 
Stage III Women with Adolescents 
Stage IV Women with Young Adults 
Stage V Women in the Middle Years 
Stage VI The Retirement of Women from Work-Life Career or 
Responsibilities for Parents (Aldous, 1978, p. 93) 
The assumption of the ideal nuclear family values still underlies this 
model and by Aldous' own admission much is left out. This approach of 
adding on a variation to the basic nuclear family in some ways intensi¬ 
fies the normative problem. Despite the desire to affirm varying family 
structures, as long as the nuclear model remains the central or ideal 
form, others are implied to be deviant. 
Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) model suffers from the same diffi¬ 
culty. It should be noted that McGoldrick is a well known advocate in 
the family therapy field for recognizing the importance of ethnic diver¬ 
sity. She pleads eloquently and forcefully that therapists should 
assume that FLC stages vary significantly across ethnic groups. 
Addressing those concerns. Carter and McGoldrick present FLC models of 
divorced, poor and-. Mexican-American families. However, using the 
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middle-class nuclear family as a prototype as they do, implies that 
other forms are not as desirable. In some ways, these models identify 
deviancy as much as they affirm diversity. 
It is not useful to view the values problems inherent in the FLC as 
being the researchers' intentions or beliefs. These philosophical dif¬ 
ficulties can be more usefully identified as being associated with the 
view of a family as a collection of members and to the problems of stage 
theory. The next problem section sheds further light on this issue. 
Organizing Concepts 
Definition of family. On a more abstract level than the normative 
values issue, there are a number of assumed philosophical concepts basic 
to the FLC that hamper its utility when applied to family therapy. From 
a systemic perspective these concepts have to do with how levels of 
organization and boundaries are used to picture family life. The parti¬ 
cular problematic concepts discussed here are (1) a confusion of class 
and member in the definition of families, (2) a view of families as 
closed systems, and (3) an individual orientation to family development. 
How a family is defined--on what level and by what boundaries-- 
reveals problems with the FLC. Researchers refer to "the family" and 
"the family life cycle" rather than "a family or families" and "family 
life cycles." In so doing they suggest a homogeneity that does not 
exist or at least an ideal that many will not achieve. The difference 
between "the" and "a" may appear to be picayune, but this semantic 
problem has fundamental repercussions for how researchers organize their 
concept of families. By trying to define "the family" with a particular 
instance or prototype of "a family" researchers confuse the class of 
families with one of its members. 
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Watzlawick et al. (1967) in explaining Bertrand Russell's theory of 
logical types point out that a class--a set of members or elements--is 
not organized in the same manner as one of the members. For example, 
families in general are not a family; there are not parent-child nor 
sibling relationships in the way that there are between members of a 
family. The member-class distinction has been a basic issue in family 
therapy. While it may be argued that the FLC was not designed to meet 
family therapy criteria, as the FLC has been proposed to serve as a 
developmental framework for family therapy (Carter and McGoldrick, 
1980), it must now address those criteria. Even in different fields, 
the FLC could benefit from a clarification of class and member. 
Researchers are correct in suggesting that developmental notions 
should apply to the class of families. However, defining family devel¬ 
opment by a prototype is a mismatch of levels. The prototype is too 
specific to portray the diversity of families and it is not flexible 
enough conceptually to capture the complex specifics of the families it 
is supposed to describe. The prototype approach is not general enough 
in some ways and not specific enough in others. This violates what 
Mogey (1966) calls the twin principles of theory building: a minimum 
number of concepts and a maximum level of generality. 
Carter and McGoldrick's model. This is the difficulty underlying 
Aldous' (1978) and Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) attempt to supplement 
the basic FLC with variations. It not only identifies, apparently 
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unintentionally, the variations as not quite normal, it also makes one 
realize that there are possibly endless permutations of the FLC when it 
is organized in this fashion. Carter and McGoldrick's FLC is now the 
fcjcr model in the family therapy field and is presented on the next 
page. 
Carter and McGoldrick (1980) use a combination of Duvall's and 
Haley's FLC models to define the basic FLC in a more interactional 
manner than Duvall and in a more systematic manner than Haley. To flesh 
out the six stages, they describe "key principles of the emotional pro¬ 
cess of transition" for each stage and the "second order (discontinuous) 
changes in family status required to proceed developmentally" (p. 17). 
The key principles and second order changes replace Duvall's more 
individually oriented positions and developmental tasks. These prin¬ 
ciples and changes represent ideal values or goals. For example, the 
key principle in Stage I is "accepting parent offspring separation" (p. 
17) and one of three second-order changes in stage IV is "refocus on 
midlife marital and career issues" (p. 17). Once again, the values sug¬ 
gested are those frequently ascribed to the middle class nuclear family. 
In addition to the basic FLC, a model describing dislocations and 
restabilizations of divorced families is proposed. This supplemental 
approach of adding on differing forms to the basic model portrays struc¬ 
tural variations as deviations with dangerous implications for develop¬ 
mental progress. 
The presentation of the Duvall, Aldous and Carter and McGoldrick 
models illustrates the points that applicability of the FLC to family 
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therapy is severely limited by (1) the narrow range of normative values 
prescribed and (2) the use of a prototypical family, which either misses 
the diversity and complexity of family development or generates so many 
different FLC models as to be confusing. By trying to overcome the 
problems of the basic FLC model by adding on supplemental features (such 
as multigenerational, ethnic diversity and interactional emphases) 
Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) model is a first order solution (Watzla- 
wick et al., 1974) to a problem that requires second order change. Once 
a sauce is burnt, no additional flavorings will remove the taste; one 
must start over. (First order change refers to shifts that leave the 
basic organizational pattern of a system intact. Second order change is 
indicated by a thorough, discontinuous reorganization of a system.) 
Closed system view. Constructing the conceptual foundation of the 
Developmental Approach to the study of the family. Hill and Rodgers 
(1964) define a "family as a closed system of interacting personalities" 
(p. 177). Hill and Hansen (1960) also specified as one of five basic 
assumptions of the approach that "the individual in a social setting is 
the basic autonomous unit" (p. 309). These closely related philosophi¬ 
cal assumptions have fundamentally constrained FLC models and reveal how 
boundaries are used in explaining family systems. 
Bertalanffy (1928) first defined open and closed systems. A system 
is considered relatively open to the extent that it could regulate its 
input and output. A closed system, then, is one in which input and 
output functions are predetermined and cannot be altered by the system. 
Hill and other FLC researchers use the term closed to indicate that a 
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system's development is primarily determined by its own internal 
rhythms. A system can be viewed as closed to the extent that its action 
can be explained without resorting to events or conditions external to 
the system. To explain a family in this manner was the aim of the De¬ 
velopmental Approach to the family (Hill and Rodgers, 1964) and is how 
the term will be used here. 
The closed system assumption indicates impermeable family bounda¬ 
ries prohibiting developmental influence from or to a family's environ¬ 
ment. The impact of culture and society on family development is 
ignored. The individual orientation suggests that a family system is 
composed of entities, thus minimizing the relational aspect of family 
life. Both assumptions are atomistic in that they organize their target 
of observation into units or things that can be separated from their 
context. These philosophical principles impact conceptualization of 
families at every level. 
One of the major consequences of the closed systems assumption is 
that environmental and interactional influences in the FLC are minimized 
as biological development is viewed as the primary force in families 
(Clavan, 1969). The shifting membership configurations based on aging 
are the basic biological or internal rhythms that determine development. 
Biology is a necessary but insufficient force to explain family develop¬ 
ment. In all orientations to therapy the controversy rages over the 
causal functions of biology. The success of family therapy, however, 
has come through the emphasis on family interaction within a social 
context. 
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Interactionally, FLC models do acknowledge that children go to 
school and most assume that at least one family member attempts to 
secure work. Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) is the best in that regard, 
but the examination of family development through those spheres stops at 
those minimal recognitions. In one FLC model the authors state that "an 
isolated conjugal family" is necessary to perform life cycle analysis 
(Lansing and Kish, 1957, p. 513). This is part of a process that 
Mishler (1979) calls context stripping. Ignoring societal and cultural 
factors legitimizes the prototypical family approach to the FLC in that 
as soon as a family is seen as an open system in exchange with its con¬ 
text, differences between families appear that cannot be explained with 
a prototype model. 
Regarding the closed system approach based on biology, many re¬ 
searchers have recognized the need to examine the FLC in the actions of 
a social context. Feldman and Feldman (1975) and Hareven (1974) both 
note that the FLC does not account for the impact of societal factors on 
family development. Clavan (1969) suggests that the FLC should consider 
the social milieu of families. And Leichter (1970) and Stolte-Heiskanen 
(1975) call for an examination of the institutional linkages that fami¬ 
lies experience. An interesting consequence of a closed systems view is 
that many of the FLC critics recommend that the environmental and inter¬ 
actional limitations should be remedied by taking a more individualistic 
view of the FLC (Clavan, 1969; Feldman and Feldman, 1975; Hareven, 1974; 
Weigert and Thomas, 1971). 
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Individual orientation. An individual orientation to family life 
is an expected occurrence if one prefers to explain a family by its in¬ 
ternal factors, for in a closed systems view a family appears to be made 
up of individual members, rather than the patterns of relationships that 
unite them. 
Carter and McGoldrick (1980) note that Duvall conceptualized 
"family primarily as a collection of individual life cycles" (p. 6). 
Duvall's work borrowed heavily from Havighurst (1953) for basic defini¬ 
tions of development and developmental task. As she basically substi¬ 
tuted the word family for individual in these definitions, development 
is depicted mainly as individual efforts which are fit alongside the 
tasks of other family members. There is no inherent problem with using 
individually oriented information in building family development theory 
as long as one remembers that an individual human organism is arranged 
and develops quite differently than a family organization. Duvall de¬ 
scribes each member in terms of positions and roles, which are recipro¬ 
cally related, but she only minimally addresses interaction as a devel¬ 
opmental mode. Leichter (1970) states that a role is an entity, not a 
function. The individual orientation of Duvall is necessarily a build¬ 
ing block approach of using the entities of roles and positions to add 
up to an individual entity, which summed with other individual entities 
combines to form a family as an entity. Referring to families as a col¬ 
lection of members, though, is similar to referring to individuals as a 
collection of organs; the undeniable, essential quality of the living 
whole is missed. 
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Like Duvall, Carter and McGoldrick (1980) define their model by 
shifting membership patterns, the mark of a closed system. While their 
major developmental tasks are more interactional than previous models, 
almost all are related to "internal" requirements of families. Despite 
their belief that "the family is more than the sum of its parts" (1980, 
p. 4), in the primary theoretical chapter in their book the purpose of a 
family is defined as providing "a context that supports need attainment 
for all its individual members" (Terkelson, 1980, p. 25). No mention is 
made of a family's necessary function in its culture and society. This 
individualistic view ignores possible purposes of families as units in 
relation to other systems. This view would limit a family therapist's 
effectiveness if they assumed this as the primary purpose of a family. 
In summary, a major problem resulting from the combination of the 
closed system and individual orientation assumptions is that boundaries 
are used to emphasize entities in the FLC. Each stage is pictured as a 
more or less closed system, a unit unto itself that arises abruptly from 
biological and/or status changes of family members. While FLC research¬ 
ers view stages as distinct units (Aldous, 1972), they also state that 
performance in one stage facilitates or inhibits performance at a 
succeeding stage (Duvall, 1971). This type of determinism is more remi¬ 
niscent of Bertalanffy's definition of closed system in that input and 
output cannot be regulated by the family system because previous stages 
are supposedly irreversible. 
Further, in the FLC, individuals are viewed as entities and fami¬ 
lies are portrayed as collections of entities. This is precisely the 
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approach that family therapy tries to avoid. Whitaker notes that he "no 
longer believes in individual persons . . . individuals are fragments of 
families" (1983). For a developmental framework to be useful in family 
therapy a family must be seen as a unity of relationships, not a collec¬ 
tion of entities. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study constructed a theoretical framework and meta-model of 
family development. These tools were designed to describe the change 
and growth of a family's organization in a manner relevant to systems- 
based family therapies. In Chapter I, the Overview of Methods section 
of this theoretical research outlined a two step method. The first step 
was the initial theory building of the framework and meta-model by this 
author. The second step was refinement of the theory through conversa¬ 
tions with family therapy theorists. 
Consistent with the epistemological emphasis of this research, as 
the specific procedures of the methodology are detailed, two aspects of 
theory development will be discussed to illuminate the author's assump¬ 
tions. (1) A systemic perspective on the genesis and focus of a theory 
and (2) the criteria of an acceptable theory will be integrated into the 
procedures of the methodology. 
The integration of the abstract description of theory development 
with the concrete description of method procedures may seem tangential 
or confusing at times. But it is viewed here as necessary, as one level 
ultimately explains the organization of the other level. This is not a 
one way influence, from abstract to concrete, but a continuing recipro¬ 
cal influence. It is the repeated transition between levels that may 
seem confusing. There is no excuse for confusing sentence structure. 
Development of a theory in this case is viewed as a series of re¬ 
cursive loops or a cybernetic process, in which one factor modifies 
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other factors which in turn (eventually) modify the original factor. 
The most vivid illustration of this process is a drawing by Escher which 
pictures two hands with pencils, each drawing the other hand. This 
cybernetic nature is the reason why the perspective of theory develop¬ 
ment is integrated into the procedures rather than presented separately. 
The first major step in the development of this theory has two 
aspects: the collection of data from various literatures and the syn¬ 
thesis of a framework and meta-model derived from this data and the 
author's assumptions. 
Collection of Data 
The raw information necessary to the theory development of this 
study was gathered from two bodies of knowledge: epistemological and 
content literature. The underlying theme that unites the literature 
from these areas of knowledge is the concern with the nature of change. 
The epistemological literature was drawn from a wide variety of 
fields, including evolution, philosophy, physics, biology, chemistry, 
philosophy of science and topology. All the concepts fit coherently 
with or contribute to the expansion of this author's systemic perspec¬ 
tive in that they explain change as whole systems interacting within a 
specific context. This literature is deemed epistemological in that the 
identified concepts are relative to the content literature, more ab¬ 
stract and therefore more descriptive of how change happens and how we 
know it. These concepts serve as guides in describing how change occurs 
in families, rather than describing specific changes in families. The 
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following authors and topics from the respective fields mentioned above 
appear to fit the systemic criteria: Jantsch on the Self-Organizing 
Paradigm (1980); Bateson on the Isomorphism of Mind and Mature (1979); 
Heisenberg on the Uncertainty Principle (1972); Mataurana on Structure 
Determinism (1979); Prigogine on Dissipative Structures (1972); Giddens 
on Structuration (1975); and Thom on Catastrophe Theory (1972). 
The content literature was drawn from investigations of families, 
human development, and cultural differences. Again the criteria for use 
in this study were concepts explaining change from a systemic perspec¬ 
tive. The content literature is more specifically concerned with the 
nature of human systems and their development. The following authors 
and topics appear to fit the systemic criteria in this area: from 
family sociology--Broderick on the General Systems Approach (1979), and 
Sprey on Conflict Theory (1974); from individual development--Piaget on 
Genetic Epistemology (1970), Kegan on Equilibration (1981), and Gilligan 
on Women's Development (1981); and from the study of cultures--Highwater 
on the Cultural Bases of Perception (1981). 
These literatures were selected according to this author's assump¬ 
tions, but they also modified those assumptions. Abstractly from a 
systemic perspective, the development of a theory is a reciprocal, or 
more complexly, a cybernetic process. Jantsch (1975), drawing on 
Vickers' concept of the appreciated world (p. 106), proposes that humans 
utilize a cybernetic appreciative system to design their view on and 
interaction with the world. An appreciative system synthesizes new 
information from the differences "between the world as we want it to be 
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(myths) and the world as we actually perceive it" (Jantsch, 1975, p. 
106). Intolerable differences between our myths and actual perception 
result in the emergence of new models of the world, which eventually 
become our myths in a deepened appreciated world. In Jantsch's design 
process myths and models inform each other over time in a cybernetic 
loop. Jantsch views design as the basic mechanism through which we 
perceptually organize and interact with the world. From this systemic 
perspective, theory building is a special type of human design. The 
genesis of theory comes from the resulting designs of the appreciative 
system. The focus of systemic theory building is the modeling process. 
A systemic perspective considers how a system is organized as a whole to 
be its most critical feature. A successful model captures that sense of 
the whole with a minimum number of concepts. Systemic theory building 
starts with the outline of an emergent model and culminates with a sup¬ 
plemental and refined model. 
Construction of a Framework and Meta-Model 
The second aspect of the initial theory draws on data gathered from 
the epistemological and content literatures to formulate a framework and 
meta-model of family development. More precisely, differences within 
the literature data, filtered through the values and assumptions of this 
author, resulted in the framework and meta-model. 
It was previously noted that systemic theory development begins 
with an emergent model and indeed such a model outline did pre-exist 
this dissertation (Bloomfield, Kaplan and Nielsen, 1981). The research 
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in the present study involved constructing a more comprehensive theory 
that explains and enriches the model. In comparison to other studies, 
this model outline resembles the initial hypotheses before they are put 
into empirical form. So the model is a starting point and the great 
bulk of the theory development remains to be done. This model will not 
be presented in this chapter as that is not necessary to determine the 
utility and consistency of the methodology. What will be offered, how¬ 
ever, is the central organizing principle of the model abstracted into a 
theoretical hypothesis. 
Central Hypothesis 
In constructing an adequate family developmental theory for system¬ 
ic family therapy the diversity of family structure, the complexity of 
family process and the theoretical congruence with a systemic perspec¬ 
tive will be the focal issues. The central organizing principle of the 
initial model of family development addresses all three issues. This 
principle is that the evolution of rule-making processes and structures 
of families is an appropriate level of discourse and an adequate de¬ 
scription of the development of family organizations. 
Rules may not be accepted by all family therapy theorists as useful 
as they are inferences by an observer of how family interaction is 
guided. They are viewed in this study as a special type of pattern of 
family interaction. It is because they are derived from the concept of 
pattern, a common term among almost all family therapy theorists, that 
rules are deemed an adequate term for this study. Rules are fully 
defined in Chapter IV. 
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The central principle is viewed as evidencing congruence with sys¬ 
temic family therapy as it utilizes pattern (rules) and organization as 
its major concepts. Family therapists analyze families in terms of how 
patterns (relationships and/or rules) are organized into a whole to pro¬ 
duce behavior. Therefore this central principle operates at a level 
which is necessary for the practice of family therapy. 
This principle adequately addresses the diversity issue as it 
examines families in terms of rule making and organizational change, not 
in terms of membership structure. Further, it is at an appropriate 
level of generality so that no particular membership structure can be 
identified as normal. Therefore, all families are described as differ¬ 
ent and none are necessarily normal and deviant according to their 
structure (Jackson, 1983). 
This principle addresses complexity as the concept of rules is 
flexible. It can account for very broad time frames with very general 
sequences of interaction involving many people and can also account for 
very specific time frames with sequences involving one or two people. 
In addressing diversity and complexity the principle shows adequate 
generality and specificity to address the criteria for a developmental 
theory. 
Criteria of a Theory 
The questions at the beginning of Chapter II also served as guiding 
hypotheses to the construction of a theory of family development for 
systemic family therapy. So the central organizing principle and the 
above mentioned questions, representative of this author s values and 
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assumptions, modified and were modified by the collected literature 
data. Through this process, a framework and meta-model were abstracted, 
leading toward the construction of a theory of family development. 
It is now appropriate to ask the questions: what are the criteria 
of an adequate theory; what must a theory do and how can it be struc¬ 
tured? 
In general, a theory is concerned with the connections of elements 
within a specified domain (scope). More specifically it is important 
for a theory to describe, explain and predict and/or prescribe the na¬ 
ture of the connections that the theory addresses. The critical ques¬ 
tion is: what is the nature of the connections that theories describe? 
Theories attempt to describe the regularities of the connections that 
activate a system. In the view espoused here, it is not required that a 
theory describe necessary and sufficient (causal) connections. To be 
useful, a theory must describe a necessary level of observation for the 
identified discipline. But once that necessary level is identified, a 
theorist can discuss the contingencies of those connections rather than 
the necessity of connections. In this study there are four descriptive 
levels of the regularity of connections. The levels are organized in 
concentric circles with conditions of sufficiency represented by the 
innermost circle, conditions of necessity the next, conditions of con¬ 
tingency next, and random conditions representing the outermost circle. 
A theory is viewed here as more useful if it can describe necessary and 
sufficient connections, but even then contingent and random conditions 
should be specified to show limitations of the theory. (The difference 
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between contingency and random is that under contingent conditions the 
likelihood of an occurrence can be estimated, and under random condi¬ 
tions it cannot.) These concepts will be more fully explicated in 
Chapter IV. The connections can be described in terms of structure 
and/or process but, a theory must exhibit conceptual consistency through¬ 
out. In brief summary, the minimum that a theory must do on an abstract 
level is to identify its domain or scope, describe the nature of the 
connections within that scope and do so with conceptual consistency. 
While pieces of the above argument can be found in many places, this 
author cannot find anyone else to hold responsible for the whole of 
those views. 
How a theory can be structured has found reasonable agreement in 
the social scientific community. Abstracting from Harre (1970) and 
Stryker (1964) a typical theory can be described as (1) a set of assump¬ 
tions used to approach some domain, (2) a set of concepts used to de¬ 
scribe that domain, and (3) a set of propositions based on the assump¬ 
tions and concepts that serve as laws of that domain. 
Harre's (1970) alternative view to the typical theory has informed 
the conception of a theory in this study. Here, the notion of a theory 
has been expanded and modified to fit the assumptions outlined in Chap¬ 
ter I. The first aspect of a theory includes not only the assumptions 
of the researcher, but a statement of their values as well. The second 
aspect of a theory incorporates steps 2 and 3 from the typical theory 
above. Specific frames of reference are used to define a scope, 
critical concepts are defined to describe the domain and a set of 
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interrelated principles are constructed to describe how the domain 
operates. (This modification of the term propositions into principles 
is important because (a) it removes the lawlike inference and (b) it 
implies a more explicit role of the theorist's values. No one ever 
makes a stand on his or her propositions, but some are moved to make a 
stand on their principles.) The third and last aspect of a theory for 
the sake of this study is only a supplement in the typical approach and 
is drawn from Harre (1970) and Jantsch (1975). The most central aspect 
of a theory is a model, a representation of the process and/or structure 
of the identified system wthin the specified domain. A model is central 
because, as mentioned previously, it captures a sense of the whole 
process/structure of the system with the least concepts. 
The second aspect describes the framework that shall be offered; 
specified frames of reference, defined concepts, constructed interre¬ 
lated principles, all synthesized into a framework of family develop¬ 
ment. The third aspect describes the meta-model of family development 
that shall be proposed. It is a model because it will be the represen¬ 
tation of a structure and process of families; it is meta because it 
will be capable of generating other models of family development. 
It is important to note that the criteria of an adequate theory 
were presented in this manner for the sake of conceptual clarity. 
Theory development does not proceed in that order. Theory development 
from a systemic perspective occurs in a cybernetic fashion. While the 
modelling process is the focus of systemc theory development, the 
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various aspects of theory reciprocal!y and continuously affect each 
other until the theorist is satisfied with their depiction. 
The second step of the methodology will now be easier to describe 
than the first step as the theoretical foundations have already been 
outlined. 
Conversational Review Method 
To obtain its final results the study will use a conversational 
method. This term has been adapted from the ideas of Churchman (1982). 
He noted that his design of an ideal life was based on "conversations" 
with historical and current figures that he admired. It is a good name 
and useful guide for refining the method devised for this study. 
Almost every book and article in a professional field acknowledges 
the influence of informed reviewers. In this work that process will be 
formalized through this method. Since the appeal and to some extent the 
utility of a theory is often initially determined by the response of 
those involved in similar pursuits, written and verbal "conversations" 
with family therapy theorists interested in the topic were recognized as 
a useful method to supplement and revise the theory. The conversational 
method, then, is viewed as a continuation and refinement of the recur¬ 
sive modeling process in theory development. The aspects of the method 
are outlined below. 
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Identifying Reviewers 
This author generated a list of family therapy theorists he consi¬ 
dered interested in the topic. That list was then circulated locally to 
four practicing systemic family therapy trainers. People at this level 
of practice were considered knowledgeable enough to help identify a 
reasonable group of theorists. From their input, a consensus was ab¬ 
stracted on which theorists to contact. A letter was sent to those 
theorists outlining the project and requesting their participation. If 
someone's reply was not received within one month, it was assumed they 
were not interested in participating. 
Design Synopsis of Theory 
A twenty-five page synopsis of the research—problem, assumptions, 
data, framework and meta-model—was designed for review by the identi¬ 
fied theorists. This aspect was monitored by the dissertation committee 
and thus, the synopsis is not presented in this dissertation. The 
synopsis was abstracted from the results of initial theory development. 
Open-ended questions were incorporated into the synopsis to gener¬ 
ate the widest possible range of responses. The questions concerned 
(1) the internal consistency of the theory, (2) the theory's coherence 
with various concepts and perspectives currently in the forefront of the 
systemic family therapy field, and (3) the theory's potential utility in 
practice. 
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Model Refinement 
When the responses were received by the author they were weighed 
against the model and against the responses of the other reviewers. The 
responses were then discussed with the dissertation committee. These 
comparisons and discussions were used to refine the model and theory. 
It should be stressed that these responses were not treated as 
empirical data. Firstly, they were opinions, not the results of an 
empirical test and secondly, they cannot be separated out and measured 
without destroying their quality. These responses are part of a recur¬ 
sive, cybernetic loop process (feedback or feedforward depending upon 
one's perspective) and thus are part of a whole system not to be under¬ 
stood if reductionistically broken down into constituent parts. As part 
of this cybernetic process, this researcher made the final determination 
of the influence of the responses on the theory based on his stated 
values and assumptions, rather than relying on some statistical or 
"objective" measure. 
The ideas, criticism and influence of the responses on the theory 
are credited to the particular reviewers to the extent possible. The 
final version of the theory in this study, then, shows explicit evidence 
of the conversational method. 
As a supplement to this dual methodology, applications of the meta¬ 
model are discussed in the concluding chapter. These applications 
include a case example of a family that was assessed using the meta¬ 
model. These applications are a supplement as this study is primarily 
theoretical and not concerned with demonstrating its practical value as 
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part of this dissertation. Also, these applications are not intended to 
be rigorous, empirical tests, but only to hint at possible uses. Such 
research will have to be part of a further study. 
CHAPTER IV 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY 
The second half of this study begins with Chapter IV. The first 
half identified philosophical assumptions grounding the study, problems 
with the current developmental framework of family therapy and the meth¬ 
ods used to construct an alternative framework and model of family 
development. The term meta-model will be used to include both framework 
and model. 
This half consists of three chapters. Chapter IV presents the 
foundation of the meta-model: basic concepts of the meta-model, cri¬ 
teria for an adequate framework of family development, and fundamental 
principles of development. Chapter V presents specific contexts through 
which family development occurs and the process model of family develop¬ 
ment that is the heart of this study. Chapters IV and V are like a 
language, or more specifically, like a generative grammar as they define 
terms that can be used to describe family development. Chapter VI pre¬ 
sents applications and implications of the meta-model for family ther¬ 
apy. 
The results of this study yield a meta-model of family development. 
The meta-model is a series of concepts. It is presented by defining the 
concepts, their conditions of operation and how they are connected to 
one another. It is called a meta-model as it is a model of development 
in its own right and is capable of generating other models of family and 
social system development. In response to a reviewer s comment 
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(Doherty) it is important to state that much of the process of develop- 
ment that the meta-model describes is unconscious, and overall con¬ 
sciousness is basically irrelevant to the theory. It was noted in Chap¬ 
ter III that presentation of the meta-model will involve providing 
abstract descriptions supplemented with concrete examples. Although 
repeatedly moving from an abstract to a concrete level and back may at 
times interrupt the flow of the explanation, this format was chosen as 
the best for elucidating the meta-model. Most of the examples of family 
development are micro-examples, which discuss brief interaction. While 
the meta-model is capable of explaining broader time frames, these types 
of interactions are the most appropriate considering continuity and 
conciseness of presentation. 
The study focuses on family development, but the meta-model also 
has application to other living systems. One of the measures of the 
systemic quality of a concept is not only how well it connects informa¬ 
tion within a system, but also how well it explains the operation of 
other levels and types of systems. Therefore, while most of the exam¬ 
ples cited will describe family interaction, it will be useful at times 
to refer to examples from biological, physical and other social systems. 
The examples are like thought experiments which allow an observer to 
examine the utility of a concept under particular conditions. There is 
a brief description of the general concepts of a systemic view early in 
this chapter, but most systemic ideas on the occurrence of change and 
development are integrated into the other categories. 
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In addition, some comments of reviewers of the condensed version of 
the meta-model will be integrated throughout the text. The reviewers' 
comments will be briefly summarized in Chapter VI. Reviewers will be 
cited in the text only by their last name in parentheses [ex. (Hoffman)] 
and will be listed in a separate appendix. One of the reviewers 
(Doherty) suggested that statements of personal values would be useful 
in supplementing the philosophical assumptions discussed at the begin¬ 
ning of the study would help further clarify the meta-model. So, 
throughout a number of statements of personal values and beliefs will be 
integrated into the text. 
General Criteria of Theory 
The nature and criteria of an adequate theory have been debated for 
many centuries. All theories have some similarities at a general level. 
A theory creates a domain of discourse about a particular phenomenon. 
Theories create a domain by unifying and simplifying knowledge about a 
range of phenomena. For example, Newton's theory of gravity related 
many previously unconnected phenomena and made explainable events that 
were previously baffling. However, of equal importance to unifying and 
simplifying, theories allow distinctions to be drawn where none were 
possible and thus promote a more complex understanding of a phenomenon. 
In family therapy, Jackson's theory of family homeostasis (1957) offered 
an explanation of many puzzling actions and thus allowed therapists to 
develop a wide variety of sophisticated techniques in response to 
resistance." 
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Beyond these general similarities the structure of theories varies 
widely. As Sprey (1978) notes the form of a theory is arbitrary. Kelly 
(1955) states that the more accurately a theory can predict and control 
events the more scientific it is. Prediction and control are not seen 
as desirable values in this study, so the theory resulting from this 
study is epistemological, in that it provides new ways to construct 
knowledge, not control reality. Giddens (1979) claims that when used in 
a theory, the term description means an elucidation of the relations of 
the phenomenon under observation and the term explanation means a state¬ 
ment of the generative mechanisms of the phenomenon. While that is 
generally how those terms will be used here, it should be clarified that 
explanation will refer to generative conditions and those conditions are 
not linearly causal. Dubin (1970) suggests omitting causal assertions 
in designing a theory. That finds agreement here, as causal assertions 
are seen as a refuge of the unimaginative. The generative conditions 
are the regularities of operation of a system which allow novel behavior 
to emerge. As noted in Chapter III, this study's particular approach to 
theory design uses models as the central aspect of a theory, not laws of 
traditional theories. 
Mogey (1966) states that a minimum number of concepts which allow 
maximum generality are the keys to successful theory building. Thus, a 
theory's power or effectiveness rests on (a) its economy of exposition 
and (b) its breadth and detail of description. Here, there are addi¬ 
tional measures of effectiveness of a theory. One is (c) its ability to 
identify its effect on the observed. For example, current theories of 
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the nature of light recognize that by setting certain conditions light 
behaves like a wave and under other conditions like a particle. In fam¬ 
ily therapy, a number of schools acknowledge that the mere presence of 
an observer alters the way a family interacts. Further, consistent with 
Kelly (1955), this approach to theory measures effectiveness by (d) the 
ability to reveal the uniqueness of each case. 
A Systemic View 
It has been previously noted that family therapy is both a deriva¬ 
tive from and contributor to systems theory. Just like the nature of a 
theory, what constitutes systems theory is the subject of endless asser¬ 
tion and revision. It is not the concern of this study to clarify that 
debate. What is offered is a summary of the critical concepts necessary 
to understanding the meta-model of this study. 
There are three concepts basic to a systemic view: organized 
wholeness, relations and context. Wholeness is the essential defining 
nature of a system. It refers to the belief that the whole cannot be 
explained by the sum of its parts and that the operation of the system 
cannot be understood without reference to that wholeness. Perhaps one 
of the best examples of wholeness/nonsummativity of a system is humor. 
Ideas connected in ways unexpected make humor projected and laughter 
detected. On the other hand, a joke dissected to explain why it is 
funny is one of the world's dullest experiences. Relations unify con¬ 
stituents of a system into a whole. Relations do not merely connect the 
constituents of a system, those constituents are included in, are an 
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aspect of the relations. The constituents, members, elements of a sys¬ 
tem are in themselves patterns of relations. A father is only a father 
in relation to a child. And one looks at the nature and quality of the 
relationships, not merely the content. Using relations as the primary 
tool to describe systems suggests that when one aspect of a system 
changes the rest of the system must change some way in response. Circu¬ 
lar causality has been used as a metaphor to explain this aspect of 
systemic relations. A classic example is an argument between spouses. 
It is impossible to tell who or what started it, but it is also impos¬ 
sible for one not to be affected in some way by the other's actions. 
Context refers to the conditions which allow a system to be viable. All 
meaning is linked to a context. Thus, context influences the specific 
structure of a system, but context can also be influenced by the systems 
it supports. The concept of culture shock provides a social example of 
the importance of context and jet lag an analogous biological example. 
Providing an elaboration of a systemic view, Maturana and Varela 
(1980) have used the term organization to refer to the essential rela¬ 
tions of a system, structure to specify the actual relations of a system 
in time and space and the term coupling to describe how a system fits 
with its context. These terms are a valuable tool in understanding the 
meta-model of this study and bear explanation. 
The biological organization of all male humans is the same. The 
biological structure of male humans varies widely and, in fact, the 
structure of each is unique. One could also say that the organization 
of all humans is alike. This shows the critical role of the punctuation 
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of an observer in defining a system. The structure of a biological sys¬ 
tem changes over its lifetime, but the organization remains the same. 
If.a person received an artificial heart, their structure would change, 
but their organization remains the same. The specific structure of a 
system is influenced by how it fits or couples with its context. Ini¬ 
tial contextual conditions allow a system to establish its organization. 
Biologically, one thinks of the primordial ooze being struck by lightn¬ 
ing that allowed various amino acids to combine into a self-perpetuating 
system. Socially, one thinks of a singles bar catalyzed by music, drugs 
and loneliness that allows participants to establish a relationship of 
unknown duration. The specific organization of the system is determined 
not by the context, but by the resources of the constituents and how 
they can be fit together. A singles bar may provide an arena for people 
to meet, but how they get along depends on how they psychologically fit 
together. The structure of an existing system is coordinated, negotia¬ 
ted between the system and the context. This accommodation on the part 
of both the system and context is called coupling. The complementary 
relationship between the plant and animal kingdoms as they exchange 
oxygen and carbon dioxide is an example of how systems and context 
couple with one another. The skin color of humans in response to envi¬ 
ronmental conditions is another biological example of how a system 
couples with its context. How these concepts--organization, structure 
and coupling--apply to social systems will be further elaborated in the 
definitional section on families. 
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There is one more set of systemic concepts that will be useful to 
define before proceeding with the meta-model: observer, observed and 
participant. Maturana (1978) claims that all statements made are made 
by an observer. These statements connect the observer in a unique rela¬ 
tionship with the observed. What the observer observes may be other 
living systems, inanimate systems, themselves, etc. The important point 
is that the observer is never separate from the observed, even though 
they have distinct identities. A participant is someone who defines (by 
their actions) that their primary interests are served by being a number 
of a particular, human social system. By these definitions a person can 
be simultaneously or sequentially viewed as both an observer and a par¬ 
ticipant. The utility in distinguishing between observer and partici¬ 
pant status is that it is a distinction between epistemology and ontol¬ 
ogy. An observer can only engage in epistemology, can describe what 
they know from their particular point of view. A participant engages 
directly in the reality of the systems of which they are a constituent, 
but must use observer status to communicate that experience. Highwater 
(1981) provides an example of the difference between being a participant 
and an observer: "[I]f you want to tell someone about a dream you've 
had, you must change the dream in order to facilitate its being ex¬ 
pressed in language. You simply cannot get to what happened in the 
dream that is so vivid to you . . ." (p. 5). This distinction will be 
important in the definition of family later on. 
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Definitions of Basic Concepts 
The meta-model begins with definitions of basic concepts: family, 
development, rules, and levels. Each of these concepts has definition- 
ally suffered from a lack of clarity and/or agreement among those who 
use them theoretically. Perhaps, this has been a problem because theo¬ 
rists have tried to define the total reality of the concepts and have 
come up disappointed with only a piece of that reality. Here, it is 
believed that it is impossible to define the reality of these concepts 
as they are epistemological notions; they describe what an observer 
"sees," not the reality of what is seen. Therefore, these definitions 
are not offered as true, but as useful in their domains. 
Each section presents a definition, a thorough explanation and the 
philosophical concepts that are the foundation of the definition. As 
the meta-model is a series of definitions, these concepts are like 
primary colors that are combined to create all the other colors 
(concepts) in the meta-model. 
Family 
During this century there has been a multitude of definitions of 
family in the social sciences. These definitions have ranged from the 
systemic, but overly inclusive and general "unity of interacting per¬ 
sonalities" (Burgess, 1926), to the reductionistic, but overly exclusive 
"mother-child unit of interaction" (Reiss, 1965). In between are other 
interesting, but incomplete definitions: "a group of people related by 
marriage, birth or adoption" (dictionary definition), "a unit of 
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nurturant socialization" (Hill & Hansen, 1978), or "a set of mutually 
contingent careers" (Aldous, 1978). The only agreement is that none of 
them is satisfactory (Segalen, 1974). In response, but not resolution, 
to this issue, this study offers definitions of family on a number of 
levels. 
The definition of family depends on the level and field of observa¬ 
tion. To gain a full understanding of the values of this study it is 
necessary to define family from a number of perspectives. Pragmatical¬ 
ly, a family will be defined as any group that identifies itself as 
such. Systemically, a family will be defined as a self-organizing, non¬ 
equilibrium, dissipative system. Conceptually, a family will be defined 
as a set of meanings unifying people into a primary social group. Func¬ 
tionally, a family will be defined as an abstract human unity that gen¬ 
erates its members' species' and context's reasons and ability to sur¬ 
vive. These particular definitions are not suggested as necessary or 
true definitions, but it is suggested that multiple perspectives of the 
definition of a family are necessary for a systemic approach. All defi¬ 
nitions are partial, so multiple definitions provide a flexible and 
fuller perspective. 
The most basic definition is that a family is any group that de¬ 
fines itself as such. This principle of self-definition is not an 
avoidance of definition, but an acknowledgement that participants, not 
observers, are the key to defining human social systems. Further, this 
means that families are self-defining just like individuals and cultures 
are self-defining. In an analogous example, the problems resulting from 
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White, American culture trying to define Black, American culture, rather 
than encouraging self-definition, have been multitudinous. On an indi¬ 
vidual level, the actions of a young child which indicate that they 
"would rather do it by myself" is an example of the imperative of self¬ 
definition. Adults insist on self-definition more subtly. 
This principle of family self-definition is critical to systemic 
family therapy (an example is the Ericksonian principle, accept what the 
patient brings you) and so is important for family development theory. 
This definition allows theory to be non-normative or more precisely it 
allows a family to be self-norming according to its society, culture, 
members and unique organization. One of the reviewers (McGoldrick) 
disagreed with the self-definition principle and gave a group of homo¬ 
sexuals as an example of a group she would not accept as a family. 
Any excursion into social theory presents an interesting dilemma 
for the observer's relationship with the observed, as they are both an 
observer and in some way a participant. All families are self-defining 
and all therapists, by virtue of their participation in primary fami¬ 
lies, have defined what family means to them. In therapy the family 
system is self-defining, but the definition of the therapy system-- 
family + therapist(s)--is negotiated. The negotiation is based on a 
family's self-definition and the therapist(s) self-definition of what 
constitutes a family. As observers of their own family and other fami¬ 
lies they continually use their own definition of family to negotiate 
what constitutes a family in each therapy situation. And in a broader 
context, every system's self-definition is constantly undergoing 
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revision as its subsystems interact and as it interacts with other 
systems. What this explanation leads to is a claim that the self¬ 
definition assertion is not contradictory with the three following 
observer based definitions, but is instead the basis for multiple 
perspectives on families. 
The principle of self-definition is based on the second definition, 
drawn from work of Jantsch (1980) and Maturana and Varela (1980). The 
second definition is that a family is a self-organizing, non¬ 
equilibrium, dissipative system. Maturana and Varela wrote about biolo¬ 
gical systems when they said that living systems renew themselves in a 
way that preserves their integrity. They refer to their own essential 
organization to determine what types of changes are permissible, not 
primarily to environmental conditions. They call living systems auto- 
poietic because they maintain the small organization throughout their 
lifetime via self-reference. Reference to DNA to determine the permis¬ 
sible patterns of growth in a human body is a good example of auto- 
poiesis. Maturana and Varela disagreed on whether or not social systems 
are autopoietic. While it depends on the point of view, here, social 
systems are not seen as autopoietic, as they do not necessarily maintain 
the same organization over their life course. They are, however, seen 
as self-organizing, as their essential relations are determined by how 
the resources of the constituents can be fit together, not by environ¬ 
mental conditions. For example, two people may meet in a bar and estab¬ 
lish a relationship. Their interaction in the bar may be influenced by 
the bar setting, but their relationship is determined by how they 
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psychologically fit together, not by the bar or any subsequent settings. 
Such a social system is self-referencing in that the growth and endur¬ 
ance of the relationship is determined by whether or not the relation¬ 
ship provides an adequate source of novelty and confirmation for the 
members no matter what the environmental conditions. (The terms novelty 
and confirmation will be elaborated later.) Organizationally, families 
are relatively closed. While organization determines the parameters of 
structure, structurally, families are relatively open. The family por¬ 
trayed in Fiddler on the Roof offers an example. When one daughter of 
this Jewish family wanted to marry someone other than the arranged 
groom, but who was Jewish, the father determined that the family organi¬ 
zation had the flexibility to accommodate that structural change, even 
though he would incur disfavor within his culture. This demonstrates 
relative structural openness. However, when another daughter wanted to 
marry someone outside the faith, the father agonized as he tried to 
accommodate that structural change. He realized that such a change 
violated the family (not just cultural) organization and felt compelled 
to disown his daughter. This shows the limits of structural openness 
relative to the family organization, in this particular case. Each 
family sets its own limits of flexibility according to what they per¬ 
ceive to be necessary for the psychological survival of the family. 
Additionally, families are called non-equilibrium systems (Jantsch, 
1980) as they maintain a dynamic order and avoid equilibrium. Often 
problems brought into therapy are those that threaten a system with 
equilibrium or in the vernacular, stuckness. Equilibrium for a living 
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system means death. Families constantly change, if only on a small 
scale. Relations fluctuate continually, ask any parent that has a teen- 
ager. These fluctuations create the order of the relationship in the 
sense that parties come to have a range of expected interaction based on 
their various experiences together. These fluctuations are most clear 
in relationships like parents and teenagers, in which the pace of change 
can get so rapid that nobody knows what to expect next. Another example 
involves an aging parent and their adult children. They may feel the 
need to reaffirm or revise major decisions on a frequent basis in re¬ 
sponse to the elder's failing health. The fluctuations may be tiring 
but are necessary to maintain the integrity of the relationship. In 
these types of situations fluctuations provide the order of the rela¬ 
tionship most obviously, but it is held here that that is the case in 
all relationships. This means that relationships are never stable. The 
value in this study is that stability is an inappropriate metaphor for 
social systems because it does not fit with the more fundamental notion 
of dynamic order. Certain conditions endure longer than others, but 
none are actually stable. While steady state is better, in examining 
patterns of family relationships change should be paired with endurance, 
not stability. 
Families are dissipative systems. Biological and chemical dissipa¬ 
tive systems dissipate entropy (non-useful resources) as a way to main¬ 
tain a dynamic order (Jantsch, 1980). Information is the fuel of fami¬ 
lies. It is the interplay of differences that continually revises the 
relational structure of a family. Families are seen here as systems of 
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conflict, that through the examination of differences establish and re¬ 
vise an enduring structure. What they dissipate is infonration that has 
little or no use in their current structure. A simple example is the 
point that people generally retain only about 20 percent of information 
that they hear. They contrast the various points of the information and 
discard (dissipate) the rest. The process of dissipation is necessary 
to determine which aspects of information is of value. A more compli¬ 
cated example is an argument. Two parties may hurl threats, suggest 
useful solutions, call names, occasionally try to stop fighting, etc., 
at various points in the argument. If an action fits the momentary 
structure of the relationship-name calling fits with "we are fighting, 
for whatever reason"—a particular action will be taken as confirmation 
of the relationship and it continues in the same manner. If they do not 
fit the momentary structure of the relationship, they may well be 
ignored (dissipated) at the time they occur. Later, when a solution 
suggested early in the argument is accepted, the party who proposed the 
soluton may say, "but that's what I said long ago." However, confirma¬ 
tion of the relationship, whether positive or negative, is the primary 
goal and so dissipation of some information is necessary for the rela¬ 
tionship to run its course towards resolution. 
The third definition is psychologically based. A family is a set 
of meanings unifying people into a primary group. Biology is fundamen¬ 
tally the generation and maintenance of families, but the essential, 
defining bonds of families are psychological or mental/emotional. It is 
not just the actions of birth, adoption, marriage and other events that 
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create a family, it is the meaning generated around those events that 
creates a family. A birth probably has some similarity of meaning for 
almost all people, but it certainly has differences of meaning for all 
people. It is these unique patterns of meaning that are the bonds of 
family. Meaning is the stuff of relationships, so a family may be 
called a pattern of relationships. The relationships include the mem- 
bers, not merely connect them to one another. 
The fourth definition refers to the functions of families; its 
relationships with components and contexts. A family is the primary 
human social group which generates its members' and species' reasons and 
abilities to survive. Further, a family reflexively co-creates its con¬ 
text. Families fulfill this function through their own direct actions 
and/or indirectly through their societal and cultural institutions. 
Some of the terms require clarification. "Generates" does not mean 
causes, but that the interactional conditions of a family are like a 
garden which provides soil, seeds, sun and water for the growth of the 
system it is linked with. Members and species are included as some type 
of primary family group is seen as necessary to the survival of not only 
the components of families, but to their larger human context as well. 
Reasons and abilities to survive refer to the belief that families are 
the arena for the construction of meaning that makes life worth living 
and the skills to pursue that meaning. A poignant example is from post- 
World War II Europe when the infant death rate of orphans in a hospital 
dropped dramatically when they were picked up and cuddled once a day. 
That this is not a family example makes it all the more powerful. It 
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illustrates the minimal relational bonding necessary to make life 
liveable. The adequacy of developmental functioning of a particular 
family can only be determined by an observer's reference to their own 
and a family's societal and cultural contexts. Families co-creating 
their context has been explained earlier. More specific developmental 
functions of families will be discussed later. 
This variety of types of definitions of families is offered as suf¬ 
ficient to allow the meta-model of this study to describe the diversity 
of family structures in American society. 
Development 
When one picks up a test on some sort of developmental theory and 
tries to find a definition of development, it is reminiscent of an 
archaeological dig, as one sifts through considerable rubble and finds 
only conceptual shards. The sociologists who have defined the family 
development field, define development as "change over time" (Hill and 
Rodgers, 1964, p. 171). In the Piagetian stream, Blasi (1976) claims 
that development is well defined and then states that "development is a 
sort of change" (p. 30). The sort of change is defined not by direct 
statement, but by process of elimination. Blasi implies that develop¬ 
ment has to do with the structure of a system and how it is transformed. 
Loevinger in the same volume (1976), more clearly equates development 
and structural transformation; this is a shard of some value, but it is 
still treated as a shard. Development needs to be more explicitly 
defined if the problems of current family development theory--diversity 
and complexity--are to be remedied. The concept of structural 
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transformation has been championed by Piaget and has been widely dis¬ 
cussed among philosophers and scientists (Giddens, 1975; Harre, 1970). 
Structural transformation is at the heart of the definition of develop¬ 
ment in this study; a definition which also accounts for the range of 
operation of development and the role of an observer. 
Development is a concept describing the process of emergence of 
successive, novel organizational patterns (structures) over the life 
course of a particular system. These transformations of structure are 
manifested as a system provokes or responds to changes in itself or its 
environment. The definition requires an explanation of terms. 
Concept. Development as a concept means that it is a descriptor 
used by an observer to organize their perspective of the observed. 
Developmental theories may or may not correspond the reality of change 
that particular system experiences. So, developmental theory is a 
punctuation of a particular class of changes of a system and thus is of 
the realm of epistemology, not the ontology of the observed system. The 
point is that development describes what an observer "sees," not what a 
system really "is." (Interestingly, the most famous developmental 
theorist, Piaget, was apparently fond of saying, "I don't give a damn 
about reality" (Gruber and Voneche, 1977, p. xxii).) 
Process. This term indicates that development describes a con¬ 
tinued series of related events. That is, there is no period in which 
development cannot occur. Further, process means development should not 
be examined statically, but in the ongoing manifestation of a system. 
92 
Emergence. This term means that with the ongoing process as a 
background, developmental changes are novel transformations and some¬ 
times appear sudden and unpredictable to an observer and to a parti¬ 
cipant. Compositely, the process of emergence suggests that development 
should examine the dynamic regime of a system that maintains change and 
order simultaneously. 
NoveJL Developmental changes are unique permutations of a system's 
organization. This implies that these changes are irreversible. 
Organizational patterns (structures). The organization of a system 
is its essential relations. The pattern that actually manifests those 
relations is its structure. Structure always coheres with organization, 
but it has infinite possible permutations. Development concerns changes 
of structure, not changes of organization. (In this meta-model these 
patterns are described using the concept of rules, which is explained 
later.) 
Life course. This term relates/differentiates development with 
learning and evolution. Development concerns the entire life of a 
system. It does not focus on the change of organization across a class 
of systems-evolution, but it contributes to it. In general, as develop¬ 
ment is to evolution, so learning is to development. Learning elabo¬ 
rates a developmental structure until the structure must reorder itself 
to accommodate the greater information it has assimilated. An individ¬ 
ual life course may include more than one family life course. 
In summary, this sentence means development focuses on an observ¬ 
er's punctuation of the continual transformations of structure of a 
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system. What constitutes the structure of a family will be outlined in 
the next section. 
The second sentence sets forth the general generative conditions of 
system development and some of those terms bear explanation. This sen¬ 
tence means that development occurs in a recursive, not linear fashion. 
Manifested. This term is used to avoid any linear causal asser¬ 
tions in how structural transformations occur. 
Provokes or responds. These terms indicate that a system is viewed 
here as neither primarily adaptive nor controlling in its relation with 
its context. A system plays an active role in its development by inter¬ 
acting to maintain its identity. Any particular change has its genesis 
in interaction whether the interaction is punctuated as having origi¬ 
nated within the system per se or from its context. 
Itself or its environment. The source of a change is not impor¬ 
tant. Any event that encourages structural transformation of a system 
is of developmental concern. This view is based on the notion that a 
system can be viewed as organizationally closed (only the system itself 
can determine what kind of changes are permissible) and structurally 
open (within the parameters of structure, which are set by the organiza¬ 
tion of a system, there are infinite structural possibilities in re¬ 
sponse to contextual perturbations). 
For a family example of a change in structure, parents may interact 
with a school in a way that leads to the restructuring of their rela¬ 
tionship with their child and each other. The parents may set new 
standards of performance for the child and they may expect themselves to 
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work more as a team, which may qualitatively change the relational 
structure of the family. The question may arise as to who started this 
change: the school complaining, the parents setting limits or the child 
misbehaving? It is irrelevant, as the point here is that no matter who 
is viewed as provoking or responding to a change, or whether the change 
comes from a social, psychological or biological source a family is an 
active, not adaptive, system that determines its developmental restruc- 
turing by reference to its own organization. 
On a more specific level, a developmental change is any change that 
encourages a change in the structure of a family. This definition of 
developmental change eliminates predictability and normative events as 
criteria. In the section defining a family, meaning has been identified 
as the content of family structure. (In the next section rules will be 
suggested as a means to describe meaning.) However, it has also been 
stated that meaning of relationships is always undergoing revision. 
Does this mean that development is always occurring and are all changes 
developmental? It is always possible for development to occur. All 
changes could be viewed as contributing to development, but that would 
be like counting grains of sand on the shore--one could provide an 
accurate description, but of what use would it be? The position here is 
that the observer applying a developmental theory must specify what 
constitutes a significant change in the meaning structure of a family. 
For example, a parent notices that their oldest, a teenage, starts to 
dress more nicely, is paying more attention to the opposite sex and is 
less willing to stay home. The parent realizes the child is growing up 
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and starts to have different expectations in terms of responsibilities 
and privileges. The child notices a difference in the way their parent 
treats them and begins to relate to the parent differently. When was 
developmental change occurring? The first time the child dressed nicely 
and the parent said "look at you!" and the child was embarrassed (a 
novel event)? The second time when the parent said, "Is this going to 
be a regular thing" (a redundancy)? Or after six months when the child 
smiled with pride when the parent said, "You look nice, as usual" (a 
pattern!)? The structure of the family relationship-the meaning con- 
necting parent and child—is changing at each step. The value here is 
that it is important for developmental understanding to be able to do 
an even more detailed microanalysis than the brief example presented 
here. However, at other times it is necessary to do a macroanalysis to 
create a broad developmental picture. Most important to this choice of 
level of observation is the observer understanding their own purposes. 
At the beginning of this section change over time was offered as 
the current definition of family development. This is not inaccurate, 
merely too general. Indeed, the context of development is time. How¬ 
ever, time is not real, it is a descriptor of the reality of change. 
Time measures changes. Trillionths of a second now exist because a 
change of position of a particular atomic particle can be detected. 
Time measures change by contrasting contexts. The Renaissance is marked 
as a particular time period by contrasting it with the Middle Ages and 
identifying the changes that took place. By contrasting contexts, dif¬ 
ferences in the pace and regularities of change are identified. Until 
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recently the type of time measured by clocks was based solely on the 
Notions of celestial bodies. How, however, the motions of atomic 
particles is used as a basis of refining those measurements because the 
motions of the particles appears to be more regular. By contrasting the 
regularities of change across contexts, endurance is yielded. The 
concepts of years and seasons are based on the comparison of the regu¬ 
larities of change of our natural environment, with the pace of change 
of our own biology and the stars. [Change is difference with motion.] 
Different types, paces and regularities of change from different con¬ 
texts are contrasted with each other, are "averaged" to yield time and 
endurance in order to recursively measure change. Piaget notes that the 
measurement of time rests on uniform velocity, but uniform velocity 
rests on a unit of time (Gruber and Voneche, 1977, p. 571). Piaget 
calls this a vicious circle that keeps us from defining time. Here, .it 
is merely a tautology that reveals that the concept of time is of the 
domain of epistemology. 
Returning to the definition of development as change over time, the 
above definition of time changes the definition to change over change. 
It may be confusing, but it is still accurate, if exceedingly general. 
Development compares one type of change--in this case, change of family 
structure--with other types of change--in this case, societal, cultural 
and individual change. The changes, endurances and regularities of 
family strucutre cannot be understood without reference to those other 
contexts. One can think of the relationship of these different types of 
change as a "linguistic equation" which yields development. For a rough 
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analogy, it might read "family change divided by societal/cultural 
change multiplied by individual change." The point of this explanation 
of the relationship of time, change and development is to substantiate 
the claim that development is absolutely relative to its context, which 
is an observer's perspective. 
Rules 
The most prominent proponents of rules to describe social or devel¬ 
opmental processes, Piaget and Wittgenstein, preferred not to define the 
concept explicitly. Rather, they defined them implicitly by example. 
Piaget, in the seminar work. The Moral Judgement of the Child (1965) 
used the rules of a boy's marble game to begin explanation of the devel¬ 
opment of morality. Piaget later used the terms scheme and schema to 
describe cognitive operations (Eckblad, 1981). These terms will be con¬ 
trasted with rules later. Wittgenstein used rules to explain the learn¬ 
ing of the language game (Brand, 1979). He defined rules by "pointing" 
at them via examples and said "that what is being pointed to here is 
something indefinite" (Brand, 1979, p. 128). Both of these theories 
have viewed rules as a basic part of socially constructed reality. 
Today, in family therapy, rules are a controversial concept, for 
the following types of reasons: (1) rules are an imposition on reality 
by an observer and are not necessarily part of the observed's reality; 
(2) the nature of a rule is vaguely defined; (3) even among those who 
use the term do so in widely different ways. In this study, these 
objections are viewed as the very reasons to value the concept of rules: 
(1) rules are most useful when specified to belong to the level of 
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observation and even a participant then, can use rules to observe their 
participation; (2) rules describe relations and when rigidly defined are 
fundamentally altered into entities; (3) the widely varying and compet¬ 
ing uses of rules allows a rich context for creating new knowledge and 
perspectives. 
A rule, in this study, is a consolidation of meaning of a relation¬ 
ship made by an observer. Rules are not entities, they are a relational 
principle, used here to describe family interaction and development. A 
child who, when asked "what color is that?" contrasts their knowledge of 
colors, identifying similarities and differences, and consolidates their 
knowledge into a statement of "blue." Blue, in this case, is a rule 
about the relationship of colors. Rules are used to simultaneously make 
generalizations and distinctions. 
Rules transform/connect isomorphic meaning across levels and in 
divergent material. When a father says to a child "don't bother your 
mother now," the father has judged the meaning of his wife's current 
activity, speculated on the effect of the child's interaction with his 
wife, decided what action would best fit the current relational struc¬ 
ture of the family and consolidated that meaning (and more) into his 
statement. This type of statement is not seen here as primarily regula¬ 
tive, although it will have that effect; it is a consolidated statement 
of meaning about the family rule structure under certain possible 
(future) conditions. Whether rules are conscious or unconscious is 
irrelevant. As observers of our own and others' actions, we can use 
them at all levels. 
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A rule structure is a pattern of rules connected by a more encom¬ 
passing rule. In the preceding example, it could be said that the 
father used a rule to determine the meaning of his wife's activity, an¬ 
other rule about the child's interaction and so on. It can further be 
said that he used a rule on a different level of relationship--the 
family as a whole—to connect all the "smaller" rules into a coherent 
pattern and then to construct his actual statement. Just like systems 
exhibit a wholeness of meaning, so rules unify the meaning of an occur¬ 
rence into useful form. Just like a system can be seen as a subsystem 
on a more encompassing level, so rules can be fitted into a more encom¬ 
passing, coherent structure. That structure can be expressed by an 
observer as a single rule. The rule of rules notion that the Milan 
family therapy group used in the 1970s is an example (Palazolli et al., 
1978). A rule structure can be fitted with other rule structures into 
yet a more encompassing rule structure. Occam's razor--do not multiply 
concepts beyond necessity—is a rule about the use of rules and rule 
structures. 
A rule is a simplifying mechanism. Some kind of simplifying mech¬ 
anism is held here to be necessary to operate in the complexity of the 
world. The authors of On Scientific Thinking (Tweney et al., 1981) 
state "we do not know why nature ought to be simple, but we strongly 
prefer it that way" (p. 402). Reference to physical, biological and 
social systems as dissipative structures offers an explanation of the 
necessity of simplifying mechanisms to system survival. As two people 
interact, a wealth of information is exchanged. Watzlawick et al. 
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(1967) cite a study that counted 10,000 bits of information exchanged in 
a one second interchange. How do systems manage this enonnous amount of 
information? It is believed here, that systems sort through all that 
information using a dissipative process to determine which information 
best fits with the structure at the moment. In general, a dissipative 
process contrasts the different bits of new information among itself and 
with the system's structure. Whatever elaborates and/or confirms the 
structure is retained in some form and the other less useful information 
is dissipated, no matter how valuable it appears to outside observers. 
In this way a dissipative system simplifies its relation to its context. 
Name calling and threats in an argument are a good example. At the time 
they occur they elaborate and confirm the momentary structure of the 
relationship--the argument--and apparently good ideas for resolution of 
the problems are ignored. Later when the relationship structure is 
focused on preserving the relationship over the long term, apologies are 
made and the previously ignored ideas are utilized. The point here is 
that ignoring good suggestions and forgetting nasty remarks are part of 
the necessary dissipative process of social systems. 
Further, a rule structure is not static, it is reflexive and thus 
is constantly being elaborated. A rule structure is one example of what 
Jantsch (1980) calls a process structure. When the elaboration becomes 
so complex that it can no longer be organized by its initial rules, a 
system must reorganize its structure according to a more appropriate 
rule. So, systems of meaning are constantly establishing a structure, 
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elaborating and complexifying it and then resimplifying the structure 
using new rules. 
The "nounish" definition of rules-a consolidation of meaning- 
could be misleading, for rules are more of an ordering principle than a 
statement of order. This position is similar to Piaget's statement that 
structures are at once structured and structuring. Rules exhibit a vir¬ 
tual, rather than real existence. This means they are observer based 
(epistemological) and temporary (reflexive). To further clarify the 
concept of rules it will be useful to contrast it to some other con- 
cepts; laws and schemes. 
Most research is part of the search for universal laws. Some of 
the physical sciences have had success "discovering" what are currently 
seen as laws, while the social sciences have evidenced universal failure 
in the search for nontrivial laws. (Therefore, it may be wise to avoid 
laws in the social sciences, following Fred Perry’s advice on tennis 
never change a winning game, always change a losing game.") Rules are 
frequently used as a way to talk about the structuring of systems 
without having to resort to laws. Some of those who search universal 
laws in the social sciences regard rules as a subspecies of laws, while 
others claim that rules and laws are not directly or coherently related 
(Toulmin, 1971). If anything, laws are a subspecies of rules based on 
the definition of rules in this study. It must be admitted that the 
notion of laws is somewhat repugnant to the epistemological view of this 
study. While the laws of Newton appeared to be laws for a long time, so 
did the "law of the flat earth." Laws, thus show themselves to not be 
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universal, as they exhibit exceptions and are not eternally useful. 
Laws, like other concepts, will do until something better comes along. 
Eckblad (1981), drawing on Piaget, uses scheme to describe cogni¬ 
tive and interactive operations. A scheme is "analogous to a program-a 
series of operations performed in an orderly sequence, capable of being 
repeated again" (Eckblad, 1981, p. 12). A scheme, like rules in this 
study, is a "tool; for process description" (p. 11). Unlike rules, a 
scheme is a unit, an entity, not purely a relational term, and thus of 
limited utility in this study. However, the concept of laws would bene- 
fit from being portrayed as schemes. 
Many family theorists have used the concept of rules (Bateson, 
1972, Broderick, 1979), in particular, rules of transformation. Giddens 
(1979) describes rules of transformation as a guiding principle that 
allows us to distinguish equivalences in divergent material or across 
levels of systems. To return to the example of learning colors used 
earlier, the color blue is taught by showing a child blue in many dif¬ 
ferent situations or objects. The concept of blue, then, is taught 
through a series of transformations. The differences of the situations 
or objects allow a child to learn how to transform blue in divergent 
material. Admittedly, there could be many kinds of transformations and 
other kinds of rules, but at the level of generality of this study rules 
of transformation are an adequate description. 
To describe the operation of rules, Wittgenstein and others are 
useful; sources. Rules originate in a linguistic domain. Rules are 
learned in the application of them, thus a rule always has implications 
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for action, be it physical or mental action (Wittgenstein, from Brand, 
1979). This is part of their relational nature. As such, rules are 
reflexive. They guide a person in interaction, which in turn modifies 
the rule. This shows their virtual existence. Interaction is the medi¬ 
um of reproduction of rules (Giddens, 1979). Rules have no exact bound¬ 
aries, as they describe relations. Wittgenstein claims that inexacti¬ 
tude and exceptions are necessary to the reflexive utility of rules. 
"Exception is a property of rules. If there were no exceptions there 
would also be no rules. ... If in following my rules I no longer am in 
agreement with reality, then I look for new rules which 'fit' better" 
(Brand, 1979, p. 127). The distinction between a linguistic domain of 
rules and a scientific one of laws is important because they assume 
different views of the cosmos. Science, in general, searches for undis¬ 
covered order, while language creates it. "The rule is the final ele¬ 
ment beyond which we cannot go. It is not possible to penetrate behind 
the rues, because there is no behind" (Wittgenstein, in Brand, 1979, p. 
127). 
Jackson (1967) made fashionable the use of rules in family therapy. 
He referred to families as rule-governed systems. While there are many 
other possible views this is a fundamental and sufficient view of the 
nature of family systems and justifies family therapy as an approach to 
human social problems. Viewing families as rule-governed systems has 
enabled therapists to work successfully with family units and it answers 
one of the three problem questions of this study: How must a 
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developmental framework be formulated to be theoretically congruent with 
the way systems-based family therapies? 
However, the notion of families being governed or regulated by 
rules has met a fair degree of disagreement in the family therapy field 
over the past few years. This objection is justified as rules do not 
regulate any thing or event. They express meaning in the eyes of a 
particular observer. 
Going beyond the notion of regulation, Toulmin (1971) discusses the 
relevance of rules as a descriptor of human conduct. He does not dis¬ 
tinguish them as tools for observers, but still provides a useful expla¬ 
nation of how they operate. He states seven uses of rules. He places 
the uses on a continuum based on the extent to which a person is in¬ 
volved in the formation of the rule. To be most informative for this 
study, the seven uses have been condensed into three groupings. Toulmin 
states that: (1) rules provide (a) descriptions and (b) explanations 
for general regularities of occurrence; (2) human behavior can be char¬ 
acterized at times as (a) rule-governed and at times (b) rule- 
conforming; and (3) humans are capable of (a) integrating and automa¬ 
tically applying rules, thus allowing more complex mastery, (b) consci¬ 
ously applying rules to achieve a chosen goal, and (c) devising rules to 
improve performance or to fit and master new situations. This provides 
a sense of the range of usage of rules in human conduct. To further 
simplify this complex understanding of the operation of rules, the three 
groupings are further condensed into the term rule-guided. To state 
that human social systems are rule-guided allows rules to be used 
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fluidly to describe many levels and perspectives of interaction. 
Throughout the meta-model rule-guide will be used as a general descrip¬ 
tor of the range of usage of rules. 
A rule, it has been said, is the consolidation of meaning of rela¬ 
tionships made by an observer. Meaning is the stuff of relationships 
and the consolidation of meaning is not an exhaustive description of the 
meaning. And despite the multiplicity of rules they cannot be an 
exhaustive description of a relationship. Although they can portray a 
sense of wholeness, rules are a partial description or particular punc¬ 
tuation. Rules are tools for an observer; it is the relationship itself 
that guides a participant. Kelly (1955) states that a theory should be 
reflexive. One should be able to use the same terms to describe the 
actions of the theorist/observer as they use with the observed. Rules 
provide that opportunity in this study. 
Levels 
A systemic definition of levels is nowhere to be found, yet it 
seems that everyone who uses the term systemically knows what it means. 
Generally, people talk about higher and lower levels. However, this is 
not satisfactory for the meta-model of this study, as those spatial 
analogies are of limited utility for epistemological constructs. 
Levels are qualitatively different orders of our perception of 
reality. The question arises, different from what? Different from 
other orders of reality (levels). Levels are one way to draw the dis¬ 
tinctions necessary so the world is not experienced as one undifferenti¬ 
ated mass. However, the criteria of those distinctions are specified by 
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an observer rather than the reality of the phenomenon under observation. 
It is a totally referential and epistemological term. Life has no 
levels, it is a unified experience. Only comparison of how an observer 
perceives various phenomena to be differentially ordered yields a notion 
of levels. Thus, levels beget levels. Some explanatory examples are in 
order. 
For example, animals are called higher life forms in contrast to 
plants. (Higher is not seen as valuable here as animals would be 
pretty hard up for oxygen if plants did not produce it.) They have dif¬ 
ferent organizing qualities and so are different levels of living sys¬ 
tems. However, plants and animals are more like each other than either 
of them is like bacteria. These distinctions are made only by contrast¬ 
ing different existing systems according to their organizing qualities. 
Thus, levels beget levels. Further, mammals are of a different level 
than reptiles. And humans can be distinguished as of a different level 
than the apes. How far can one proceed with these distinctions? Are 
men of a different level than women? Many ancient religious traditions 
and current religious practices would say yes. Economic conditions 
would say yes. The values here say no, but they are different fields 
within the same level. Levels have no basis in reality, they are punc¬ 
tuations of our perceptions of reality. Giddens (1979) states that 
there are either one or infinite levels of structure, meaning that we 
can either see the wholeness of life or we can draw endless distinctions 
within the phenomena under observation. 
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Kelly (1955) insists that establishing differences is not merely a 
Natter of comparing two objects or systems. He claims that a minimum of 
three is necessary as similarities and differences clarify each other. 
If, in some imagined vacuum of existence, there were two balls of dif¬ 
ferent colors, we would know neither of the similarity of shape nor the 
difference of color until a third object of different shape and similar 
color to one of the balls came into view. As Kelly says "similarity 
does not exist, except as it has a reference axis" (1955, p. 306). This 
principle supports the importance of context in determining how levels 
are distinguished. In family development theory it raises the question, 
the typical or normal family is typical or normal compared to what?" 
Not only does normal define deviance, but deviance also defines normal¬ 
cy. In the meta-model of this study, levels will be used to specify 
particular frames of reference and therefore one will only be able to 
define normalcy in reference to a particular, limited context. 
As a number of levels are related into framework a hierarchy is 
generated. The principle that allows the levels to be ordered is the 
context of the hierarchy. Depending on the ordering principle, the 
hierarchy can be linear or reflexive. The frames of reference of the 
meta-model are organized in reflexive hierarchies. Bloomfield (1983) 
identifies five common ordering principles of hierarchy: inclusion, 
complexity, dominance, situational variance, and generativity. Families 
are most usefully portrayed, Bloomfield claims, as generative hier¬ 
archies. A generative hierarchy is one in which one level generates the 
following level. Parents generate their children, their reasons and 
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abilities to survive, and the parents were in turn generated by previous 
generations. Interaction between parents and children affects how the 
parents raise their children, and affects the parents' reasons and abi¬ 
lities to survive, so a generative hierarchy is reflexive. 
The basic concepts and how they operate are critical to a full 
understanding of how the meta-model operates. As they are combined they 
will generate novel principles of development. 
Criteria for Family Development Theory 
The following content criteria of a theory of family development 
are based on the epistemological and values assumptions grounding this 
study, the critique of the current developmental framework, and the 
definitions of basic concepts. By addressing the issues first identi¬ 
fied in the problem statement these criteria of adequacy provide a meas¬ 
ure for family therapists to compare the value of the meta-model of this 
study with the FLC. 
To adequately describe the diversity of family structurs and the 
complexity of family process in a manner which is theoretically congru¬ 
ent with systems-based family therapies, a theory of family development 
should: 
1. Acknowledge that it describes what an observer sees rather than 
what a family actually is. This criterion and the following examples 
are consistent with the assumptions that descriptions are incomplete, 
objectivity is not possible and reality is only knowable from a point of 
view. From the realm of physics, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle 
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(Capra, ,975) states that we cannot identify the ,ocation of a particle 
1,1 t1me 5PaCe s’mu'tane°usly. This principle has been critical 
^ dlSt1"9UiShin9 b6tWeen °'3server and observed and can valuably do so 
1n fam"y theraPy‘ Pdla20lli et «!• 0978) note the importance of dis¬ 
tinguishing between the reality of a family's experience and what a 
family shows a therapist. This does not mean that an observer cannot 
experience the reality of a family, only that a relationship with that 
reality is unique and partial. While it is highly respectful not to try 
to define a family's reality for them, that is not the only value behind 
this criterion. It is further claimed, along with Palazolli et al., 
that such a view improves the effectiveness of a theory by distinguish- 
ing between observer and observed. 
2> Sp-ecify Barnes of reference used to describe what an observer 
sees. Frames of reference allow more specific evaluation of a theory by 
identifying the conditions under which it operates and the general 
values of an observer applying it. For example, if the traditional FLC 
is identified as portraying American, white, middle-class, two-parent, 
nuclear families, then other family forms can be contrasted with this 
model without deviance being implied. Without specific frames the unin¬ 
tentional pragmatic effect is that the life cycle of other family forms 
is implicitly characterized as supplements or deviations of the "normal" 
FLC. Further, if the values of the observer applying the theory are 
noted--in this case, an American, white, middle-class male--then one can 
ask how might the application by an observer with a different cultural 
background be similar or different. In their book Stepfami lies, Visher 
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and Visher (1979) note the pain and confusion of stepfamilies as they 
try to approximate the normative, nuclear family. They further discuss 
how professionals unintentionally comply in perpetuating the notion that 
stepfamilies are somehow pathological. To be congruent with the system¬ 
ic value that families can restructure themselves in a functional 
arrangement, developmental theory should use multiple norms according to 
the society and culture of the family being observed. It should be 
noted that there is always an unspecified frame of reference that an 
observer cannot specify, but the effectiveness of theories is improved 
by the articulation of newly discovered frames. 
3‘ ijse relational constructs (i.e., patterns, interaction, organ- 
j_zing principles, etc.) to discuss how family structures are trans- 
formed. Systems theory uses relations as a fundamental descriptive 
concept. The FLC defines its stages by membership configurations. 
Changing relationships are implied, but are secondary. The individual 
orientation associated with western thought (and represented in the FLC) 
constrains a relational view as primary. For example, Whitaker's (C. 
Whitaker, 1983, personal communication) provocative comment that he "no 
longer believes in individuals, they are only fragments of families," is 
most often met with quizzical disbelief. The belief here is that the 
individual orientation is grounded in a view of life as a grouping of 
things or objects. It is preferable to describe life as a series of 
events. It is important, in the relational view, to draw on Piaget 
(Gruber and Voneche, 1979) to view systems not only as structured, but 
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also as constantly restructuring. Therefore ,wi 
y ineretore, development of families is 
seen as occurring through interaction. 
4‘ Of families and nH,e. .. 
The current fam- 
lly deVel0pment f™«* views families as closed systems, but that is 
only a partial picture. A family does construct its own identity as a 
dosed system, but how that identity is specifically embodied (a fam¬ 
ily's structure) is determined through interaction with its contexts. 
For example, a lesbian couple with children self-defines its basic 
spousal and parent-child relations, but the quality of those relations 
is affected by such factors as acceptance by extended family, attitudes 
of neighbors and school officials, etc. Being headed by women, the 
structure of such a family is negatively affected by existing economic 
conditions. The structure of all family forms can be impacted by inter¬ 
action with contextual factors such as jobs, local values, even severe 
weather, etc. and thus these should be considered developmental factors. 
An observer must judge when contextual factors are encouraging a trans¬ 
formation of family structure and consider it a developmental event. 
5‘ Describe development of all cultural and structural variations 
of family forms in a non-deviant manner. The value behind this criter- 
ion is that all families can (but will not necessarily) produce func¬ 
tioning human beings and contribute to society. There are no deficits 
or excesses of structure based on membership, only on adequacy of func¬ 
tioning. For example, while many people state that it is easier to 
raise children with two parents, if those parents cannot resolve 
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conflicts with regularity they may find it easier to h ■ , 
,..., 0 11 easler t0 be single parents. 
While single parents may handle stress frnm i 
«= stress from the larger context differ¬ 
ently than two parent families, they can do a perfectly adequate job of 
raising children. The societal expectations that single parent families 
function poorly does affect self-perception and functioning (see Levine, 
for an excellent discussion of how expectations affect the func¬ 
tioning Of children of single parent families), but that is very differ¬ 
ent than stating that there is something innately wrong with the struc¬ 
ture of single parent families. Another related value supporting this 
criterion is the belief that it is necessary for a class of systems to 
exhibit diversity of structure across its individual members in order to 
survive and reproduce. On a biological level, incestuous reproduction 
endangers survival by reducing the diversity of the gene pool. On a 
social level, the lack of diversity of opinions in cults is the basis of 
so many people fearing them. Further, developmental theory should 
recognize explicitly that individual families must differentiate them¬ 
selves in some way from their cultural norms. 
6* Depict the developmental influence of any event or factor that 
encourages restructuring of a family. The FLC only identifies the so- 
called major life transitions as having developmental impact. Yet Haley 
(1973) and Carter and McGoldrick (1980) claim that development is the 
context and goal of therapy. If both of these statements are accurate, 
then there are either big gaps in the theory or families must be fit to 
the theory. The major transitions certainly have developmental influ¬ 
ence, but they vary from culture to culture and family to family. And 
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other occurrences may have equal influent r 
m/o + M ai influence. For example, unpredictable 
vents like migration, getting or losinq a ioh r iw y ur losing a job could significantly 
7Ctaf8m11y- subtle level, the redundant Interactions 
at lead one spouse to unexpectedly ask for divorce, or on a more posi¬ 
tive note, the family time and effort invested in developing a child's 
athletic skill, are examples leading to developmental restructuring of a 
family. Any event that contributes to the structural transforation of 
a family should be considered a developmental event, not just major, 
predictable occurrences. 
7' and through states M1nuch1n 
(1974) states that the membership of subsystems is not nearly as signif¬ 
icant as the relationships between the members and with other subsys¬ 
tems. Translated to the stages of the FLC, this means that the member¬ 
ship configuration of a stage is not as significant as transitions 
through and between stages. The FLC theorists choose to emphasize one 
unifying theme of a stage-its membership configuration-and do not ade¬ 
quately distinguish the constant fluctuations of each stage. A family 
is continually in transition in that it is always encountering and 
generating new information, which reorders its relationships. While the 
FLC theorists do not explicitly claim that any stages are stable, they 
leave that impression. As previously mentioned, stability is an inade¬ 
quate metaphor for a family. The theme of a stage endures, but it is 
the constant transforming of a system that should be the focus of 
development. 
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8' ixam1ne fami1y development across time spans from thg 
^O^Jiei^road. The FLC focuses on a two generational scherce 
in its stages and assumes the involvement of a third generation. A de¬ 
velopmental framework should be able to accomodate multiple generations 
of a family's history and very brief episodes, as they can affect the 
structure of a family. For example, many families are aware of five or 
\ore generations. That awareness contributes to the meaning of family 
membership and members define themselves in relation to that meaning in 
their actions by affirming it and/or attempting to change it. In terms 
of episodes, an outstanding achievement or a single scrape with the law 
can change the way family members interact with one of the children. 
Each episode is a fluctuation in a stage and the numerous fluctuations 
in a stage give the stage its order and meaning. The point is that the 
development of family structure had many sources and they should be 
accounted for in family development theory. 
Systemic Principles of Development 
This study offers four general, systemic principles directly rele¬ 
vant to the development of living systems and families in particular. 
The principles describe the generative conditions of system development. 
These principles have been implicitly suggested in the definition of 
concepts and family development criteria. They directly inform the 
meta-model and will be briefly summarized and exampled. 
1. Systems maintain order through fluctuation. This is fundamen¬ 
tal to a non-equilibrium, non-stable view of systems. Fluctuating is 
used in this study to describe the operation of systems, rather than 
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equilibrating, as it does not imply that equilibrium is a goal of sys¬ 
tems. Structures are seen here as embodying a symmetry, not equilibri¬ 
um. For example, each wave and valley in the ocean is a fluctuation in 
a particular order of the seas. It is those fluctuations which create 
the order. Earlier, the fluctuating relationship between a parent and 
teenager was offered as an example of order through fluctuation. Each 
exchange between parent and child is a fluctuation that shapes the 
structure of the relationship. A severe argument and a loving recon¬ 
ciliation lets both know what range of emotional intensity is possible 
in the relationship. The rules that each draw from that experience 
become part of the structure in that it informs them about what their 
future actions might lead to. Order through fluctuation is at the heart 
of the dissipative process of living systems. From a developmental 
perspective, a simple observational principle one can draw is that, 
understanding order by following fluctuations means seeing in sequence. 
2. Systems seek a blend of novelty and confirmation to enable 
development. Bowler (1981) states that "it is the novel characteristics 
of molecules that make living systems possible, just as the novel char¬ 
acteristics of human psyches make culturespossible" (p. 19). Jantsch 
(1980) calls for a new information theory based on the interplay of 
novelty and confirmation and states that the novelty aspect has been 
ignored relative to confirmation. Here both are viewed as necessary to 
system development. For example, when a young child learns to use a 
fork, imitation is a limited view of the motivational factors. The 
child is engaging in a novel experience and at the same time is 
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confirming their belonging with their social system by engaging in 
similar action. A system must confirm its structure in relation to its 
organization primarily and confirm that it fits with its context secon¬ 
darily. The interplay of novelty and confirmation elaborates and 
complexifies a structure, eventually forcing a re-ordered, simplified 
structure capable of handling greater complexity. In a repetitive argu¬ 
ment, people activate the same pattern searching for novel solutions 
that would allow them to transform the pattern, all while the repeated 
pattern confirms the relationship. It is important to note that what is 
novel and confirming is determined by the structure of a system, not the 
broader context. This principle reorients developmental observation 
from examining how the history of a system led to this structure (be¬ 
cause many histories could have led to it and only one unique history 
actually did lead to it) to how this structure prepares a system for its 
future. To aid development observers should examine what is novel in a 
system, not what is normal. 
3. Systems must continuously transform themselves in order to 
maintain their autonomy. Change has no direction, but appears to be 
imperative. On an atomic level, both Capra (1976) and Zukav (1979) 
point out that atomic particles are apparently continuously transforming 
themselves into one another and back. Translated to living systems, 
continual change means transformation from one structure to another in a 
manner which preserves the integrity of organization. From the actions 
of repeatedly transforming food into energy to the continual negotia¬ 
tion, confirmation, and renewal of relationships, family members 
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participate in the ongoing transformation of their families. Structur¬ 
ally, this means that as the first step in developmental change, systems 
break the symmetry of their own structure. A grandparent, insisting on 
disciplining a child after being asked not to, is breaking what they 
perceive as the symmetry of the family structure. A parent yelling back 
at the grandparent or complaining to their spouse is also symmetry 
breaking. These types of actions lead to an elaboration of structure. 
In systems of meaning, like families, it is the interplay of generaliza- 
tion and distinction that elaborates a structure. Eventually, the 
meaning (rule) which makes the structure viable can no longer support 
the wealth of elaborated information and the structure must transform 
itself. Parents who say, "I'm no longer going to tell you every detail 
of your chores, from now on you do it or else . . and children who 
say. Stop lecturing me, I know what to do," are both transforming 
relational structure at a micro level. When structure transforms itself 
it is simplified by virtue of a unifying rule and is then generally 
capable of handling greater complexity than the previous structure. The 
elegant discoveries of science exhibit this quality. Eckblad (1981), 
identifying principles relating to complexity as a motivator, suggests 
that people have a limit to the amount of complexity they can handle and 
that they prefer to operate near that limit. Further, as someone inter¬ 
acts their capacity to handle complexity increases and restructures 
their limit to a greater level. This continual reflexive transformation 
of simplicity into complexity into simplicity and so on is fundamental 
to a developmental perspective. The critical transformations into new 
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developmental phases or stages are those which show the ability to 
handle more complexity much more simply. Jantsch (1980) cites studies 
that indicate that what a structure transforms itself into is unpredict¬ 
able. It is coherent with the systems organization, but can be mani¬ 
fested many ways. The observational principle which can be drawn from 
this discussion of transformation is that a developmental perspective 
means looking at the possible, not the predictable. 
4. Diversity of structures across a class of systems is necessary 
to maintain the transformative potential of the class. This is an 
underrecognized principle in developmental theory and in family develop¬ 
ment in particular. Most developmental theory efforts are aimed at dis¬ 
covering and maximizing similarities, such as seeing the unity in diver¬ 
sity. Emphasis on universal or normative theory building implicitly 
devalues this aspect of development. Bateson (1972) asserted the impor¬ 
tance of differences in the operation of mental systems. Out of this 
Keeney (1983) has formulated a rallying cry: draw a distinction! The 
value of individuals differentiating themselves has long been recog¬ 
nized. While this principle is recognized on a biological level, as in 
maintaining the diversity of the gene pool, it is not strongly promoted 
on a social level. For example, agricultural scientists have expressed 
worry that because farmers understandably pick the varieties of corn 
with the best yields, we are in danger of ending up with only two or 
three types of corn. If that were to occur, corn would be irreversibly 
headed for extinction. The offspring of incest having higher risk of 
biological deficiencies is another example that the lack of diversity 
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inhibits the transformative potential of the class. On a social level 
Cronen offers an example reflecting this principle. Imagine a situation 
in which every statement made was agreed to by everyone present. There 
would be no way for any of the ideas expressed to be elaborated. They 
merely could be restated and intensified. Very quickly interaction 
would become very boring. Complete agreement all the time would mean 
death for a social group (V. Cronen, personal communication, November 
1985). Throughout history it has been different ideas and new organiza- 
tions of ideas that have changed governments and cultures. Social sys¬ 
tems are constantly negotiating how much diversity they can handle while 
still maintaining their identity; rarely is the necessity of diversity 
recognized. The interplay of similarities and differences is essential 
for system development at any level. The observational principle that 
emrges is that "nobody's normal, everybody's different" (B. Jackson, 
personal communication, March 1983). 
This chapter has presented the definition of basic concepts, cri¬ 
teria for theory of family development, systemic principles of develop¬ 
ment. The next chapter presents the frames of reference through which 
family development occurs, a process model of the development of rules 
in families and an explanation of how the model operates. 
CHAPTER v 
META-MODEL OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter IV laid the groundwork for the heart of this study, the 
meta-model of family development that is presented here in Chapter V. 
The meta-model consists of a three phase, rule-processing model and two 
frames of reference through which it operates. 
The rule-processing model describes family development by examining 
how rule-guided interaction leads to continual restructuring of a family 
system. As it uses rules to describe family development, it is referred 
to as the Family Rules Model (FRM). In this model, rule-processing 
cycles through three interactional phases: establishing, consolidating/ 
diversifying, and contracting. 
The two frames of reference indicate the FRM's range and nature of 
operation. One frame of reference is the four interrelated social 
systems which are contexts of rule-guided, family interaction: society, 
culture, family, and individual. These systems are called Rule Source 
Systems. The other frame of reference is represented by different 
temporal levels of family interaction: generation, life course, stage, 
and episode. These punctuations are called Family Time Frames (FTF). 
It is useful to repeat that this representation of family develop¬ 
ment theory is called a meta-model, because (a) it can be used to con¬ 
struct other family development models and developmental models of other 
types of social systems, (b) for each social system under observation it 
can generate a different model revealing the uniqueness of each case, 
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P ocessing model remains the same as it generates different models, 
but the frames of reference change in each case. The meta-model oper¬ 
ates like a generative grammar which can be used to describe the content 
of widely varying situations. 
The order of presentation in this chapter is as follows. First, a 
general comparison between the FRM and the FLC will serve to sharpen the 
contrast between the two and introduce the meta-model. Second, the two 
frames of reference will be discussed as the contexts of family develop¬ 
ment. Third, the phases of the FRM will be described. Fourth, how 
systems make transitions between phases will be elaborated. Fifth, dia 
grams of the FRM will be offered to provide further conceptual clarity 
on the operation of the meta-model. 
One of the reviewers (Hoffman) suggested that the FRM should be 
more explicitly contrasted with the FLC, to clarify its differences and 
thus its value. Therefore, to introduce the FRM it will be useful to 
briefly identify some of the theoretical and practical differences 
between it and the FLC, the current developmental framework of family 
therapy. The FRM is a cyclical, recursive model prescribing how rules 
can be used to describe the interaction, identity and transformation of 
family systems. The FLC is not actually cyclical, it has a linear set 
of fixed stages describing membership configurations. The FRM is a tool 
for an observer to describe what they see as families interact, as it 
forces an observer to specify their frames of reference. The FLC 
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ignores the effect of an observer and claims to describe what typically 
occurs in "the family." The FRM is content free, although it is not 
value free. It reveals the uniqueness of each family by forcing the 
observer to specify the content of family interaction. The FLC speci¬ 
fies the content of development for an observer and thereby stresses the 
similarities of families and ignores the differences that make each 
family unique. By emphasizing the uniqueness of each family the FRM is 
a non-normative model. More precisely, the FRM views families as self- 
norming as they differentiate themselves in relation to their contexts. 
The FLC is a normative model based on one society, one culture, one 
family. These differences summarize the claim that the FRM offers a 
more useful model to describe the development of the diverse range of 
American families, and the complexity of family interaction. 
The one other major difference that bears clarification now is the 
use of phases and stages. The FRM uses phases to describe the cycle of 
different types of rule-guided interaction. This term is preferred over 
stages primarily due to the connotations associated with stage in devel¬ 
opmental theory. Stages have come to imply a series of distinct enti¬ 
ties, locked in a particular order. Phases are used here with the 
intent that they are more fluid, are overlapping and can be recycled. 
It could possibly have been the other way around in that phases could 
have been used in developmental theory and become reified like stages 
have been. If stages were seen as the more fluid, less reified term, 
they would be used in this model. However, the use of stage is based on 
a physical analogy to a raised platform used for performance. Stage in 
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its derivation means a place to stand, and so it is too static to de¬ 
scribe the continual changes of family relationships. Phase is based on 
a temporal analogy of passing and/or recurring sequence of events. 
Phase in its derivation, means to bring to light, to show. Therefore, 
phase is more congruent with the assumptions grounding this study as it 
can be seen as implying that when some thing or event is brought to 
light or shown, one receives only a partial portrayal of that thing or 
event. 
Despite these criticisms of the FLC, it can be a more useful guide 
to the development of certain types of families if it is integrated into 
the FRM. That is, if the FLC stages are circumscribed by the rule- 
processing phases of the FRM and the frames of reference of the FLC are 
specified, then it is seen as only one possible model of family develop¬ 
ment out of many and it loses many of its normative implications and 
much of its rigidity. As the meta-model is presented the differences 
between the FLC and the FRM shall become clearer. How the FLC can be 
improved by subsuming it under the FRM will be presented in the section 
on diagrams of the FRM. 
Frames of Reference 
With encouragement from Bateson (1972) family therapists are fond 
of saying the meaning emerges from context. This takes on special sig¬ 
nificance when systems which are constituted of meaning--!ike families-- 
are at issue. 
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A family's organization is autonomous; its identity is independent 
in that it refers only to itself to determine how its resources are 
related in a viable pattern. However, a family's development, its suc¬ 
cessive, structural transformations which maintain its organization, do 
not occur in a vacuum. These transformations respond to a specific con¬ 
text. A system's context is its source of maintenance and organization 
of a system determines what types of structures are permissible. It is 
not so simple a matter as the system and context respond to and shape 
each other in a recursive manner. For example, interaction of family 
members may be influenced by the values of a church or a political 
party. That family, in turn, may act in such a way as to lead the 
church or party to question its values in some cases or reconfirm them 
in others. These types and effects of interaction may appear quite 
obvious, but they have never been considered an aspect of family devel¬ 
opment. 
If family development does not occur in a vacuum, but in a specific 
context for each family, how then might a theory of family development 
describe those contexts without suggesting that families fit the values 
of a particular context? Indeed, this is a major problem of the FLC. 
Throughout this study there has been an emphasis on a level of general¬ 
ity which allows all families to be included and at the same time 
allows each family to be described uniquely. Addressing this issue, the 
meta-model of family development described in this chapter is devoid of 
particular content. As the previous chapters attest, the meta-model is 
not value-free. The meta-model is a tool for an observer, in that an 
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observer must specify the content of family development in each case in 
which the meta-model is applied. As the contexts and model of family 
development are presented the claim of being content-free will become 
clearer. The following contexts of family development are general 
enough to include all families. There are two sets of frames of refer¬ 
ence presented as the context of family development. These two types of 
frames are viewed as sufficient to describe how family development 
recursively occurs. 
The first set of frames of reference is four interrelated social 
systems through which family structure is shaped: society, culture, 
family and individuals. The interaction of these social systems is the 
source of meaning which forms the structure of a family. The example 
above of church and family interaction results in new meaning for the 
family and thus new structure. Since this study describes meaning in 
families by using rules, these four social systems are called Rule 
Source Systems (RSS). These are the arenas or systems that are the 
source of rule-guided family development. 
The second set of frames of reference is four temporal levels which 
contribute different types of rules to a family structure: generations, 
life course, stage and episode. These temporal levels are punctuations 
or frames through which an observer can describe a family's identity and 
structure. They are called Family Time Frames (FTF) as a family struc¬ 
ture is viewed differently according to which level is used. These are 
the conduits for different levels of meaning in rule-guided interaction. 
The FTF will be described following the presentation of each RSS below. 
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Rule Source Systems 
Each RSS Will he described by defining (1) its identity, (2, its 
:nCt7’(3) and context, and (4, how its value! and 
Pace of change affect family development. 
SSI** For the purposes of this study, society is the most 
inclusive political/economic context to which a family perceives itself 
to belong. To state that "I am an American" or "I am a Nigerian" is a 
statement of societal identity. The primary function of all RSS is to 
negotiate the best conditions for its self-perpetuation with its inclu¬ 
sive context. This means any system must work to insure the survival of 
its context as much as it works for self-survival, as no system can 
exist without a supportive context. In the case of a society, its 
inclusive context is the natural environment and the network of other 
societies. Thus a society must work to preserve its natural environment 
and the larger societal network in some form in order to insure its own 
survival. In order to fulfill its primary function, each RSS creates an 
environment that provides opportunities for the perpetuation of its 
components. The conditions which best promote an effective blend of 
differentiation and belonging of components will be the most successful 
environment. The components of a society are its cultures, families, 
individuals, and societal institutions and movements. While certain 
aspects of cultures transcend societies, a society is the context of a 
particular aspect of culture, thus culture is viewed as a societal com¬ 
ponent. The similarities and differences of Black African and Black 
A \erican cultures or of Italian Catholic and Irish Catholic cultures 
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serve as examples of the preceding statement. Those who are members of 
a dominant culture in a society may well experience society and culture 
as one in the same. 
Societal institutions are those which primarily promote the politi- 
cal/economic survival and well-being of the society and its components, 
like corporations, schools, and the military. Societal movements like 
the nuclear freeze and yuppies are reflexive events that are not insti¬ 
tutions, but which shape the values of institutions and thereby of 
society. These societal institutions and movements do reflect a certain 
cultural flavor. That is due to the reflexive influence of culture on 
society. There may be supra systems in which societies participate, 
like the United Nations, but due to their lack of influence they are not 
seen as relevant to family development. A society is distinguished from 
the other RSS by its emphasis on intentional structuring of a political/ 
economic system promoting the survival and well-being of itself, its 
components and its context. 
Regarding a family and how it is transformed, a society's values 
and pace of change are the critical issues. Values (rules) of a society 
are at once its structure and its means of structuring. The values of a 
society significantly affect the rule structure and transformations of a 
family. A family is connected with its society through values which 
have to do with survival and physical well being. The values of a 
society are not only represented in the laws and governing institutions, 
although they are a part of a society's rule structure. They would 
include such values as the wel 1-documented African emphasis on rugged 
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individualism or the Chinese e.phasis on collective cogent as .eans 
for survival. These types of values impact the rule structure of a 
family; how its members relate to one another, what skills they develop, 
how parents raise their children, etc. The point for an observer is 
that in describing the development of a family, they should account for 
particular societal values and their impact on a family's rule struc¬ 
ture. 
The pace of change of a society is a context of family development. 
The timing of particular issues in a family is influenced by the socie¬ 
tal context. For example, American society has a more extended and 
accentuated adolescent period than most so-called third world societies. 
For many American families adolescence means experimenting with being an 
adult, yet still having many of the freedoms of a child. In societies 
like Vietnam and Nicaragua, adolescence may mean doing the same activi¬ 
ties as an adult, from fighting a war to working in the fields. Clear¬ 
ly, societal change dramatically affects family rule structure in these 
types of situations. Families themselves may or may not see societal 
change as a factor of family development, but any family that talks 
about changing with the times or not changing just because everyone else 
is, is acknowledging the impact of the pace of societal change. At 
different periods or in different societies, the pace of societal 
change may appear to be a constraint or accelerator on familial change. 
These types of normative pressures help families decide how quickly they 
want to change, by serving as a background for families to differentiate 
from. However, these normative pressures do not force decisions, only 
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families themselves do that. Different families at the same time may 
experience very different effects through their relationship with 
society. An established Boston family probably would experience their 
family development more smoothly and slowly than a Cambodian family that 
recently immigrated to Boston. 
In summary, if an observer wants to facilitate a family's own 
direction of their development, then it is useful to acknowledge the 
family's relationship with the values and pacing of change of their 
society and to also acknowledge the observer's relationship with the 
values and pacing of change with their society. Here, the criterion 
which identifies the societal factors is those issues which concern the 
physical survival and well-being of a family. 
Culture. In its general use in this study, culture is the patterns 
of practices and values that define us as human. More specifically, 
particular cultures are the distinct practices and values which evidence 
a unique manifestation of humanity. Specific cultures are discerned 
from one another by contrasting patterns around different human activi¬ 
ties, like sleep and like religious beliefs. The primary function of 
culture, given its societal context, is to promote the development of 
our essential humanity. Culture is the environment which allows our 
humanity to grow. In contrast to the use of the term, society, in this 
study, culture has more to do with the meaning of our lives and society 
concerns our physical survival. Further, society is viewed as being 
more intentionally structured than culture. Cultural practices emerge 
out of repeated interaction which give them meaning. We may create a 
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society, but we recognize a culture. Despite these distinctions, socie¬ 
tal and cultural concerns are frequently merged. The distinctions about 
society and culture in this study are meant more to be useful in under¬ 
standing family development, rather than a claim about the true natures 
of these systems. Another observer may draw these distinctions differ¬ 
ently; the important point is that distinctions between varying types of 
contextual influences should be made. 
Clearly, in actualization the boundaries connecting and distin¬ 
guishing culture and society are quite fluid. The above definition of 
culture—the manifested patterns of our essential humanity-could be 
construed as incorporating society. While some aspects of culture tran¬ 
scend society, this study is concerned with specific cultures, which 
rely on a specific society as a context. To say, "We are Hispanic" is a 
statement of cultural identity which transcends societal boundaries. To 
say, "I am Puerto Rican" begins to identify the societal context, but 
Puerto Rican culture in New York is different than in San Juan. As with 
all RSS, the context of culture includes the natural environment and 
other like systems. 
The components of a culture are families, individuals, and cultural 
institutions and movements. Religion and the arts are cultural institu¬ 
tions which reflect their societal context. The movements for women's 
rights. Black rights, and the moral majority are viewed as cultural 
\ovements whose major function is particular societal impact. As stated 
in the section on society, for those of a dominant culture the 
131 
experience of society and culture may indeed be synonyms. Host clear¬ 
ly, culture and society exhibit a reflexive relationship. 
The values of a culture inform a group of people that they are 
human and how they are uniquely so. Cultural values generally make a 
nore immediate impact on the rules guiding family interaction than 
societal values, as families are major conduits of culture. The inter¬ 
action of subcultures or culture groups, which may be a church, a dance 
class or a group of friends, is also a source of cultural values. Cul¬ 
tural values are not compiled anywhere; they exist in the practices and 
minds of people. These values range from the particular ways of greet¬ 
ing people to deeply embedded beliefs about the nature of life. High- 
water (1980) points out how fundamentally different cultures can be when 
he claims that native people live in a multiverse, not in the universe 
of white western culture. Mbiti (1976) suggests that African culture 
emphasizes harmony with nature, while the technological cultures stress 
control over nature. These types of cultural values evolve over many 
ages. A family system must differentiate itself within its cultural 
values, but those values are the starting point for familial and indi¬ 
vidual identity. A family rule structure is fundamentally influenced by 
cultural values. A family system blends its members' perspectives on 
their cultural values into a unified and unique rule structure. One 
cannot understand the development of a family without a perspective on 
how that family belongs to and is differentiated from its culture. 
Values of a culture change more slowly, in general, than the rule 
structure of a family. While fads, like fashion changes, and cultural 
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events, like Michael Jackson, seem to strike like lightning, they are a 
long time in incubation and much time passes before their effects are 
understood. The pace of cultural (and societal) change can be used to 
explain the phenomenon of family homeostasis. As a family changes, its 
cultural values serve as a background against which a family can make 
distinctions. Whether or not a family agrees with particular cultural 
values, by using them as an anchor or measuring stick, the pace and 
nature of family changes are modified. 
An observer cannot know all the different values of all the differ¬ 
ent cultures with which they come in contact. A family does not know 
what all their cultural values are. But an observer, by generally 
recognizing the impact of culture on a family rules structure and sort¬ 
ing the cultural from the familial in each case, can come to display a 
deeper understanding of how families structurally transform themselves. 
Fami1y- Family has been defined as a set of meanings unifying 
people into a primary social group. A particular family is self-defining 
regarding which meanings organize which relationships in which way. 
That is, that while many families will have parent-child relationships, 
each family self-determines what that relationship means and how it is 
to be structured. 
In previous theories the context of family development was not 
clearly identified, although a particular family unit was clearly por¬ 
trayed as connected with its extended family. In this study, it is the 
totality of a family that is considered a context of development. 
Totality means not only entire extended family, but also those no longer 
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alive and those not yet born. As a family is a set of meanings, its 
totality includes members' sense of familial history and their expecta- 
tions for the future. 
The primary function of families has been defined as generating its 
members' and species' reasons and abilities to survive. More specific 
functions of a family relative to its members and itself as a whole are 
promoting differentiation and belonging, providing socialization and 
protection, insuring growth of the system and the maintenance of bounda¬ 
ries. It is these types of functions that make families the "matrix of 
identity" (Minuchin, 1974, p. 47). Functions which connect a family 
with this context include contributing to the survival of its context 
and drawing resources from the context for its own survival; to some 
extent fitting is structure to the context and simultaneously shaping 
the context. The missing child and anti-drunk driving movements are 
examples of familial functions being fulfilled in the larger context. 
These family-originated efforts will eventually result in a reshaping of 
societal and cultural values. The functions of families are in some 
cases fulfilled by them, but in other cases families delegate some of 
their functions to societal or cultural institutions, like schools or 
churches. 
The context of families is its natural environment, society and 
culture. Families have a reflexive relationship with their context in 
that they are influenced by it and reshape it as well. The high inci¬ 
dence of divorce in American society is reshaping that society and its 
cultures. Divorce was made more possible by economic (societal) 
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conditions. Many women who got divorced would live with their children 
P0Verty, ^ 3t 16331 th6y Would llve- m previous times that was 
questionable. Now these so-called single parent families are changing 
government policy and cultural values. Divorce is certainly a family 
development issue. If seen in this circularly causa, context, it is an 
illustration of the necessity of examining development in terms of 
reflexive, contextual interaction. 
In this study, it is not quite correct to say that individuals are 
the components of families. It is the relationships unifying families 
which are its components. These relationships include the individuals 
who participate in them. But it is individuals who make statements of 
familial identity when they say, "I am an Ikaanga" or "I am a Johnson" 
or It's always been like this in this family." 
The values of the totality of a family obviously form the founda¬ 
tion of a particular family unit's rule structure. As families are 
still most frequently formed by the joining of two individuals from two 
different families, it is not always easy to make this foundation coher¬ 
ent. The values of the families of origin are the initial rules which 
guide interaction of individuals as they form a primary social system. 
Eventually, through rule-guided interaction a new family of choice does 
find a way to make the rule structure of both families fit together 
tolerably. These families of origin rules, like the closely associated 
cultural values, always serve as a backdrop for a family of choice and 
its members to differentiate from. Throughout a family unit's exis¬ 
tence, the rules of the larger family serve as guides for particular 
135 
interactions. A man in raising his son may wonder what his father would 
have done and how should he act similarly or differently. Further, he 
may be aware that his great grandfather was abusive to his grandfather 
and that he wants to avoid those types of actions at all costs. These 
kinds of rules from the family at large help guide a family unit in par- 
ticular interactions. This is boring. 
The pace of change of the totality of a family may or may not be 
slower than a particular family unit. For example, Aunt Jane and Uncle 
Henry may complain about the other family units in their extended family 
changing with the times and ignoring the values that helped this family 
survive through the Great Depression. So, while the total family 
changes. Aunt Jane and Uncle Henry are an anchor to the past trying to 
slow the pace of change. The totality of a family exists, not in his¬ 
tory, but in the minds of those now alive. If a family member changes 
their perspective about their total family then that total family has 
changed. The extended family usually changes more slowly than one fam¬ 
ily unit, but this does not mean that the extended family is a con¬ 
straint on family development. The death of an elderly family member 
may bring the extended family closer together and encourage change in 
family units. 
The pace of change in a family, whether an extended family or a 
particular unit, is not steady and consistent, but fluctuates. Occur¬ 
rences sometimes seem discontinuous and sometimes emerge with seemingly 
smooth regularity. An observer cannot predict how the pace of change of 
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a family will change, but by expecting fluctuations in that pace can 
track more closely how structure is transformed. 
Individuals. Individual persons, as the locus of human identity, 
are both a biological entity and a social unity. The components of an 
individual, for the purposes of this study, are their biology and the 
endless interactions they engage in. While an individual's name is a 
statement of their identity, clearly their sense of identity, like the 
other RSS, is much deeper than their name. Their identity is defined 
through an endless sequence of interactions. Thus an individual's 
identity emerges through enactment in various contexts, not merely 
through statements in a vacuum. 
Individuals are only to be understood in relation to other indi¬ 
viduals and larger social systems. The contexts of an individual are 
their natural environment, society, culture and family. They exhibit 
reflexive relationships with their contexts, affecting the world they 
live in as it affects them. Reflexivity is perhaps easiest to see on an 
individual level. Many individuals have shaped the course of human 
history. Most people know that they both change and are changed by 
those they love. This integrated (unarticulated) understanding of 
systemic reflexivity is not surprising. What is surprising is that it 
is not applied more broadly. 
The theory of family development in this study is in response to 
linear and hierarchical theories of family development. While they are 
the locus of human identity and are the only biological entity among the 
RSS, individuals are not seen as primary among these social systems. In 
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interaction no social system is always or even mainly primary. Hier¬ 
archical primacy of the RSS shifts with the meaning of interaction. All 
interaction occurs between individuals, but this does not make them the 
primary unity of human social interaction. Meaning is primary. One 
merely has to watch an upset customer treat a phone company employee as 
if they were the phone company to realize this point. A claim for indi¬ 
vidual primacy is a claim for primacy of biology over meaning in human 
life, and is antithetical to the values of this study. 
The general function of an individual as a biosocial unity, like 
the other RSS is to contribute to the perpetuation of themselves and 
their context. As a biological entity an individual's drive for sur¬ 
vival is more immediate than other social systems, but the need to 
insure the survival of their context as an integral aspect of their own 
is very similar to the other RSS. The mere fact that individuals per¬ 
severe through the continual societal, cultural, and familial conflicts 
they experience would seem to be adequate documentation of their com¬ 
mitment to contextual survival. As the particular functions of indi¬ 
viduals as biosocial unities are so widely varied and are not the topic 
of this study, they will not be elaborated here. 
It should be obvious to all that the values of individuals affect 
the structural transformation of their families. The examples of indi¬ 
viduals in reflexive interaction cited throughout this study should 
serve to make the point here. Many critics of a systemic approach 
complain that the individual is lost, or at least their freedom of 
choice is lost, in a systemic picture. Here, an individual's rule 
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structure (identity) is describable using the same terms as the other 
RSS. An individual is at times viewed as a system in its own right (an 
autonomous identity), and at other times as a subsystem of another sys¬ 
tem (a relational component). Since the focus of this study is family 
development, individuals are most frequently viewed as a subsystem, and 
culture and society are viewed mainly as contexts. 
Individuals are capable of changing more quickly than families. 
However, an understanding of systems reveals that in a family, some in¬ 
dividuals will change faster and some more slowly than the family unit. 
For example, one parent may decide that a child should be punished for 
an action and so is accelerating the pace of thange. The child responds 
to constrain the pace of change by justifying their actions and ulti¬ 
mately appealing to the other parent. The parents then argue for a 
while and then decide on a different punishment than originally in¬ 
tended. Regarding this example, the family as a whole changed more 
slowly than the first parent wished and more quickly than the child 
wished. Any RSS can serve as a constraint or an accelerator to family 
change, depending on how its rule structure fits with the family at that 
point in time. To understand how structural transformations occur in a 
family it is useful to be able to distinguish the sources and their 
effects on a family rule structure. 
Family Time Frames 
It has been claimed that the context of development is time (and 
that time is a way to describe change). That is, that an observer com¬ 
pares change in one system with change in other systems to understand 
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development. More specifically, it has been claimed that the context of 
family development is four interrelated social systems. That is, that 
the structural transformation of a particular system-a family-is 
understood by contrasting it against a background of other changing 
systems—society, culture, individuals. The regularities of change of 
each of these four systems is qualitatively different and these differ¬ 
ences allow an understanding of family development. A further under¬ 
standing of family development can be gained by punctuating in more 
detail the qualitatively different types of change within a family. 
Just as temporal concepts like hour, day, season, year allow us to de¬ 
scribe our existence in more detail, the temporal concepts of genera¬ 
tions, life course, stage and episode allow us to describe different 
types of family meaning and change. 
These four temporal concepts are called Family Time Frames (FTF), 
and are an elaboration of family as a Rule Source System. They are 
punctuations or temporal levels of a family's experience. The idea of 
generation is a way of describing a great deal of family history with a 
few words, while a stage describes a shorter period of family experience 
in much more detail. They are convenient distinctions to discuss more 
specifically the variety of rules and rule structures (meanings) that a 
family draws upon to guide its interaction. Each FTF describes rule 
processes at a different level and at a different rate of change. The 
rules handed down through the generations of a family are of a different 
nature than the rules that emerge during an episode of a family unit. 
Rules of broader FTF show greater endurance and they generally change 
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m0re Sl0Wly than briefer 0nes- FTF allow an examination of how a family 
maintains its identity across time frames fro, the very broad to the 
very brief. The rules of episodes are always changing, but the rules 
that guide a family's life course ("Every member of this family goes to 
college" or ". . . obeys the rules of the house") change much more 
slowly. The slow changing rules provide a family a source of meaning so 
they can know what it means to be a member of that family (an identity), 
while the rapidly changing rules provide a source of meaning for that 
identity to be confirmed and expanded. For example, a son knows that 
ultimately he will obey the rules of the house, but an interaction with 
his mother may modify those rules. Thus, as the family rules are 
changed, the son's identity is confirmed by his obedience of the rules 
and his identity is expanded by his helping to modify them. Like the 
RSS, the relationships between the FTF are reflexive and the broader 
frames are inclusive contexts for the narrower, component time frames. 
The life course of a family unit is the context for many stages. While 
the life course influences what happens in a stage, the life course is 
also changed by each stage. Below, each FTF will be defined by (1) the 
type or level of rules it describes, (2) how this time frame connects 
various family subsystems (a life course time frame connects a family 
unit with its extended family), and (3) how reflexive rule development 
happens at this level. 
Generations. The generational time frame refers to the rules of, 
to adapt Hoffman's term, the mythic family (L. Hoffman, personal commu¬ 
nication, September 1983). These rules then, are myths. 
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The mythic family consists of those no longer alive and those not 
yet born. Thus, myths connect a family not only to its history, but to 
its future. The expectations for children and grandchildren yet to 
come signify the initial transmission of family mythology into the 
future. Someone who vows to carry out the dream of a recently deceased 
family member, is also using family mythology to guide the family into 
the future. 
The myths of the generational time frame provide the unifying 
themes for an extended family, and so these rules connect the mythic 
family to its extended family. The talk at a family reunion about how 
"this side of the family is different than that" or "how much we all 
have changed since Grandma started these reunions" are meanings that 
unify and distinguish extended and mythic family. Myths transformed 
through generations help form the foundation of a family's identity. 
These myths are not deterministic of a family's identity, but are used 
to guide interaction and form a unique family structure. Myths are 
deeply embedded in the relations of family with various aspects surfac¬ 
ing as they fit current interaction. For example, when a grandparent 
says to their grandchild, "If, I had said that to my grandfather he 
would have slapped my face," a mythic rule is being used to guide pre¬ 
sent interaction. When a new college graduate states, "I wish my 
grandfather were alive to see this" the generational family is the con¬ 
text that gives meaning to the graduation. As a parent says to their 
adolescent child, "Wait 'til you have children" they are creating a 
\ythic family as a frame for the meaning of a disagreement. Whether 
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mythS 3re "trUe" - "0t - irrelevant. Myths are meanings that guide a 
fSmlly ^ interaction and other systems. Myths are not pro¬ 
duced in the past. They exist only in the present in the mind of the 
family and they are changed in the present by interaction. 
Rules of this temporal level link a family to its cultural identi¬ 
ty. For example, during a recent campaign a national political candi¬ 
date, Geraldine Ferraro, referred frequently to her deceased father and 
his Italian culture that provided the conduit for her family to develop 
Its values. The generational time frame is the most inclusive time 
frame and thus these meanings are generally subject to the least and 
slowest change. However, when a person learns new information about 
generations past, this time frame can change as quickly as any other. 
As used in this study, the generational time frame puts family history 
in a new perspective. A family is neither determined by its history, 
nor free of it. Its history exists in the present in the mind of the 
family and while under constant revision, forms a foundation upon which 
a family unit builds its structure. 
Life course. The life course of a family is the time span de¬ 
scribed by the Family Life Cycle. This time span is only cyclical from 
a generational perspective. From the perspective of a particular family 
unit this period is a one time experience. Most often, the life course 
of an individual will include more than one family life course--a family 
of origin, a family of choice, perhaps a divorce, and then perhaps 
another family of choice. 
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The life course time frame refers to the rule structure that marks 
the lifelong identity of a specific family unit. These rules are the 
basic enduring structure of a family unit. A rule structure is a com¬ 
plex of rules, a pattern of meanings, that requires a considerable quan¬ 
tity and redundancy of interaction to develop. While a rule structure 
is always being revised, a certain quality of it endures throughout the 
life of a particular family unit. This enduring quality is the unique 
identity which indicates what it means to belong with this particular 
family unit. Reflecting on their family of origin, a person can identi¬ 
fy a number of values that characterized that family unit. These gener¬ 
al values and the relation between them are like the tip of an iceberg 
which indicates what the family rule structure is like. A family rule 
structure is not like a constitution. It is embedded rather than on 
display. The rule structure is evidenced by general values that guide 
and are modified by interaction. A self-defining family unit—a 
divorced, nuclear, homosexual or extended family—negotiates its rule 
structure as its members interact with each other, their kin network and 
their larger social context. For example, imagine a twelve year old 
coming home and reporting to their parent, "You should have heard what 
'my friend said to his mother." When the parent says, "I never want to 
hear you talk to your parents that way," the child replies, "You don't 
have to tell me, I'd never say something like that." This example 
illustrates parent and child using embedded life course rules (the 
family rule structure concerning respect) to guide their discussion and 
the content of the discussion reconfirms the rule structure. 
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Hoffman (personal communication, April 1985) likens a family to a 
beehive. The hive, she claims, is not the physical structure that the 
bees create, but the pathways that the bees create which are organized 
around the physical hive. Many churches define themselves in the same 
manner; they are not their buildings, but the spirit and actions of 
their members as a whole. In this analogy a family rule structure is 
not its members, but their interaction and meaning. 
The life course of a family unit is the context for a number of 
stages and numerous episodes. But the stages and episodes bring novelty 
to the life course of a family and thus reflexively impact the rule 
structure. The life course time frame connects the extended family to 
and distinguishes it from its particular family units. The unsolicited 
and unappreciated advice from one adult sister to another regarding how 
to raise children can demonstrate this point. The one sister's assump¬ 
tion about the right to give advice and the other sister's eventual use 
of the advice show how the life course time frame connects extended 
family. The lack of appreciation by the other sister of her sister's 
style and continual insistence on giving advice shows the need for 
family units to differentiate themselves. 
The generational time frame is the context of a family life course, 
and usually includes many life courses of its various family units. A 
family rule structure is generally more malleable to change than its 
generational myths as those myths are the basis of the rule structure 
and thus offer a broader and deeper sense of identity. However, a 
family may find it more important to change its generational myths than 
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change its rule structure, for each family unit must differentiate 
ltS6lf ^ S°me S1'9nifiCant Wa* °r the "Vths may threaten the identity of 
the family unit rule structure more directly. A family unit that wants 
to immigrate to another country may be breaking with many myths about 
the extended family staying close together and in their home culture. 
'magine that parents whose daughter changed religions let the daugh¬ 
ter know that her children were going to go to hell. The daughter and 
her husband may vow never to let her parents see their grandchildren in 
order to preserve the autonomous meaning of their family unit. 
Stage. The stage time frame refers to rules that reflect major 
social/biological themes of family interaction. A stage, in this study, 
is defined by a major, but temporary, interactional theme. Stages are 
only defined in contrast to other stages. A family frequently is en¬ 
gaged in more than one interactional theme at once, so there can be 
multiple, simultaneous substages. A two parent family may have an 
adolescent member and thus there is a subsystem experiencing what has 
been frequently called an adolescent stage. At the same time this fam¬ 
ily may have a child under two and so there is a subsystem experiencing 
a stage frequently called early childhood. The spouses, having been 
married for fifteen years, are experiencing as a subsystem, a stage 
frequently called middle marriage. As these subsystems interact as a 
family whole, there is a theme blending the stages into a unique inter¬ 
actional pattern (stage) which defies easy categorization based on 
typical biological or social emphases. So stages, as part of this 
lodel, are not defined by typicality or norms, but by the interaction of 
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the family being observed. The so-called typical stages are seen here 
as substages. Stages are used here for lack of a better tent. The ten 
Phase is used as an integral part of the central model of this study and 
to use it again here would be confusing. 
Rules of a stage are used primarily during the existence of the 
particular, temporary, interactional pattern. One might like to recre¬ 
ate the passionate meanings of the halcyon days of early romance at a 
later time in a love relationship, but those rules can only be reignited 
occasionally and for briefer durations. These initial enthralling mean¬ 
ings (rules) do impact the lifelong family rule structure, as evidenced 
by such phrases as "what happened to the excitement in our relation¬ 
ship? or I always remember the look in your eyes the first time we 
met." 
Each time a child of a family first starts school, the interaction 
of parents, child and siblings alters and renews what it means to be a 
member of that family. However, that "entering school" interaction is 
guided by expectations (rules) of what this event means to all involved, 
beliefs (rules) about who this child is, values (rules) of the parents, 
et cetera, all of which are integral aspects of the overall family rule 
structure. Therefore, stage rules are of a different level than the 
organizing rules of the rule structure. Being temporary in relation to 
life course rules, these rules are more short lived than the myths and 
rule structure which contextualize them. As myths define a generation¬ 
al/extended family and a rule structure defines a family unit, stage 
(and substage) rules defines a family subsystem. As a family actualizes 
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a major interactional pattern, the emergent meanings unify the interact- 
mg members into a subsystem It is the consolidated meanings around an 
"entering school" event that actually define who is part of that subsys¬ 
tem and in what way. A stage restructures family interaction, but does 
not reorganize the essential defining bonds of a family. 
A family function like obtaining food and shelter does not define a 
ge. How a family fills this function does have developmental impact, 
but the nature of this lifelong function is changed by the successive 
Stages of family life. While most of the examples in this section have 
involved typical occurrences in many families, unpredictable and unique 
events can occasion a stage. And due to multiple, simultaneous sub¬ 
stages operating a family always creates a unique overall interactional 
pattern or stage. 
ERlsode. The episode time frame refers to the rules that serve as 
markers or guidelines of specific interactions. An episode is the time 
frame of briefest duration in this study. An episode is any event 
organized around a focal subject. It can be extremely brief, like two 
family members passing in the hall, or of longer duration, like a wed¬ 
ding. The manner in which family members pass in the hall both gener¬ 
ates meaning and is guided by rules of the relationship. For example, a 
father and son may regularly bump into each other in fun as they pass, 
while sister and brother pass each other without apparent acknowledg¬ 
ment. Each of these examples exhibits an aspect of meaning of the 
relationship. As these episodes are repeated over time, the meaning is 
a guideline of action and the action specifies how individuals are 
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connected in relationship. Episodes may be repetitive or cyclical. A 
series of episodes .ay core to be unified by a the.e which identifies 
the series as a stage or substage. 
Episodes are the arenas of action through which all meaning is 
generated. As one reviewer stated (Doherty), "episode is a fuzzy con¬ 
cept, but it has to be fuzzy" so it can describe varying types of 
events. All the examples cited in the above time frames are episodes 
illustrating a particular level of meaning. No events happen in the 
past or in the future. All events occur in the present in episodes or 
are mentally reconstructed or anticipated as episodes in the present. 
An episode focuses family relationships through the interactions of 
individuals. In family development, the context of meaning of episodes 
is stages, life course and generations. However, as episodes are the 
arena of action of all levels of meaning, episodes reflexively affect 
the rules of these other temporal levels. Episodes are the fluctuations 
that order the meaning which unifies a family. Episodes can be the 
elaboration of a stage or mark transition between stages. Episodes con¬ 
nect individuals of a family into relationships and subsystems. All 
members of a family interacting at once are a temporary subsystem of the 
family unit which endures for a much longer period. 
Meaning markers or guidelines of the episode level are constantly 
being renegotiated. Every time father and son pass in the all, bumping 
or not bumping into each other, the meaning of the relationship is ela¬ 
borated. When father says "not now" and son respects that request, they 
have negotiated a meaning for the relationship in this episode. 
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EPlSOdeS are the S°UrCe 0f red^dancy necessary to create interactional 
patterns and thus rules. The guidelines that endure through repetitive 
episodes become part of the stage rules. When a mother says to a teen¬ 
age child, "I told you not to talk to me like that," and the child says, 
"Well, don't treat me like a two year old then," they are negotiating 
guidelines for episodes which will become rules guiding interaction in 
this stage. 
The four FTF and the four RSS serve as the variable contexts of the 
meta-model of family development of this study. They are variable so 
that as the model is applied to each family a unique, non-nonaative 
model is created. The next section presents the Family Rules Model and 
a description of how it operates. 
Family Rules Model 
To describe the central model of this study, first the three phases 
(of eve) will be defined, second, transitions connecting the phases will 
be discussed, and third, diagrams of the model and its frames of refer¬ 
ence will be presented. 
Phases 
The three phases of the FRM will be explained in the following man¬ 
ner. Each phase will be defined by identifying (1) the primary interac¬ 
tional emphasis of a system, (2) the genesis, (3) operation, and 
(4) completion of the phase. This definition will be supplemented with 
examples and various analogies about a systems relationship with its 
context. 
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Ushmq. The flrst phase of the FRM is the ESTABLISHING 
' ”•,i* pr,”r' „„ 
«...*.«th, l,!lc Mtttrnt fomtnj thi 
foundation of a family's idpnti+w tu 
y ldentlty- These patterns can be described by 
both members and outside observers by rules, so the primary task is 
establishing the basic rules and rules for changing rules of a system. 
The genesis of an establishing phase occurs as t,,„ „ y occurs as two or more parties 
interact in a novel way and a fit of their current identities (rule 
Structures) is made. For example, the parties may be two young or older 
people about to become lovers, or the parties may be a single teenage 
mother, her newborn baby and her mother, or they may be two young people 
and their families participating in an arranged marriage, et cetera. 
Each party already experiences a system of meaning (an identity) which 
defines them as an individual social system, and which connects them to 
other social systems-their family, culture and society. Every individ¬ 
ual and other type of system has an operative identity whether they 
consciously know it or not. That individual identity is shaped by, but 
not dependent upon, years of reflexive interaction with the values of 
one s society, culture, and family. No matter how it happens, once the 
parties' identities fit together in some way a temporary system is 
formed. For example, some movies portray how pleasant conversations 
lead to the discovery of common values and other movies show how appar¬ 
ent conflicts encourage a strong attraction between two people. If, 
through interaction, each party's identity fits with the other's in some 
way, then the parties suspend the primacy of their particular individual 
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system of meaning in search of a new and greater unity of meaning. For 
example, the rush of feelings experienced by someone who is falling in 
love, is the experience of suspending their current unity of meaning and 
creating a new and greater unity or system. The confusion of someone 
during their first day on a new job is a similar experience. 
The operation of an establishing phase involves continual reflexive 
interaction, through which the creators of a family system negotiate and 
agree upon basic rules and rules for changing rules. This negotiation 
and agreement are pervasive in a system and while most of it is uncon¬ 
scious, on the whole the question of consciousness or unconsciousness is 
irrelevant to the formation of rules and rule structures. For example, 
one romantic partner says to the other, "Do that again, I love it when 
you move your head that way," and the other replies, "I didn't know I 
was doing it and now I'll feel funny doing it." This exchange shows how 
rules may be created and used in an establishing phase. The head move¬ 
ment was attractive and thus had meaning which connected the two part¬ 
ners. Presumably, this meaning was created on an unconscious level (a 
rule), and only noticed by the one partner after many repetitions 
(another rule). Expressed as a conscious statement of meaning (yet 
another rule), it altered the meaning of the action for the other part¬ 
ner (more rules) to the extent that the second partner expressed the new 
meaning in another rule. This reflexive interaction leads to the emer¬ 
gence of an unspoken rule structuring concerning how one communicates 
about meaning in this relationship. The structure is not a regulative 
structure; it is an expression of meaning which unifies all the more 
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specific rules about an aspect of the relationship. The rule structure 
guides future interaction, but is also modified by it. For example, in 
a succeeding interaction, as one of the partners is smiling for an unap- 
parent reason, the other says, "What are you smiling about?" The other 
initially replies, "nothing," but with encouragement says, "I was just 
thinking how cute you are," and hastily adds, "but I don't want you to 
feel self-conscious." The other partner responds, "I like it when you 
think I'm cute, I just don't want you to tell me how to be cute, I just 
don't want you to tell me how to be cute, like how to move my head." 
These episodic examples are one illustration of how a system establishes 
its rules and rule structure through reflexive interaction. 
As these types of interactions are repeated concerning many differ¬ 
ent subjects, meanings are created, revised and fitted with other simi¬ 
lar meanings into an overall rule structure. As systems members inter¬ 
act, the system continually and simultaneously seeks novelty and confir¬ 
mation. Novelty fuels the necessary transformations that a system makes 
to maintain itself and confirmation supports the basic pattern (organi¬ 
zation) that makes a system a system. If one wants to confirm the rela¬ 
tionship, then they act congruently with the structure. If, however, 
one wants to change the relationship in some way, then, relative to the 
structure, one introduces novelty. While both of these emphases are 
continual, what is generally noticed during an establishing phase is the 
search for novelty. Many of the cliches of lovers show the emphasis on 
novelty and confirmation: "I've never loved anyone like I love you," "I 
feel like I've known you all my life." The search for novelty is 
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dominant during an establishing phase as events are experienced as new 
or chaotic (like culture shock). The complex, reflexive interplay of 
novelty and confirmation is a dissipative process, which establishes the 
basic rules of a system. 
The following analogies describing how a system operates--its 
"focus," "energy usage," and "territory"-will further elucidate an 
establishing phase. During this phase the "focus" of the system is on 
the system per se to the exclusion of its context. The system is con¬ 
cerned with establishing its autonomy which defines it and enables it to 
be self-perpetuating. In one sense, as a new system establishes autono¬ 
my it is the context of itself and its members. For example, when two 
people fall in love they are frequently oblivious to action in their 
surrounding context. The notions of lovers losing their appetites, 
becoming physically clumsy, forgetting about other important aspects of 
their lives are all examples of how previous context is ignored and how 
an establishing phase affects the behavior of systems members. The 
"territory" of a system is explored and defined during the initial 
phase. Through the dissipative process, system members interactionally 
agree what values will be a part of the system and which will not. 
These values, meanings or rules are the "pathways" (Hoffman's sugges¬ 
tion) or "territory" of the system. So during this phase, the "energy" 
of the system is predominantly devoted to creating the meanings that are 
the system—rules and rules for changing rules. "Energy exchange" with 
the environment is a very secondary, but still necessary action. 
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Having babies provides an example of these analogies of "focus," 
"territory" and "energy." When a baby, particularly a first baby, is 
born into a two parent family, generally other actions in life pale in 
importance (temporarily). Members "focus" on what's necessary for the 
baby first. As people interact with the newborn, both they and the 
baby "explore" the new system and the interaction creates guiding rules. 
Perhaps the baby likes to be held upright when gassy and upon discovery 
a proud father "marks the territory" by proclaiming, "See, I got him to 
stop fussing!" The system as a whole reserves its "energy" to insure 
the baby's survival. Generally after a birth, parents devote more 
"energy" to insuring a secure future for their family. More specifical¬ 
ly, in many cases the mother gets up at night with the baby, not just 
for feeding, but also so the father can continue to work productively. 
However, the particular caretaking arrangements are influenced by the 
societal and cultural values a family incorporates in its structure. 
All of these patterns of meaning and actions are uniquely established 
through the interaction of the particular family being observed. 
Quite obviously, during an establishing phase, a system's rule 
structure increases in complexity. However, the key variable in the 
viability of a system is not the complexity of structure of the system 
per se, but how well that structure can manage complexity in itself and 
its environment. The endurance of a system is determined by how well 
its successive structures can manage the complexity the system generates 
itself and encounters in its context. The question arises, how does a 
system know when its basic rules are established? That is, when is an 
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establishing phase fulfilled or completed? This theory states that an 
establishing phase is complete when the system's rues are unified into a 
whole (an identity), but this requires explanation. The functions that 
a particular family system must fulfill to establish its identity are 
initially determined by a blending of each member's individual identity. 
An individual's identity connects them with certain societal, cultural, 
and familial values. Through years of reflexive interaction with soci¬ 
etal, cultural and familial values an individual social system has con¬ 
structed expectations (rules) of how a family system should be mani¬ 
fested. (What the relationship should be affects a partner's actions 
in the relationship, but what the relationship actually is also changes 
a partner's expectations about relationships.) Quite obviously, those 
expectations exhibit both similarities and uniquenesses to other indi¬ 
viduals. When two people are attracted to one another, their expecta- 
tious about relationships fit together in some significant ways by 
definition. However, due to the overall uniqueness each person's set of 
expectations, they will also experience some conflicts of expectations. 
As individuals interact, modify each other's system of meaning and 
thereby manifest an actual relationship, the relationship draws on both 
persons' expectations to uniquely organize their system. Built into 
this organization are certainly criteria about what functions should be 
fulfilled in a relationship. The organization determines how many and 
to what extent those functions must be fulfilled in order for the system 
to become a primary factor in one's life. This point is critical: the 
unique organization of a social system makes that system self-norming. 
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So, an establishing phase of a system is completed when its basic rules 
are unified into a whole, but only the system in question can know when 
that occurs. 
Consolidating/diversifying. The primary interactional emphasis 
during the consolidating/diversifying phase is unifying and elaborating 
a system's rule structure relative to its context. This is a dual 
directed phase as two different types of rule-guided interaction occur-- 
consolidation or unification and diversification or elaboration. Whe¬ 
ther these are viewed as simultaneous or sequential interactions is not 
important. What is important is that these two directions are comple¬ 
mentary and inseparably linked. 
The genesis of this phase occurs as a rule or rule structure is 
established. Interaction of the system shifts from a concentration on 
making rules/meaning to using the rules to consolidate and diversify the 
system. As a system's basic rule structure is established, the system 
no longer has to invest most of its resources in generating rules and 
then invoking and making rules develops an economy. For example, a 
parent shows a child where and how to put her toys away and then helps 
her do it a couple of times. When the child is told to do it on her 
own, she finds toys that were not assigned a place, and she says, 
"where do I put this?" The parent answers, "Find a good place to put 
it, just like we did with the other toys." The child finds a place and 
asks the parent, "Is this a good place?" After the parent replies 
"yes," the child repeats the request a couple of times. Finally, in 
this ideal example, the child stops asking and in a little while starts 
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singing to herself. Shortly, the parent comes in the room to find the 
child not only putting away her toys, but "putting away" the family's 
plants and magazines in unusual, but, to the child, good places. On an 
episodic level, this example illustrates the beginning of a consolidat¬ 
ing/diversifying phase in a number of ways. The child and parent first 
created (established) a rule about putting away particular toys in 
particular places. They then agreed to have the child do it on her own 
(a consolidation). She then set about applying (diversifying) it. When 
the child found toys with unknown places, she and her parent made a new 
rule, based on the first one, with much less effort than it took to 
establish the first rule. After making a rule so easily (it showed an 
economy), the child began using the rules about toys easily (economical¬ 
ly) and she stopped asking. Then the child thought to herself for a 
while about which things should go where (a consolidation of the newly 
diversified rule) and when she started singing she had consolidated the 
veaning of this activity and was diversifying it by "putting away" 
practically everything. This entire sequence was itself a diversifica¬ 
tion of a previously consolidated meaning about how and why to please 
parents or if one prefers, how and why to raise children. On a broader 
temporal level the genesis of this phase occurs as rules are linked in a 
unified whole; a rule structure emerges which gives a family a sense of 
identity. 
The operation of a consolidation/diversification phase involves the 
repetition of the above type of interactions at many temporal levels. 
When a father says, "My father taught me this and his father taught him 
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this," he (with his son) 
is consolidating rules at a generational level. 
And when he goes on to teach his son the same information, but in cir¬ 
cumstances different than his father and grandfather faced, he and his 
son are diversifying rules on a generational level. The notion of 
economy of rules means they are invoked during this phase with signals 
which carry far greater meaning than the effort used in sending the 
signal. For example, when a husband and wife are out socially they may 
exchange certain looks, one of which means, "don't talk about that," 
another which means "let's go home." Or when one or two adult siblings 
asks "you were always like that" it is a signal which invokes the mean- 
ing of an entire rule structure. 
Consolidation and diversification of rules and rule structures make 
each other possible. More than that they make each other necessary. As 
rules are unified into a whole, diversification is demanded. The ongo¬ 
ing transformation of systems requires that all systems must seek 
novelty and confirmation. As systems seek novelty in this phase (diver¬ 
sify) they must confirm the organization of the system by consolidating 
new rules with the existing unified whole. There are infinite rules 
that could emerge as a system interacts with itself and its context, but 
all rules refer to the unified whole or consolidated rule structure to 
determine which types and patterns or rules can exist and still maintain 
the basic identity of the system. They do this through the dissipative 
process of social systems, the sorting, retaining and rejecting of vari¬ 
ous information. For example, a teenager says to a parent, "I know what 
you will say, but can I . . .?" When the teenager says, "I know what 
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you will say" they are marking the identity of the system; they "know" 
the rules and know" that the system will continue to endure. But, if 
they "know" what do they ask, and why do parents so often listen? 
Because they both also "know" that the system must diversify itself. 
Every so often a novel situation emerges (novel to one or more parties) 
and the system must fit the rule structure and the novel situation 
together. This results in change in both the structure and situation, 
and thus a system diversifies. For an example from another social 
realm, the U.S. Supreme Court refers to the Constitution to determine 
which laws and verdicts are constitutional given the novel situations to 
which they apply. 
As always interaction is rule-guided in this phase and as always 
the interaction has reflexive effects on the rule structure which ini¬ 
tially made interaction possible. (The statement that a rule structure 
makes interaction possible is true by definition. A system must be 
organized in some way to be viable. The manifestation of this organi¬ 
zation is described by a rule structure.) 
Using analogies of "focus," "energy," and "territory" this phase 
can be further elucidated. During this phase the focus of the system is 
no longer on the system per se to the exclusion of its context, but on 
interaction between system and context. Consolidating/diversifying 
encourages a system to expand its territory as rule-guided interaction 
emphasizes exploration of the unknown territory of the context. The 
energy of the system is invested in broadening the horizons of the 
system relative to its context and maximizing the skills of the system. 
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Through jobs, school, friends, societal and cultural institutions a 
family system grows, interacts more productively and becomes more rooted 
in its context. This expansion is an elaboration of the relationships 
of the system. The growth of skills via jobs and school is a most obvi¬ 
ous family example. For a cultural example, after Hoses "established" 
the ten commandments, the Hebrews spent many years in the desert elabo¬ 
rating and applying Judaic law. This diversification always referred to 
the judge s sense of the consolidated whole as represented in the ten 
commandments. 
Events during this phase do not appear as completely sudden or 
sharp as in an establishing phase. Expansion, growth or novelty has 
become the rule in the family. Therefore, during this phase novelty and 
confirmation hold equal dominance. An adolescent may come home pro¬ 
claiming "you'll never guess what happened today," but this type of 
event has come to be expected in the family. To the adolescent, how¬ 
ever, they are establishing a new individual identity. The novelty is 
qualitatively different to them than to the family as a whole. 
Any structure has limits to its consolidation and diversification. 
As a system completes this phase its structure reaches its ma imum com¬ 
plexity. This maximum is self-determined by the organization of the 
system. A family system evidences its greatest quantity of rules and 
its greatest complexity of order of rules. The system's ma uimum ability 
to handle complexity in its environment is also reached in this phase, 
but it is not directly correlated to the complexity of structure. For 
example, the U.S. government's complexity of structure appears to be 
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almost inversely related to its ability to handle complexity. As well a 
family with a preponderance of explicit rules and routines often limits 
its ability to handle complex interaction. To say that this phase sees 
management of greatest complexity is not a statement of any ideal goal 
or that all family systems manage complexity well. It means that, rela¬ 
tive to the establishing phase that a particular system experienced, the 
consolidating/diversifying phase will necessarily allow greater manage¬ 
ment of complexity. This then is a statement of how the model operates. 
Any structure has limits to its consolidation and diversification 
according to the resources of the system. While a most obvious example 
is a biological one of the need for sleep, social systems also find that 
their structures of meaning are only able to accommodate a certain quan¬ 
tity of meaning. A consolidating/diversifying phase is completed as 
that limit is reached and the third phase emerges. 
Contracting. The primary interactional emphasis of a CONTRACTING 
phase is maintaining the essential identity of a system (a "contract" of 
\eaning) in relation to its context as the system's ability to manage 
complexity diminishes (its resources "contract"). So, a contracting 
phased implies both meanings of the English word--an enduring agreement 
and a shrinking of the system. Both meanings are derived from a word 
which means to draw together. 
The genesis of this phase occurs as a system's rule structure is 
elaborated to its limit. The limit is reached as a system s resources 
diminish or no longer fit the context and in response its rule structure 
declines in utility. The so-called leaving home/empty nest occurrence 
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provides an example. In the normative FLC model (which does apply to 
some families) leaving home is a diversifying stage, but as it occurs 
the empty nest syndrome supposedly emerges and this is a contracting 
stage. So, contracting overlaps with diversifying. Without the person 
who left home, the family of origin's rule structure no longer fits the 
context. In place of the previous typical interactions with the now 
absent member, some members may experience loneliness and be comforted 
by others, while other members may engage in activities which they 
could not do before. Interaction between the remaining family members 
changes significantly and the rule structure changes with it. (My 
family got a St. Bernard when I was the first to leave home and did it 
explicitly to replace me.) 
During the operation of a contracting phase the rule structure in¬ 
volving daily interaction with the launched member contracts or shrinks 
and is reduced in usage. However, that rule structure does not disap¬ 
pear entirely. When the absent member returns in body or in the memo¬ 
ries of those remaining, the rule structure is to some extent reacti¬ 
vated. Many adults find that when they return to their family of ori¬ 
gin, they act in some ways like they did when they were children. In 
this sense as the rule structure shrinks it also leaves a contract or 
agreement about how the launched member fits into the family rule struc¬ 
ture. This is how a contracting phase operates in both senses of the 
English word. In another example, after receiving a complaint from 
their parent about how they are raising their children, an adult child 
tells their parent, "the world has changed since I was a kid, parents 
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and children relate differently these days. The kids and I have an 
excellent relationship." The grandparent, acknowledging their adult 
child's authority as a parent, but not acknowleding defeat says, "I know 
you have to handle things as you think best, but I think you were raised 
with some pretty good values." The parent replies, "sure you taught me 
good values. Those are the same values I use in raising my kids; I 
don t dispute that. It s just that the way a parent gets some of those 
values across has changed." In this example the generational rule 
structure has contracted to the point that it does not seem in existence 
to either the parent or grandparent. However, through a conflict of 
rules it becomes clear that the essential values of that original rule 
structure still serve as a contract between the generations of this 
family. Imagine at a later date this same grandparent is listening to 
one of his grandchildren complain about her parent. Grandpa says, 
"when I was a boy I didn't even think about complaining about my par¬ 
ents, but times have changed and you can talk about these things out 
with your folks. I'll help you figure out what to say, but you've got 
to go say it." The teenage girl says "thanks Grandpa, I knew I could 
count on you." The values that have endured as a contract of meaning 
over the generations of this family provides the guilding rules for this 
interaction. As situations arise the contract can regenerate new rules 
to fit the situation. The example has a happy ending, but the contract¬ 
ing phase can just as validly describe situations without a solution. 
For example, suppose in this situation, Grandpa had said to this grand¬ 
daughter, "young lady I don't care if times have changed, you still have 
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to respect your parents. Don't ever talk about them like that again." 
And suppose the granddaughter had run out crying "you don't understand." 
The generational rule structure would have still been contracted (not 
directly useful in this situation) and a contract of meaning still would 
have linked the three generations together. However, the nature of the 
contract that is passed on from Grandpa to granddaughter would have been 
very different in this case. In the happy ending, it might have been 
expressed as something like "the family will find a way to resolve these 
things, one way or another." In the unresolved scenario, it might have 
been experienced as "parents and children are in an eternal battle." 
In the above examples. Grandpa represented the generational family 
and its myths. To him the context appeared new and unknown. This is 
typical during a contracting phase. Novelty emerges in this phase from 
the new and unknown relationship between the system and context, but a 
system's emphasis on confirmation is dominant in this phase. 
To continue with the analogies of "focus," "territory," and 
"energy," the focus of the system shifts from the emphasis on connec¬ 
tions and expansion with the context during a consolidating/diversifying 
phase to insuring that system and context remain distinct during a 
contracting phase. The energy of the system is focused on preserving 
the autonomy of the system. An aging mother may lay down clear and 
strict conditions for her daughter's visits. In this way the mother 
maintains clear boundaries and forces herself to make her own decisions 
and not become too dependent on her daughter. The contextual circle of 
the family system narrows. Territory is not so much explored as it is 
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defended. On an episodic level, people who, after an ardent gets 
their dlStlnCt b0Undar1es as th« resolution threatens to make their 
boundaries less clear. This phase marks the decreasing complexity of 
the rule structure of a system and a decline in the system's ability to 
handle complexity. In the face of the decreasing complexity, behavior 
nay be extremely rigid or fluid. The stereotypes of older people engag¬ 
ing in very detailed routines can show rigidity and the loss of memory 
illustrates fluidity. These behaviors are efforts to maintain the 
autonomy of a system and are part of a contracting phase. A contracting 
phase is experienced first as a breakup of the existing rule structure 
and then a reorganization of the system at hand. Breakup does not mean 
that the experience is negative, for even all good things must come to 
an end. 
Many developmental theories state that performance in succeeding 
phases or stages depends on performance in previous ones (Duvall, 1971; 
Erickson, 1968). Synne as far back as 1965 referred to this as the 
epigenetic principle (1984). This claim is based on a normative view of 
development which insists that systems must complete certain tasks or 
types of tasks in order for the next stage to go well. The notion of a 
contracting phase is offered as a better explanation of how historical 
interaction influences present interaction. The contracting phase does 
not carry the normative and deterministic implications that the epigene¬ 
tic principle does. It maintains a link with history, but puts deter¬ 
mination of meaning and action in the present. As an observer examines 
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the development of a system, can ask what resources and flexibility to 
generate new options does the contract with the past provide. 
A contracting phase is completed as the contracted rule structure 
reestablishes meaning on a new level and the cycle of transformation 
continues. For example, a funeral marks the overlap of contracting and 
establishing phases, as it acknowledges the contracting changes to come 
and provides support and direction for facing those changes. On a soci¬ 
etal level, Ronald Reagan's presidency asserts that consolidation/diver¬ 
sification of the U.S. government has gone on long enough. He has 
worked to contract the meaning of what government does in many respects 
and has reached back to an earlier time to establish his vision of how 
government should operate. He has drawn on a contract of meaning that 
says national defense should be the primary and perhaps only action of 
government. 
Individuals may live through the contracting of a number of family 
life courses. It is through those individuals' lives that new systems 
are established and the cycle of life continues. 
These three phases describe the Family Rules Model of system devel¬ 
opment. To further elucidate the operation of the FRM, transitions con¬ 
necting the phases will be explained. 
Transitions Between Phases 
The phases of the FRM have been described by outlining the genesis, 
operation and completion of each phase. The phases evidence continuity 
as the genesis of one phase emerges out of the completion of a preceding 
phase. The brief definitions and examples explaining the phases hint at 
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how transitions between phases occur. Another type of explanation will 
further elucidate the manner in which the interactional emphasis of one 
phase necessarily is transformed into the next phase. 
The FRM operates at the four temporal levels identified earlier: 
generations, life course, stage, and episode. That is, the generations 
of an extended family, the life course of a family unit, a stage of a 
family subsystem, and an episode can each be punctuated as evidencing an 
establishing phase, a consolidating/diversifying phase, and a contract¬ 
ing phase (see diagram on page 180). While the specific interactions of 
a transition from an establishing to a consolidating/diversifying phase 
look quite different in a generational frame than they do in a stage 
time frame, transitions at all temporal levels show some general simi¬ 
larities, which will be explained below. 
A family system can be said to have made a transition between 
phases when the interactional mode of rule generating has been trans¬ 
formed. The interactional mode of a family system changes through the 
coordination of meaning. The concept of coordination has been borrowed 
from Pearce and Cronen (1978), but they cannot be held responsible for 
its particular use here. In this study, there are two levels involved 
in the coordination of meaning. One level is the degree of agreement 
evidenced among the subsystems of a system (a meaning/psychological 
level of content) and the other level concerns how a system uses its 
energy resources (a physical level of context). 
Interactional agreement does not require conscious acknowledgement 
between parties. Just as the great share of rule making occurs at an 
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unconscious level, agreement is a reflexive, 
subsystems in which consciousness is irrelpv 
exive, interactive process between 
each spouse and yet the pattern of interaction serves the relationship 
overall. The "assertive" spouse may see it as a sign of their love, a 
so tries to be very assertive. The "passive" spouse may interpret it , 
a sign of their spouse’s individual needs, and so lets it continue as 
long as it does not interfere with their 
r own needs. These different but 
fitted meanings allow the system to endure, and thus illustrate agree¬ 
ment. That endurance of the system through fitted meanings is the meas 
ure of agreement, not whether subsystems share the same conscious mean¬ 
ing. 
The organization of a system has been claimed to be autonomous and 
yet, for survival, the structure of a system is clearly dependent on 
contextual factors in some significant way. If the energy exchange 
between system and context ceases, so does the system. Energy exchange 
is the pattern of interaction between system and context which fuels 
the continual transformations which are necessary for a system to main¬ 
tain its autonomy. The energy exchange required for continual trans¬ 
formations does not determine how the transformations occur. That is, 
energy exchange does not compromise a system's organization. The 
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organization of a system determines what type of energy exchange is 
acceptable, so what the system is dependent upon is the availability of 
raw sources of energy. For a simple biological example, the biological 
orgamzation of human beings and mosquitoes determines what types of 
energy sources they each prefer. If these two systems tried to switch 
methods and sources of energy exchange neither would survive very long 
as their structure would prohibit it. 
How systems come to agreement has to do with autonomous aspects of 
their operation: how their organization structures information flow. 
Energy exchange has to do with interdependent aspects of their opera¬ 
tion; interdependent because the context determines what energy is 
available, while the system determines how it is used. The point of 
view in this study is that systems simultaneously exhibit autonomy and 
interdependence. It is the interplay of these two levels, autonomy and 
interdependence, and more specifically, agreement and energy usage, 
which promotes the transitions between phases of interaction in social 
systems. The interplay of agreement and energy usage in social systems 
creates different types of coordination of meaning, which in turn en¬ 
ables transitions to be made. In this study it is sufficient to dis¬ 
tinguish three different types of coordination to explain how phases of 
the FRM are connected. The three types of coordination are evidenced by 
(1) simple agreement on two or more levels of relationship, (2) agree¬ 
ment to disagree, and (3) agreement by default. These types of coordi¬ 
nation have certainly been previously identified in many other places 
and in many other ways. What is new is identifying them as necessary 
conditions which must be fulfilled for develops! transitions to 
occur in families. 
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IH Simple aqreenentonjgo^rjrogje^. When two or more 
parties experience agreement about a particular episode and simultane¬ 
ously experience agreement on other levels of meaning-stage, life 
course, generation-then they are capable of changing their interaction¬ 
al emphasis to the next phase. An example is an agreement to marry. 
The largely unconscious process of fitting together of values that 
readies two people to commit themselves to a shared future shows agree¬ 
ment on the stage level of their individual lives. As they agree upon 
the date and other details they make that stage level manifest in epi¬ 
sodic agreements. This demonstrates agreement on two levels, and as 
long as there are no relatively major conflicts on another level (life 
course or generations), then the system will change its interactional 
emphasis to the next phase. From this point the example concerning 
marriage will be continued in two directions. 
First, say that the parents of both young people support the marri¬ 
age and further, the extended families of both are supportive. This is 
evidence of agreement on life course and generational levels. This 
agreement involves the totality of this family. Agreement on all these 
levels of family meaning will necessarily change the interactional 
emphasis of this family. The totality of this family—both extended 
families which are organized around the marital pair--will complete a 
contracting phase and initiate an establishing phase as the two young 
people dramatize leaving their families of origin and establishing a 
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family of choice. Agreement through all these levels of family meaning 
does not guarantee how long such a new system will endure, although it 
can help. As novelty is continually introduced into the system, the 
agreement can quickly dissolve on any level. The order of the system is 
maintained through fluctuations. As the system interacts with its 
context, episodic fluctuations can reorder the meanings unifying the 
system at any level. Imagine a newlywed stereotypically reacting to 
their first argument by saying, "Everything was so perfect on our wed¬ 
ding day, but I was wrong about you and so was my mother." So, while 
agreement on all levels is a nice experience it does not necessarily 
indicate the quality of interaction over the long run. 
In the second direction of the example, say the parents do not sup¬ 
port the marriage. However, to the young partners, values conflicts 
with their parents have always been useful to differentiate themselves. 
So the conscious disagreement could be a sign to the young people that 
the larger family system is encouraging them to move ahead, since it has 
done so in this manner so many times in the past. The pragmatic meaning 
of interaction determines what counts as agreement. In this part of the 
example, the pragmatic meaning indicates that apparent disagreement is 
part of the identity of this family, and so to move ahead with the mar¬ 
riage could very well be in agreement with the family meaning. There 
are two important points in this part of the example. One is that 
systemic agreement is not merely what happens in obvious interaction, 
but is determined by the patterns of meaning that bind a family to¬ 
gether. The other point is that each system self-determines what 
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constitutes agreement. If the young people knew that conscious dis¬ 
agreement indicated systemic disagreement then the meaning and resulting 
action of the second part of this example would be quite different. 
This type of agreement indicates not only a fit of the content of a 
relationship (episode level), but also consensus about the purpose of a 
relationship (stage and/or life course level). This type of agreement 
responds to aesthetic concerns of a family, as it unifies a family at 
all levels. 
[2) Agreement to disagree. When two or more parties agree on one 
level, but disagree on another level, they will come to the next inter¬ 
action phase on the level which they agree. There is a variety of ways 
in which this can occur, which will be explained and exampled below. 
Two parties could agree on what type of interaction should occur or 
what its purpose should be, but not on what the content should be, and 
yet they could make a transition to the next phase. For example, a 
stepparent and their stepchild could agree that the stepparent has the 
right to set tasks for the chi 1 d--agreement on the stage level—but dis¬ 
agree on timing of a particular task—disagreement on an episodic level. 
The rule about stepparent and child interaction was established long 
ago, as this relationship is in a consolidating/diversifying phase. The 
argument the two are having over the task is a diversification of the 
rule. However, the underlying agreement about their relationship allows 
the two of them to move to the next phase and form a contract about what 
is to occur. The stepparent finally says, "I don't want to hear any 
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more. Do it now." The stepchild grumbles about "unfairness" and other 
Principles, but turns their attention to completing the assigned task. 
Two parties could agree on what content should occur, but not on 
how it should happen or what its purpose should be. For example, two 
lovers may agree to a sexual encounter-agreement on an episodic level- 
but not on how it should happen or why-disagreement on a stage level. 
One partner may believe that the relationship could benefit from the 
novelty of a "lustful" experience, while the other thinks that it is not 
novel at all and the relationship needs the type of confirmation that 
only a "sensitive" encounter could provide. Despite the disagreement on 
the more encompassing level-the stage of the relationship-this couple 
will move on to the next episodic phase. They will move on from an 
establishing phase-"lefs make love"-to a consolidating/diversifying 
phase in which they determine how or even if they will actually fulfill 
the meaning they established. If they can fit their different percep- 
tions of the stage of their relationship together they will proceed 
with their intentions. If they cannot come to agreement, their diversi¬ 
fication will undo the meaning they established by moving on to a con¬ 
tracting phase in which neither gets their desires fulfilled. At any 
rate, no matter what the course of action, they will make a transition 
to the succeeding interactional phases. 
The notion of agreeing to disagree has been around for a long time. 
And it can be used much more complexly to describe relational comnunica- 
tion. It has been used here to illustrate discrepant meanings on the 
different levels of the FRM. One could punctuate the levels differently 
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and still demonstrate the same effect of developmental transition, for 
it describes how purpose and content levels of relationship are related. 
There are a number of cliches that express this type of agreement, such 
as, "vive la difference," and "you go your way and I'll go mine." This 
type of agreement responds to pragmatic concerns of a family, as it must 
use its discrepancies to continue its transformations. 
(3) Agreement by default. In any interaction between people there 
is a limited quantity of energy which can be utilized to negotiate 
agreement. When two or more parties cannot agree on the content or 
purpose of their interaction before they exhaust the finite energy 
available to them they necessarily move on to the next phase. They do 
not agree on what to do, they do not even agree on what not to do, but 
they must continue to construct meaning through interaction. For ex¬ 
ample, an adult child and their parent have an argument which they can¬ 
not seem to resolve. One of them finally says, "we aren t getting any¬ 
where, let's talk again later." While each party continues to fire 
parting shots, the unresolved discussion winds down. These people 
realize they have exhausted the energy available to them and thus lost 
the perspective and abilities necessary to resolve the conflict. On a 
stage level of interaction, an example of this type of agreement is 
parents and teenagers who no longer feel that they can communicate. 
They are repeatedly unable to reach agreement and come to experience 
alienation from one another as the consequence of default agreement. 
Vicious cycle interactions evidence this type of agreement. When 
after failing to reach a working agreement, a social system agrees by 
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default to move on to the next interactional phase, that system is even¬ 
tually drawn back to the unresolved issue to again attempt coordination 
of meaning. If a system repeatedly attempts resolution without success 
they continually move through a cycle of episodic phases: establish¬ 
ing—consolidating/diversifying—contracting, without getting anywhere 
on the broader stage level. Systems experiencing such trouble appear to 
be in a very early stage of development as people argue about seemingly 
petty issues and at a maturity level far beneath them. Indeed, they 
have never established some very basic rules, thus the appearance of 
immaturity. 
The notion of "leaving the field" in family therapy, either physic¬ 
ally or psychologically,‘is another example of agreement by default. 
Very serious symptoms can result from coordinating meaning primarily on 
a default level. War between nations is a default agreement, as coun¬ 
tries muster all their resources and risk their survival when disagree¬ 
ment threatens their interactive system. Usually divorce is most use¬ 
fully seen as a default agreement, although a case can be made tat some 
are agreements to disagree. 
However, this type of agreement can exhibit a positive tone as it 
can serve as the context for the two other types of agreement. For 
example, two people falling in love may be perfectly willing to continue 
to explore and establish their relationship, but they finally agree, 
"It's been a very special night. It's too bad it can t continue, but 
we're exhausted. Let's go to sleep." Or one of them may feel this way, 
but while the other is exhausted, they may want to continue anyway and 
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feels slightly disgruntled that their partner insisted on stopping. 
Agreeing by default can also emerge from the other types of agreement 
when people do not seem to know when to quit. For example, two brothers 
may decide to have a play fight. In the course of the fight, one does 
something considered dirty fighting and the other reciprocates. In 
short order, one or both is crying and the play fight comes to an un¬ 
happy end. They moved from simple agreement-play fighting-to agreeing 
to disagreeing—dirty fighting-to agreement by default-quitting by 
tears. Many times people can resolve a problem, but they still have 
high energy levels and persist in using that energy until they and their 
agreement are exhausted. This insistence can lead to an agreement by 
default and an undoing of the previous agreement. 
When a social system cannot create a coherent meaning structure, 
that is, come to agreement within itself, the system must refer to its 
context for resolution. So, as agreement has to do with the aesthetics 
of a system and disagreement has to do with pragmatics, default is a 
type of agreement which refers to a system's relationship with its con¬ 
text to enable the system to move on to the next phase. 
Agreement by default is different than agreeing to disagree, in 
that, in default the lack of resolution is the current focus of the 
relationship and the participants are drawn to reattempt resolution, 
whereas, agreeing to disagree emphasizes agreement in the relationship 
and the tolerance of differences. Clearly, these distinctions are drawn 
by the particular relationship in question, not some supposedly objec¬ 
tive measures. 
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An example will illustrate the difference between the different 
types of agreement discussed here. Imagine a husband and wife having an 
argument. They have completed an establishing phase by agreeing to 
focus on a particular subject. During the consolidating/diversifying 
phase of this episode they disagree so much that the wife runs off to 
the bedroom crying. This separation marks the contracting phase of the 
episode and the contract of meaning about this interaction is completed 
by an agreement by default: the ending of active argument by tears and 
anger. Now, suppose the husband stomps off to work without making fur¬ 
ther contact with his wife as he believes that she is trying to manipu¬ 
late him. The agreement by default continues. This default agreement 
could continue for a long time as they negotiate other issues or that 
night the husband may come in and apologize and his wife says "well, you 
should." They have now moved from default to agreeing to disagree and 
this allows them to negotiate a solution. Suppose alternatively, that 
the husband does not stomp off to work, but follows his wife and com¬ 
forts her. The couple is now agreeing to disagree and have thereby 
established a new episode. They both make apologies (are in agreement) 
and begin to work toward agreement about the original subject. These 
types of episodic examples provide the simplest and clearest examples of 
how phase transitions are made, but the other temporal 1evels--stage, 
life course, and generation--also operate in the same manner. 
These explanations of phase transitions operationalize the FRM. 
Further conceptual clarity will be provided by explaining the diagrams 
of the meta-model which follow. 
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FRM Diagrams 
The following diagrams are intended to provide further conceptual 
clarity of the meta-model. They are a more simplistic representation of 
the model than the preceding explanations as they visually portray the 
meta-model in two dimensional form rather than in the more numerous 
dimensions in which family life occurs. That limitation should be 
continually considered as an observer attempts to use the diagrams to 
understand the model and apply them to families. Also, the diagrams 
look somewhat like a bell-shaped curve. It would be unfortunate if that 
were interpreted as implying some sort of normalcy. The diagrams are 
not meant to characterize any real or ideal family, but only aid under¬ 
standing of the meta-model by simplifying its presentation. 
The horizontal axis of the diagrams represents time: the average 
rate of change across numerous contexts. The vertical axis represents 
the accumulation of structure (a quantitative measure) or the complexity 
of structure (a qualitative measure) of a family system. An observer 
could punctuate the structure of a family either quantitatively or qual¬ 
itatively depending upon their purpose. 
This first diagram presents the FRM in its simplest form: as a 
cycle of phases at one temporal level devoid of any frames of reference. 
It is intended to show that the complexity of structure of a family 
system increases through the establishing phase and well into the con¬ 
solidating/diversifying phase. As a system reaches its limits of diver¬ 
sification the complexity and utility of its rule structure begin to 
break up and decline. During the contracting phase it continues to 
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diminish, but at the end of the cycle the complexity of the remaining 
rule structure is greater than at the beginning of the establishing 
phase. This is intended to illustrate the contract of meaning which 
remains at the end of a cycle. At the completion of a contracting phase 
the level of complexity levels off and begins to hint at another rise. 
This suggests that the system engages in a new establishing phase, at a 
new level of meaning, based on the contract from the previous cycle. 
The model does not necessarily follow this neat curve as one applies the 
model to specific systems. Systems could show significant fluctuations 
of complexity, rapid rises and drops depending on the system and situa- 
tion it encounters. 
The second diagram adds a second temporal level to the first dia¬ 
gram. This demonstrates that each phase of the FRM can be portrayed as 
exhibiting a briefer cycle of phases within it. Each consolidating/di¬ 
versifying phase has a set of phases under it: an establishing, a con¬ 
solidating/diversifying, and a contracting phase. Clearly then one 
could add unlimited cycles of the FRM above or below to picture broader 
or narrower temporal levels (see the fifth diagram). 
The third diagram illustrates how the FRM can incorporate the FLC. 
At the top of the diagram the frames of reference of the FLC are speci¬ 
fied, making clear that it only applies to certain types of families. 
While some might claim that middle-class Black families (and others) 
would also follow this model, here it is preferable to generate two 
separate models and thus underinclude families rather than overinclude 
families in each diagram. This approach allows an observer to make more 
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detailed examinations of each type of family and avoid assumptions of 
overly general similarities. The typical stages of the FLC fit rather 
easily under the broader rule-processing phases. Each stage exhibits an 
interactional theme that associates it with one of the three phases of 
the FRM. It should be notd that under each FLC stage one could put 
cycles of the FRM. So, for example, the stage of launching is part of a 
broad consolidating/diversifying phase in the life course of a family, 
but the launching stage would also have an establishing phase, a consol¬ 
idating/diversifying phase, and a contracting phase under it to describe 
it in more detail. To minimize confusion, this emphasis was not in¬ 
cluded in this diagram, but it is portrayed in the fourth diagram fol- 
1owing. 
The fifth diagram presents the meta-model in its most general 
manner. There are three temporal levels shown in relation to one an¬ 
other. This diagram suggests the reflexive relationship between the 
different temporals levels. The relationship of the levels is intended 
to point out that the fluctuations of the briefest level--episodes-- 
directly affects the fluctuations of the next level--stages--in turn 
the fluctuations of stage level interaction impact the outcome of the 
next encompasing level--life course. Order through fluctuation moves 
from the briefest level to the broadest level and yet the broader, more 
enduring levels are the context for the briefer ones. This means that 
there is no primacy of any temporal level, except as specified by an 
observer. More temporal levels can be added, but it was assumed that 
three is adequate to convey the relation between levels. At the top of 
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the diagram are the two sets of frames of reference, presented in their 
most general form. They can be used to describe a particular family by 
specifying how they interact within the different frames. Further, an 
observer can use the frames to describe themselves and thus more clearly 
represent the values used in observing a particular family. 
These diagrams illustrate how the meta-model can be used as simply 
or complexly as a particular observer wishes. At their best use the 
diagrams are capable of portraying the uniqueness of each family in a 
non-normative manner, characterizing how a family is related to its con¬ 
texts, and suggesting how an observer's values affect their description 
of a family. 
The theoretical meta-model has been presented. It has been con¬ 
structed to account for the diversity of structure and complexity of 
process of American families, and to describe these families in a manner 
congruent with the broad systemic theory base of family therapy. The 
brief examples presented throughout only hint at its application. It 
was not an intention of this study to discuss applications of the meta¬ 
model at any length, but a brief application is outlined in the next 
chapter. The purpose of the study was to offer the meta-model as a 
theoretical, generative grammar that could be used by observers to 
describe any family or group of families that they wished. 
chapter VI 
APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation is a theoretical study. It presents a theory 
capable of generating hypotheses and models. While the study does not 
substantiate the value of the theory by a test of rigorous application, 
in this concluding chapter two brief sections related to application 
will be presented. First, the comments of the reviewers will be summa¬ 
rized with a discussion of how their comments affected the version of 
the meta-model detailed in the dissertation. Second, a developmental 
assessment of a family in family therapy will be offered. Lastly, 
implications for further research will be discussed. 
Reviewers' Comments 
A condensed (25 pages) version of the meta-model was sent to five 
reviewers (see Appendix). These reviewers are known as leaders in the 
family therapy field through their publications, speaking and/or posi¬ 
tion in national family therapy organizations. Four of them shared 
their responses. Three of the four said they thought that the condensed 
version could make a positive contribution to family development theory. 
One of these three was quite specific in his comments, while the other 
two were more general. 
This one reviewer (Doherty) said he "liked it a lot," it was 
"clearly an improvement over the current theory," and "it is a good 
contribution to the field." At the time of this work, Doherty was Chair 
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of the Program Committee of the American Association for Marriage and 
Family Therapy. He stated that those positive comments were the context 
for the suggestions he could offer to improve the model. First, he 
thought that the criteria for adequacy of a theory should be stated more 
clearly and strongly, so that an observer could better judge what might 
make this theory better than others. Second, he noted that he found 
most of the definitions of terms to be a useful improvement on current 
notions. The emphasis on the sequence of structural transformations in 
the definition of development he viewed as particularly helpful. He 
thought the idea of punctuating family time frames was good and he found 
the particular distinctions valuable. While he initially said that 
episode was defined in a fuzzy manner, as it was further explained he 
stated that it has to be fuzzy" and that fuzziness should be indicated 
in the definition. Broadening the context of family development by 
including society, culture, and individual he said was also useful. In 
terms of the FRM, he said that the phases made sense individually and as 
a collective sequence. The establishing phase was quite apparent and 
almost self-explanatory. The consolidating/diversifying phase he saw as 
a new twist, but he was most impressed with the concept of a contracting 
phase. He thought this was a "important contribution to the understand¬ 
ing of development" and the dual meaning of the phase provided an 
explanation for continuing development. The transitions between phases 
he "did not find compelling" because use of the term agreement seemed to 
imply a role for consciousness that he did not believe was necessary. 
He suggested the term accommodation instead. Finally, he said that the 
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critique of the FLC was accurate, but harsher than it needed to be. The 
FLC was not intended to be congruent with systemic theory, and he said 
that disclaimer should be included in the critique. 
The suggestions that this reviewer made were generally incorporated 
into the final version of the meta-model. For example, the section on 
transitions was strengthened. While the notion of various types of 
agreement was still used to explain change in social systems, a clearer 
statement about the irrelevance of consciousness in such transitions was 
included. 
The two other reviewers (Coyne; Hoffman) who were generally posi¬ 
tive about the meta-model were not as detailed in their comments. Coyne 
has offered numerous workshops across the country representing the Men¬ 
tal Research Institute perspective on family therapy; Hoffman has writ¬ 
ten a major book on family therapy and is a well known theorist. Both 
thought it had potential for a positive contribution to the field, but 
in the form they read, it was too abstract to be understood by a wide 
audience. They acknowledged that the condensation could only contain 
the essentials of the model, but wanted to see more examples. Coyne 
said, "it was abstract, but there is definitely a good contribution in 
it." He said he would "like to read an application of it." In particu¬ 
lar, he thought the inclusion of societal and cultural factors in 
development was important. He thought that the definition of rules was 
good, but warned that rules are too often interpreted as having regula¬ 
tive power and he could not agree with that. Hoffman indicated that she 
found the definitions to be congruent with her perspective of systemic 
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theory, but she had trouble with the denseness of the writing style. 
She thought the content was fine for a dissertation, but was challenging 
about what style should be used to disseminate the theory to family 
therapists at large. More specifically, she agreed with the definition 
of a family. "Families are not entities, but a temporal succession" of 
events. She saw the emphasis on novelty as important. While she liked 
the definition of development, she believed that the term was so loaded 
with unacceptable meanings that a novel term should be used to describe 
the type of changes that the meta-model addresses. She agreed that 
transformation would be a better term and suggested that the transforma¬ 
tional view of this theory should be more clearly contrasted with the 
traditional developmental view. 
The criticisms of these reviewers about abstraction strongly influ¬ 
enced the final version of the meta-model. While it was always expected 
that the final version, which is eight times longer than the condensed 
version, would contain many more examples illustrating how the model 
vight operate, the comments of these reviewers insured it. The fact 
that the level of abstraction obscured some of the content of the model 
for these reviewers has led to the conclusion that it was probably a 
mistake to expect even the most knowledgeable readers to be able to get 
a comprehensive sense of the meta-model in such severely reduced form. 
Given the assumption that it would have been unrealistic to expect 
reviewers to read ny effort that was much longer, perhaps this conversa¬ 
tional method is of limited value when the material represents such a 
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new perspective and requires significantly more length to be fully 
expressed. 
The fourth reviewer (McGoldrick) did not find the condensation of 
the meta-model to be valuable as "the level of abstraction which you 
seem to find helpful. I don't know how to use." McGoldrick is the co¬ 
author of the major book on the FLC in the family therapy field. She 
believed that the FLC continues to be an adequate framework for family 
therapy. As presented she thought that the meta-model was not useful. 
Specifically, she repeatedly stated that the meta-model ignored the 
value of family history. Further, she disagreed with the notion of a 
family as a self-defining group, but did not state her alternative view. 
These comments, although negative, also influenced the final ver¬ 
sion of the meta-model. They emphasized the importance of drawing the 
distinctions between the traditional model of family development and the 
meta-model presented here as strongly and clearly as possible. Further, 
they served as confirmation that the values of an observer should be 
clearly stated as they have a significant impact on what one observes. 
In sum, the reviewers' comments were valuable in initially confirm¬ 
ing the general value of the meta-model. Overall, they supported the 
need for family development theory to better account for the diversity 
of structure and complexity of process of families, and to account for 
those factors in a manner more congruent with systemic theory. Three of 
the four reviewers believed that this meta-model had the potential to 
address those needs. Obviously, this is not an empirical review, but 
the process achieved the desired results as an initial indication of the 
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potential value of the content of this meta-model. The major difficulty 
with this particular use of the conversational method was the amount of 
material that was condensed in such a limited space. Perhaps, more 
readers reviewing just sections of the meta-model, which were more fully 
explained and exampled, would have offered a more detailed and clear 
analysis of the theory. 
FRM Developmental Assessment Outline 
Any developmental framework, to be useful in family therapy, must 
be valuable in guiding assessment and directing treatment. The FLC pro¬ 
vides general, normative categories that do aid in therapy, but tend to 
fit families to the theory and the therapist's experience is usually a 
\ore valuable guide than the FLC. The FRM must be adapted to fit the 
family being observed and it can provide some directions that a thera¬ 
pist had not previously considered. 
This section offers an example of how the FRM can be used for 
developmental assessment. Five beginning family therapists, all of 
whom had less than two years experience in systemic therapy, were 
taught the FRM in a 33 hour course that basically followed this disser¬ 
tation. Drawing on a family that was currently in their treatment, one 
assignment was for every student to do a developmental assessment based 
on the FRM. Each student presented their initial assessment to the 
class and then revised it with input from the other students. An out¬ 
line of the assessment was provided. Following, the assessment outline 
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will be described first, and then one of the assessments done by the 
students will be presented. 
As development concerns the successive structural transformations 
that a system experiences in relation to its context, a developmental 
assessment focuses on Structure and Context, and the Functions which 
connect them. 
Under the category of Structure there are four subcategories which 
elucidate how the concept is used. One is the organizational phases 
that an observer perceives a family as experiencing. This means that an 
observer examines the interaction of a family and decides whether they 
are best described as in an Establishing, Consolidating/Diversifying, or 
Contracting phase. The observer makes this decision about the family in 
a Generational, Life Course, and Stage time frame, and uses Episodic 
examples to illustrate their decisions. Since Episodes are continually 
moving through cycles of phases it is not useful for the assessment to 
say that a particular family is, for example, in an Establishing phase 
in this Episode. 
The second subcategory is the critical Patterns of Interaction or 
critical Relations of a family that an observer chooses to represent the 
identity of a family system. These Patterns or Relations can be de¬ 
scribed by drawing on the meta-model, and indicating how this particular 
family is making transitions between phases of development (agreement, 
agreeing to disagree, or agreement by default). And they can be de¬ 
scribed by using the techniques of any school of family therapy. A 
micro-analysis of the structural school (Minuchin and Fishman, 1981), a 
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problematic sequence of interaction of the MRI school (Weakland and 
Fisch, 1982), a hierarchical description a la Haley (Haley, 1981), the 
systemic myths of the Milan school (Palazolli et al., 1978), a multi- 
generational analysis of the Bowenian school (Bowen, 1976), or any other 
systemic formulation can be used to describe a family under this subca¬ 
tegory. As should be evident, some of these schools will emphasize 
Patterns in different time frames. The Bowenian and even the Milan 
school may use the generational time frame to discuss a family much more 
than the other schools. The structural school may use the life course 
or stage time frame more than the others. The brief treatment schools 
of MRI and DeShazer (1985)i ay primarily use the episodic time frame to 
describe family interaction. This subcategory. Patterns, involves 
whatever interactional history an observer chooses to include up to the 
present. 
Third in the Structure category is the Challenges or Events that a 
family faces. This category examines a family from the present to the 
near future and is connected to the Functions of a family relative to 
its Context (see Functions below). The question is, what issues is a 
family facing that present a conflict between its Structure and Con¬ 
text? This may include potential conflicts with the larger social 
service system, with extended family or between family members, et 
cetera. How a family handles these Challenges and Events can be guided 
and evaluated by the developmental principles suggested in Chapter IV 
(order through fluctuation, novelty/confirmation, continual transforma¬ 
tion, and diversity across a class of structures). 
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The fourth subcategory is the possible Directions or Consequences 
that a family may experience as a result of how they handle the events 
they are facing. This subcategory extends a family interactionally into 
the future. There are, of course, multiple possible directions for the 
future, but this grouping is a reminder to observers that systems are, 
as Piaget notes, at once structured and structuring. This last struc¬ 
tural grouping implies the importance of viewing development as a resur- 
sive process. Some family therapists prefer not to speculate on possi¬ 
bly future directions as an affirmation of the multiplicity of possibi¬ 
lities and of the self-definitional power of the system being observed. 
The view here is not necessarily incongruent with those values, for an 
observer may prefer to have a family chart these Directions. In a 
developmental assessment of a family it is important in some way to 
account for where interaction, intervention and other changes might 
lead. 
These four subcategories provide a dynamic and variable description 
of structure. The second category of this developmental assessment. 
Context, also has four subcategories that elaborate the meaning and 
influence of contextual factors. 
Context, in this developmental assessment, means examining the 
impact on family interactions of the values and timing of change in the 
four Rule Source Systems. Each individual member of a family as a bio¬ 
social unity exhibits a unique pattern of values and the pace of change 
that they prefer is in some significant way different from the other 
individuals. A common criticism of systemic family therapy is that the 
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individual is lost. This emphasis counters that criticism, but does not 
grant primacy to individuals over any of the other Rule Source Systems. 
While it is obvious, it is necessary to mention that the values and pace 
of change of the totality of a family influence the development of its 
particular family units. Likewise it should be clear by this point in 
the study that the values and timing of change of the culture and 
society with which a family is connected influence its structural trans¬ 
formations. All of these subcategories have been fully explained in 
Chapters IV and V. Neugarten (1968) has suggested that developmental 
changes can occur on-time or off-time according to the cultural/societal 
norms of the system being observed. This perspective refutes that nor¬ 
mative view by expanding the levels of context and by holding that while 
the structure of family systems are influenced by contextual interac¬ 
tion, those family systems are self-norming and thus determine what 
structures are permissible for them to embody at what points in time. 
Context examines how other systems affect family development at a 
general level, while the third category, Functions, evaluates the speci¬ 
fic connections of a family and its context. The specific functions 
listed below are not claimed to be a complete view of a family's rela¬ 
tions with its context. One could punctuate a seemingly endless stream 
of functions and still sense that there is more that a family does to 
insure its survival. And more than any other category, the functions 
that an observer uses to evaluate a family reveals the observer's 
values. The five sets of complementary functions offered below are 
examples of the types of relationships a family engages in to survive. 
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The primary function of a family has been defined as generating its 
members' and species' reasons and abilities to survive. As well, a 
family co-creates its context. Such events as the exchange of meaning 
(communication), the selection of particular meanings (decision-making), 
and the restructuring of meaning (problem-solving) are basic processes a 
social system uses to maintain its autonomy and are not functions per 
se. The phenomenon of a subsystem differentiating itslef in a way that 
realigns the systems toward some goal (leadership) is also an autonomy 
maintaining process. Further, while punctuating different domains of 
system operation (cognitive, affective, instinctual, spiritual, et 
cetera) may be interesting, it is not necessary to describe the Func¬ 
tions which mediate between Structure and Context. How these processes 
operate is of relatively little concern as long as the Functions of a 
social system are fulfilled. All that having been said, the following 
five sets of complementary functions are by no means claimed to be an 
exhaustive description of a system's relation with its context. 
These functions, which are nearly self-explanatory, have previously 
been identified in Chapter V. The functions necessary for a family to 
fulfill in relation to its context include promoting differentiation and 
belonging, providing socialization and protection, insuring the growth 
of the system and the maintenance of boundaries. Further, a family must 
contribute to the survival of its context and simultaneously draw re¬ 
sources from the context for its own survival, and a family must fit its 
structure to its context, but also shape that context. While a family 
is a self-norming system, the adequacy of fulfilling these functions is 
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determined by negotiation between a family and its contexts. This 
recursive negotiation results in changes in both family and context. 
The suggested developmental assessment based on the FRM can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. STRUCTURE - a description of 
A. Organizational phase - in Generations, Life Course, Stage 
time frames with Episodic examples 
B. Relations of patterns of Interaction - historical 
sequence to present and types of coordination used to 
vake transitions 
C. Challenges or Events - issues of the near future, evalu¬ 
ated by developmental principles 
D. Directions or Consequences - the possible, multiple 
responses a family may make to intervention, interaction 
with other systems and other changes 
2. CONTEXT - The developmental impact of values and timing of 
A. Biosocial factors of individuals 
B. Totality of family meanings 
C. Culture and subculture 
D. Society 
3. FUNCTIONS - An evaluation of how a family promotes 
A. Belonging and differentiation 
B. Socialization and protection 
C. Growth of system and maintenance of boundaries 
D. Fitting and shaping context 
E. Contributing to and drawing from contextual resources 
Assessment Case Example 
The following case illustration did not use every possible tool 
that the assessment outline suggested, but certainly made use of enough 
to offer a picture of its utility. The assessment was done according to 
standards of the agency for which the work was done. Most of the cate¬ 
gories outlined should be apparent. First, the assessment will be 
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presented and then the comments of the therapist about the value of the 
assessment will be offered. The names have been changed to protect the 
confidentiality of the clients. 
Identifying information: The A family was referred to a public 
sector mental health center for therapy for their youngest boy, Gregory 
14, and for the family. The referral was made by Greg's probation 
officer. Greg is a Caucasian male who lives with his divorced mother 
Christine, 38, sister Karen, 18, brother Robert Jr., 17, and his mater¬ 
nal grandmother Joanne, 60. Greg's father, Robert Sr., is living with 
his sister, one town away where he works as a policeman. 
Presenting problems: Greg was referred for therapy to address 
problems of truancy and illegal behaviors. The illegal behavior in¬ 
cluded entering the home of an elderly woman and shooting out lights, 
windows, television, et cetera, and two weeks later hiding in a depart¬ 
ment store until after closing, then stealing a rifle and ammunition, 
shooting the rifle inside and being apprehended shooting the rifle out¬ 
side the store. Greg's father then came to the police station and 
returned him home. 
Greg and his mother argue frequently about who decides what Greg 
will do. Greg regularly wins these arguments. Greg's brother, Robbie, 
is also on probation for stealing guns and mopeds, and using marijuana. 
He is assigned to a state program that monitors the daily activity of 
adolescents. 
Relevant history: Robert Sr., whose one brother is a policeman. 
became a policeman in 1975. According to Christine, he then began 
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coming home late and spending time with other women and prostitutes. 
Robert and Christine got divorced in 1978. Robert was supportive as a 
father and had consistent contact with the kids until he and his ex-wife 
could not resolve a child support conflict in 1981. Shortly after 
Robert began to withdraw from his sons, Robbie was first caught for 
theft. In 1983, with the child support conflict still unresolved, Greg 
and Robbie began new episodes of illegal activities. 
Family assessment: Several events over the past ten years indicate 
that this family is in a contracting phase of development both in their 
life course and in the extended (generational) family. 
In looking at the generational organization some key episodes have 
been the deaths of three of Greg's grandparents over a four year perod. 
His paternal grandfather died in 1979 of cirrhosis of the liver. His 
paternal grandmother died in 1982 of a heart attack. His maternal 
grandfather died in 1981 of lung cancer and also suffered from alcohol¬ 
ism. Further evidence that this extended (generational) family is con¬ 
tracting is that Christine's mother has moved into her home since the 
grandfather's death and Robert moved in with his sister shortly after 
the divorce. In the face of shrinking membership the family has drawn 
together, but they don't appear to have restructured themselves yet in 
the face of these deaths. 
In the life course of the A family unit, evidence of the contract¬ 
ing process is that Karen and Robbie are both considering leaving home. 
Although the arguments involving Greg and his mother sometimes focus on 
him leaving the home, he probably will be there for several more years. 
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One gets the sense from this family that "the good old days" are over 
and people are waiting to get on to the next stage in their lives. The 
divorce, a natural contracting process, never seems to have been com¬ 
pleted. Christine presents herself more as an estranged wife, with 
jealousy and anger toward Robert, rather than a divorced mother who is 
living her own life and parenting her children with her ex-husband. In 
their current stage this family has had difficulty establishing the 
rules of the contracting phase. The contracting episodes in the genera¬ 
tional family and in the life course of this family unit, seem to make 
it difficult for them to establish new growth and expansion. 
The illegal activities can be viewed as a pattern of interaction 
which assists the parents in resolving several issues of the divorce. 
On the one hand the illegal activities bring Robert back into the pic¬ 
ture and on the other hand they require Christine and Robert to renego¬ 
tiate, at some level, their new positions of parents who are still 
parents together, yet divorced. Another pattern relevant to this case 
is the theme of cops, robbers, guns and molls. The term molls, a female 
accomplice in crime, is used because both mother and grandmother ex¬ 
pressed ambivalence about the boys' therapy and court appointments to 
the extent that they had "forgotten" to tell Greg about one court date, 
complained that Robbie's monitoring program was bad for him, and didn't 
support Greg in attending the adolescent activities program probation 
had assigned. The complaints could be valid, but they show that deci¬ 
sions are made by default. Guns seem to be important because they link 
the "molls" with the "cops." Both boys were involved in stealing guns. 
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Guns allowed the boys to talk about the police, particularly their 
father. Robert Sr. is rarely discussed in the family unit and several 
times at family meetings to even bring up his name was to elicit a 
distracting response such as Robbie leaving the room. All these inter¬ 
actions are evidence that the family makes decisions by default and thus 
have had problems restructuring themselves in the face of the contract- 
ing episodes. 
One of the themes which becomes more vivid in looking at this fam¬ 
ily over several generations is that sex determines destiny. In this 
family it seems as if women are strong and competent, and that men are 
weak and passive. In family meetings, the boys, who have had no diffi¬ 
culty in being aggressive in other settings, are passive and defer to 
either their mother or grandmother. For generations and on both sides 
of the family, men have underfunctioned and been alcoholic, or criminal¬ 
ly involved. This multi-generational pattern of gender determining 
destiny could be a cultural influence from either the paternal side 
which was Scottish or the maternal side, which was Swedish. 
This family is clearly in conflict with the values of its societal 
context, which is made all the more interesting by the fact that a num¬ 
ber of family members are or have been policemen, charged with enforcing 
society's values. Further, the boys began independently engaging in 
"grown up" activities (guns) well before the accepted time. 
Some very significant events which face the family are the deaths 
of the three grandparents and an uncle. It seems as if the deaths of 
the three grandparents were mourned inadequately due in part to the 
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divorces. The family is still struggling with knowing how the meaning 
of these deaths affects their relationships with each other and what 
family values can be passed on from them. One gets the sense that the 
richness and benefits of the grandparents' lives have not been passed on 
to other family interactions. It is very tough for Christine and Robert 
to complete their divorce and for Karen and Robbie to leave home. Given 
the strong contracting influences it will be difficult for people to 
move on in their lives until there is some sort of agreement about the 
meanings of these events of the past ten years. 
Useful directions to explore in therapy might include: 
(1) Exploring with Christine unresolved divorce issues between she and 
Robert, helping them to form a "contract" about their divorce. A 
consequence of not working through the divorce issues would be that 
the memory of the "good old days" would be preserved. If they were 
to come to agreement and Robert were to become more appropriately 
involved with the family, it would run the risk of a new history 
being developed, which may not be as special as the current his¬ 
tory. 
(2) Pursuing with the family the differences and similarities between 
\en and women toward exposing the myth that "gender determines des¬ 
tiny." Again, this runs the risk of changing the family's self¬ 
perceptions, which are very deeply rooted in family and cultural 
history. 
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(3) Giving assignments to the family to talk about the special contri¬ 
butions that the deceased grandparents have made to them. This 
would be particularly helpful if the grandmother, who was also 
divorced, could be involved, asking her to tell stories and anec- 
dotes. 
Treatment plan: Individual therapy as indicated, group therapy on 
a bi-weekly basis to promote positive peer relationships and prevent re¬ 
occurrence of illegal activities. Family therapy on a bi-weekly basis, 
or as indicated to address the above directions. 
The content of this developmental assessment was based on the FRM 
meta-model, while the narrative form was standard for the agency for 
which the therapist worked. The therapist quite fully addressed the 
categories of Structure and Context. The issues identified under Func¬ 
tions were not directly expressed, although they are implicit. Some 
professionals may question the frequent use of "it seems . . ." and 
other similar phrases, but from the FRM perspective it is precisely what 
is required as it is a reminder that an observer has a partial and dif¬ 
ferent view than the actual experience of the family. The treatment 
plan is not unusual in any way, but the premises which guide the treat¬ 
ment are unique to the FRM. Following are a number of questions and 
answers from an interview with the therapist who did the assessment. 
Question: How did the FRM assessment tool help you in understand¬ 
ing this case? 
Answer: In general, it helped me organize a lot of information 
into a structure. Initially, there was so much diverse information I 
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didn't know what to do with it. It pulled a lot of facts together and 
made it easy to make them meaningful. I would have missed some impor- 
tant things without it. 
Q: Can you be more specific? 
A: Well, for one, all the contracting stuff I would have missed, 
like the death of the grandparents. And that the father moving in with 
his sister and the grandmother (moving in) with the mother were, along 
with the deaths, all part of the same contracting pattern. Not until I 
started using this developmental model could I look at the deaths and 
divorces and find a meaningful explanation for those interactions. 
Also, the model somehow helped me recognize that the golden days were 
over for this family, that there was a sense of emptiness that had to be 
addressed. . . . Some of the pieces I had somewhat of a handle on, but 
the model helped clarify a number of themes, like "sex determines des¬ 
tiny" and how guns pulled the family together. It (the FRM) made it a 
lot easier to look at cultural variables, because those themes were very 
much a part of the family's culture. . . . From a biological point of 
view, the kids should be in consolidating/diversifying phase, but psy¬ 
chologically, given all the contracting going on, the evidence said that 
the kids were on the way out of the home earlier than they might normal¬ 
ly be. ... I saw that this family was stuck and unable to establish 
rules for the contracting phase of their lives. 
Q: Did this understanding affect how you intervened with this 
family? 
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A: Definitely. I don't know if you can really quantify it, but I 
felt that it contributed to about 60% of the directions. It was unlike¬ 
ly that they would've been there without the model. . . . Specifically, 
from this information (on the contracting phase) I could ask, how the 
deceased grandparents had helped your family. And how were men and 
women similar and different? The emphasis on the positive and other 
techniques were there from other family therapy training, but the parti¬ 
cular questions came from the model. . . . Without this understanding I 
would have just focused on the divorce, which hadn't gotten that far. 
... The model helped me focus on the importance of contracting-both 
the loss of members and marriages, and the need for agreements for the 
future. 
Q: So, do you think this influenced the results of the therapy? 
A. Yes, the answers to the questions about men and women were use¬ 
ful. It helped the family recognize the pattern on their own. I think 
they also recognized, in some way, as I did, that the deaths of the 
grandparents were not mourned due to the divorces and with both kinds of 
contracting episodes going on (deaths and divorces) it made it very 
difficult to grow into a new system. The most important result was that 
the long term disagreement over child support was resolved. There now 
is more regular and appropriate contact between the father and kids. 
The kids are also free to call him. I terminated very successfully with 
them. 
Q: What do you think the overall value of the FRM is? 
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A: I really like the model. I think it can be the basis for a 
whole new school of family therapy. . . . More than any other model it 
simplifies more information about families more effectively and meaning¬ 
fully. It's the best hat rack I've found to hang my ideas on and it has 
just the right places to hang hats on-l've never been as consci¬ 
ous of cultural variables as I have been with this model and that's a 
valuable learning. ... It can be applied to any kind of social system. 
• • . This model gives a breadth of understanding with clarity and sim- 
pl i city. 
This particular application of the FRM strongly emphasized the 
generational family as the context for the experience of the specific 
family unit. This was an unexpected emphasis in this case which re¬ 
sulted from the model. However, one does not have to examine a family 
in its totality to gain full utility from the FRM. A brief therapist 
could observe a family interacting only in the Episodic time frame of a 
single therapy session and conclude, for example, that this family can 
adequately establish rules about a particular subject, but in the next 
interactional phase their tolerance for diversifying from those rules is 
very limited. To be more specific, after there is an agreement and one 
member starts to act on it, another member indicates that action is out 
of bounds of the established rules. This family will spend much of its 
time confirming its consolidated rules and little successful efforts at 
introducing novelty needed to provide vitality to those consolidated 
rules. Further, this brief therapist could notice in the next session 
that this family reaches initial agreement rather quickly, but continues 
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to focus on the subject until disagreement emerges. Given the small 
tolerance for diversity, this family, the observer notes, cannot agree 
to disagree. This starts the search for agreement and confirmation all 
over again and provides some small measure of novelty for the system. 
This abstract example is a brief indication of how variably the FRM 
can be applied. It can be applied to any social system, but must be 
fitted to the system in question and will reflect the values of the 
observer. One more brief example will serve to illustrate. 
The FRM was recently used to assess and prescribe directions for 
the clinical program of a state funded mental health center. Beginning 
four years ago a new Clinical Director implemented a new clinical treat- 
ment model. There was no unified model operating prior to that. 
Current and new staff worked diligently at understanding and applying 
the model over the four years until they developed expertise. At a 
recent agency-wide meeting all agreed that the clinical model was the 
strongest aspect of the agency. There were, however, many complaints 
about the administration of the agency focusing on the administrative 
efforts of the Executive and the Clinical Director. This led the Clini¬ 
cal Director and the two other administrators over him to conclude that 
since the clinical model had been successfully established that the 
efforts of the Clinical Director in the future should be primarily 
administrative. On the surface this makes some sense, but in light of 
the FRM it could spell disaster for the clinical model. 
The clinical model has just completed its establishing phase and is 
about to embark upon a consolidating/diversifying phase. Referring to 
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the diagrams of the FRM, the establishing phase represents one temporal 
level in the life of the agency. The life of the agency, which is 13 
years old, is represented on a broader temporal level. Underneath the 
establishing phase of the clinical model is a complete cycle of sub- 
phases—establishing, consolidating/diversifying, contracting. When the 
agency staff agreed that they were happy with a clinical model that was 
a "contract of meaning" that signaled the completion of the establishing 
phase. As the clinical program moves into the consolidating/diversify¬ 
ing phase it will diversify around whatever meanings form the center of 
its identity. If those meanings suddenly shift from their clinical 
strength to an administrative emphasis, then the clinical program will 
diversify into a mushy eclecticism. Further, as a new interactional 
phase begins the first subphase is establishing, which prescribes the 
predominance of novelty. If administration is the core emphasis, then a 
plethora of new administrative policies, procedures and paperwork can be 
expected. If, however, the clinical model is recognized as the strength 
of the agency and it continues to be the center of its identity, then a 
new round of clinical innovation is called for. This innovation would 
elaborate the current model, not be a radical departure from it, as 
diversification refers to the consolidated identity of the system for 
its guidelines. Both the clinical director and one of his superiors 
agreed that this analysis provided a useful perspective on the future of 
the clinical program and the agency as a whole. 
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There are many other ways that the FRM 
require years to understand which situations 
can be applied, but it will 
can benefit the most from 
it. 
As the preceding application examples should make clear, the FRM is 
more a conceptual tool than an empirical one. Its value lies in the 
subjective judgments of those who use it as a guide. It can be sub¬ 
jected to empirical tests, but those tests would indicate the variabil¬ 
ity of those subjective judgments. There is no intrinsic truth to this 
meta-model, as it is just one possible punctuation of the development of 
social systems. In the perspective of this study, this is not seen as a 
weakness, but a strength consistent with the assumptions of the study. 
This is an heuristic device whose value will be determined by the thera- 
pists who use it. 
The FRM is a meta-model of family development that is capable of 
describing the development of any social system. It portrays develop¬ 
ment in a unique fashion, as its phases are represented by verbs and 
oriented to interaction, rather than titled by nouns that suggest the 
static stages of many other theories. Initially, this emphasis on 
recursive interaction makes the FRM appear fuzzy to someone used to the 
more static perspective of other theories. This meta-model was designed 
to more adequately account for the diversity of structure and complexity 
of process of American families than the current developmental framework 
for family therapy, the FLC. It was also intended to do it in a manner 
congruent with the systemic theory base of family therapy. It is 
claimed here that it more than adequately meets all of those criteria 
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constructed in such a way to add another important feature. The 
™ is a tool for an observer to indicate what they see, not whatis 
occurring in the observed system. This distinction is vital if social 
theory is to understand its effect on the observed. 
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